Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings by Naval War College, The U.S.
U.S. Naval War College 
U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons 
International Seapower Symposium Events 
10-2009 
Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the 
Proceedings 
The U.S. Naval War College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/iss 
Recommended Citation 
Naval War College, The U.S., "Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings" 
(2009). International Seapower Symposium. 4. 
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/iss/4 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Events at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in International Seapower Symposium by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval 





















The editor has made every attempt to establish a clear and accurate record of the
symposium proceedings, one that faithfully records the opinions and views of the
participants. In establishing the printed text from speaking notes, transcripts, sem-
inar notes, and tape recordings of speakers or of the official English-language
simultaneous translators, the editor has silently corrected slips of grammar, spell-
ing, and wording. He has inserted full names and ranks when omitted by the
speaker, and occasionally a word or phrase in square brackets to clarify the text.
The editor acknowledges with great appreciation the tremendously valuable
support and assistance of John W. Kennedy, in listening to the tapes and helping to
prepare the final text for publication, and the assistance of the Naval War College’s
Visual Communications Department with its Desktop Publishing unit, particularly
Lori Melissa Cameron and Ken DeRouin, for composition and layout, and
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The Honorable Hillary Clinton
Secretary of State
Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Honorable Hillary Clinton:
[Live Video Teleconference from the State Department, Washington, D.C.]
I am very honored to be able to address you today here at the largest gathering ofnaval leaders in history. The efforts you are undertaking to advance mutual in-
terests and collective security are essential to effectively addressing some of the
most important issues we face in this interconnected world of the twenty-first
century.
Trust and cooperation between navies and coast guards have always been key
enablers of diplomacy. Your efforts to promote international cooperation on issues
such as piracy, smuggling, natural disasters, and other threats enhance the security
not only of your nation but of all nations, and strengthening our maritime partner-
ships have become even more critical in this century.
Globalization has generated transnational challenges that don’t recognize bor-
ders or nation-states. No one nation has the resources or capacity to meet these
challenges alone. As President Obama made clear at the United Nations General
Assembly last month, the need for cooperation among states has never been more
urgent and your efforts on the seas of our world more vital.
From the Joint Interagency Task Force South to counterpiracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden to the many other joint maritime partnerships, you have contributed to
the robust and expanding international cooperation that we so desperately need. On
behalf of President Obama and the American people, thank you for your service and
for your collective efforts toward a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous world.
Associate Dean for International Programs Vincent Mocini, Naval War College:
At this time, it’s my pleasure to introduce the President of the Naval War College.
After graduating in 1977 from the Naval Academy, he earned graduate degrees
from the University of Southern California and from the University of Strasbourg,
France, where he studied as an Olmsted Scholar. He’s had various commands, in-
cluding sea service during OPERATION DESERT STORM and later [as] Commander
of Destroyer Squadron 21. Ashore, he served at NATO Headquarters and was a
Fellow in the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. He was also Di-
rector of the White House Situation Room. His first assignment as a flag officer was
as Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea and he most recently served as Commander
of Strike Group 7, the USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group.
As you can see, he comes to this job with extensive experience, both national and
international. At this time, I’m pleased to introduce the fifty-second President of
the Naval College, Rear Admiral Phil Wisecup.
Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, United States:
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to Newport and to the Naval War College, cele-
brating our 125th anniversary yesterday. To some of you, I must add, welcome
back. You have traveled far to gather in this room and engage with your contempo-
raries who lead the world’s navies. We meet here on the banks of the Narragansett
Bay in our newly renovated auditorium named, as you know, after Raymond
Spruance, the famous U.S. naval leader who served as the 26th President of this
Naval War College, then retired to become U.S. ambassador to the Philippines
some sixty years ago.
Forty years ago in 1969, at the first Seapower Symposium, held in Mahan Hall,
right here in Newport, Admiral Richard C. Colbert, then President of the Naval
War College, welcomed the leaders of the world navies. The keynote speaker was
Arleigh Burke, then retired, who was the longest-serving CNO in the history of the
U.S. Navy. Present were eighty high-ranking navy representatives of thirty-seven
different countries, including twenty chiefs or deputy chiefs. Today, we gather at
this Nineteenth Seapower Symposium with leaders from over one hundred navies
of the world, including more than ninety chiefs of navies. When you consider the
fact that there are also other distinguished senior American civilian and military
leaders in this room and selected members of the War College faculty and staff, I
think you will agree with me that Admiral Arleigh Burke would certainly be pleased
today.
After that first symposium, many of those delegates who attended sent letters to
the President of the Naval War College. Looking at these letters, we see the pro-
found effect the symposium had on officers from around the world. We have put a
few of their remarks into some posters commemorating the fortieth anniversary of
the International Seapower Symposium. I invite you to look at these posters that
are displayed in the lobby and at the Officers’ Club with quoted remarks from many
of the officers who described their impressions.
Again, it is an honor and pleasure to welcome you and your spouses to the Naval
War College and to this symposium. Anne and I really enjoyed meeting most of you
last night and look forward to the opportunity to spend time with you over the next
three days.
I’m particularly pleased to note the many alumni of this college, [who have]
graduated from our Naval Command College or the Naval Staff College. Of this
number today, some are now serving chiefs of their own navies. To all our former
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students, you came to Newport years ago, recommended by your service chiefs as
future leaders, expected to do great work and lead your service into the future. The
fact that you are here is clear proof that you have done so. Congratulations on your
success and welcome back to Newport.
We hope all officers in this room, both alumni and nonalumni, will join us to-
night at the Officers’ Club for a reception in honor of the returning alumni and the
more than eighty officers from fifty-plus countries who make up this year’s group of
international officers.
You here today are the senior leaders of the greatest navies, coast guards, and
maritime services in the world. The cut and color of our uniforms may vary, as do
the languages and the cultures of all the participants, but we all have a common set
of bonds that will always link us together. These include an understanding and re-
spect for the sea that comes only to those mariners who have challenged the oceans
throughout their careers, a commitment to service and sacrifice in support of our
own nations, and a desire to work collectively with friends and partners to solve
common problems.
It is this desire to improve our nations’ security through cooperation and collab-
oration that lies at the heart of the International Seapower Symposium series. For
four decades, the leaders of the world’s seafaring nations have gathered on the
shores of historic Narragansett Bay to share ideas, strengthen cooperation and
friendship, and plan for the future.
We can all agree that the world has changed since first meeting forty years ago.
Tremendous political, social, and economic changes and, in some cases, upheavals
have occurred. It has been an interesting time, for sure, to be a naval officer.
The title of our symposium is Connecting Navies, Building Partnerships. In the next
three days, we will look at some ways that the navies and coast guards help ensure
peace, promote prosperity, and provide maritime security. The importance of en-
hancing maritime domain awareness and maritime security has never been
greater. This symposium underlines the value of sharing experiences and consid-
ering new ideas. We sit in this room as equals, looking at the same issues, while we
develop this habit of partnership. The ideas you’re willing to share are of value, no
matter if you’re from a nation large or small, from a blue-water or a littoral navy or
a coast guard, we all share this planet together. Open discussion and full participa-
tion by all is encouraged—no, it’s expected—and this indeed promises to be a
rewarding three days.
Over the years, the achievements of these symposia have not been limited to or
even entirely expressed in the printed record of academic discussions. Over the
forty years devoted to building a global network among maritime service profes-
sionals, the main achievements in these symposia have been created through the
friendships made or revived between professional officers—the personal camara-
derie, conversations in the corridor, general ideas exchanged and, later, turned
into concrete action in some other more specific context.
We can, however, point to a number of issues which were either related to or de-
rived from this series of meetings. For example, these include the growth of
regional arrangements, such as the Inter-American Naval Conference, the Western
Pacific Naval Symposia, the Black Sea–Mediterranean Regional Symposia, the In-
dian Ocean Naval Symposium, and the African Sea Power Symposium, just as
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examples. Other examples of progress include the fact that many navies have been
cooperating extensively to enhance global maritime domain awareness and to pro-
vide enhanced maritime security from piracy, smuggling, and other criminal acts.
Participation at ISS has grown steadily over the years and I believe this year’s
event may, in fact, be the largest gathering of naval leaders in history. It is momen-
tous; it is unprecedented.
Let me conclude by saying we’re glad you’re here; we hope you brought family.
CNO, Admiral Roughead, many thanks to you for being so supportive and for sup-
porting the renovation of this wonderful facility here in Spruance Hall. The Naval
War College is at your service.
Admiral Gary Roughead, United States:
Admiral Wisecup, Phil, thank you so much for the introduction and congratula-
tions to you and to your staff and to the many men and women who make possible
events like this, for the War College to be able to host another historic moment,
here in Newport, Rhode Island. I would also add my congratulations on the 125th
anniversary of the Naval War College. I’m sure that it’s only the beginning of a
great future that will take place here. And I also commend you on finishing this au-
ditorium in time for the International Seapower Symposium. But as the last varia-
tion of the auditorium was referred to by so many of the students who have gone
through here as the “blue bedroom,” they’ll have to get a new name for this. So
maybe we’ll take a poll at the end and we’ll decide on what it should be.
I regret that we have had to change the program a bit. Regrettably, I have to re-
turn to Washington tonight for a brief meeting and then I will return again in the
morning, but that is what’s driving the change in the schedule and I appreciate
your flexibility and your understanding of what is driving that.
But it is indeed a great honor for me to welcome this truly extraordinary assem-
bly of colleagues and friends from around the world and I thank you for making the
effort to travel all this way. I know how busy each of you [is] and the responsibilities
that you have and to take this time to be able to come the distances that you have is
so very important and I thank you for that.
I’m also confident that the weather at the end of the symposium will be better
than it has been in the past. I think [at] one of the most recent ones, we had a lot of
snow delays as people were trying to leave, but I do believe we’re in for a tremen-
dous week here at the International Seapower Symposium.
I would like to begin this conference by reflecting for a moment on the impor-
tance of our meeting. At this largest gathering of naval leaders in history, we here
today represent our countries’ efforts not only to defend our respective maritime
interests and our shores, but also to secure the global maritime commons at a time
of great challenge. The stakes are massive: our activities—individually and in
partnership—are vital to future generations.
Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly two weeks ago, my com-
mander in chief, President Barack Obama, underscored the need for cooperative
efforts to address the world’s problems. As I stand before you today, I am humbled
to associate myself with fellow mariners and leaders, who are already well advanced
in building invigorated partnerships around the world to address many of the very
problems the president and other world leaders cited.
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In the four decades since the first International Seapower Symposium, and espe-
cially in the two years since the last symposium, we have all become increasingly
mindful of the centrality of partnership to the preservation of safety and security of
the world’s oceans and the prosperity that comes from that. We have launched a
range of initiatives in recent years and, at this conference, we will assess yet more
opportunities before us. I believe that we, as maritime service chiefs, are on the cut-
ting edge of international partnership, and I do believe that we must challenge
ourselves in ISS Nineteen to think expansively about how our mutual efforts can
safeguard international peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century.
In the time since the first International Seapower Symposium, in 1969, the year
that I entered my Naval Academy and began this wonderful voyage that I have been
on, the world has changed dramatically. In so many ways, it is a better place. None-
theless, in the maritime security area, it faces many new and, in some cases, more
difficult challenges. Through the decades since International Seapower Sympo-
sium number one, however, this symposium has endured and prospered, because
its purpose has held fast. A purpose which, in the words used at that first gathering,
is “to promote mutual understanding of our common problems and interests, as
well as each other’s problems and interests.” That enduring principle—that we
should come together to discuss our common interests and overcome our common
challenges—has driven our achievements over the years. As Rear Admiral Ahmed
from Bangladesh said recently at another conference that I was privileged to at-
tend, “it is the sea that unites.” And over the past two years, it certainly has. These
past two years have been more remarkable in terms of global maritime partner-
ships than the preceding thirty-eight years all together.
Today, we welcome six nations to their first International Seapower Symposium:
Cambodia, Guyana, the Maldives, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Russia, and Viet-
nam, who are represented for the first time by delegations from their home
countries and we are very pleased that you have joined us. [Applause] Together
with you, our distinguished group makes a total of over one hundred nations and
over ninety chiefs of service—the largest assembly yet and nearly three times the
number who came together in 1969. The trend is clear—partnerships are growing.
They are growing because they work, and they will continue to grow because there
is still more to do in our changing and uncertain world.
So thank you for coming, thanks to all of you for making this symposium a pro-
ductive gathering of navies and maritime forces. There is much happening in the
maritime domain, much for us to do, and I am confident that this event helps us all
to come closer to our common goals of safety and security of the seas.
When I last stood before you at this symposium two years ago, my counterparts
in the United States Marine Corps and in the United States Coast Guard [and I] un-
veiled the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” That strategy, with
conflict prevention and international partnerships at its core, has served our navy
and our nation exceedingly well and continues to guide our thoughts, our plans,
and our actions, leading our navy and maritime services. Our task is to prevent con-
flict whenever possible, while being ready to fight for our interests should
prevention fail. For now, we may still ask our young sailors to go into harm’s way,
and we must do so responsibly, according to strategies that meet the demands of to-
day’s world and the needs of our countries.
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One of the central ideas in the U.S. maritime strategy is Global Maritime Part-
nership. The U.S. services’ interest in Global Maritime Partnership stems from our
desire to seek out cooperative approaches to maritime security and promoting the
rule of law. President Obama reminded leaders in New York that no single country
can remedy the great problems of the day. The challenges to maritime security of-
fer some of the clearest demonstrations of this point: there are many of them and
no one country can adequately confront them alone. Hence, we stand together
here in Newport this day.
Trust, personal trust, is indispensable to partnerships of any kind. As I asserted
here two years ago, trust cannot be surged. With that as my guiding principle, I
have spent the past two years traveling the globe, meeting with many of you and
learning from your experiences, so that I can better understand your concerns and
proposals to make the maritime domain a safer place. I must tell you that one of the
most exciting things I confirmed in my travels is that the desire for partnerships ex-
ists across all of our services and our nations, and that we are all in good and rich
company as we seek to promote maritime partnerships around the planet.
In preparing for this symposium, I’ve reflected with gratitude on the hospitality
of my fellow mariners around the world and my respect for their cutting-edge ap-
proaches to the world’s problems. In the last two years, I’ve attended the Chiefs of
European Navies Conference in Bulgaria, the Regional Seapower Symposium in It-
aly, and the Maritime Planners’ Conference in Denmark; and in between, I was able
to spend some time with the Royal Navy.
I visited the kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates,
Iraq and Pakistan and Djibouti.
And though I was unable to attend the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, be-
cause of commitments here at home, I have visited Japan and Singapore and South
Korea. I attended Indonesia’s SAIL BUNAKEN Fleet Review and in China, the
sixtieth anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
I journeyed to Chile, where I participated in EXPO NAVAL. I made the first U.S.
counterpart visit to South Africa, where I was greatly impressed by the professional-
ism and spirit of South Africa’s proud navy. In the next two years, I hope it will be
convenient to visit with more of you in your countries, and I will be honored to host
you here in the United States. Our personal relationships are the first step in the
trust I mentioned before. If we are to develop those habits of partnership that are
so fundamental to our effective cooperation then our personal relationships are an
investment in that future. Indeed, in those moments when disaster or crisis de-
mands the most from us, our relationships may yet pay the highest dividend.
Speaking for myself and for my navy, therefore, the principle of partnership is at
the core of our maritime strategy and our approach to the world. Fortunately, the
U.S. Navy is not alone in that regard. Maritime services around the world are dem-
onstrating inspired leadership and launching naval partnerships to meet common
challenges. These efforts confirm that there need be no contradiction between de-
fending our countries’ sovereign rights and sailing together against the common
threats to our welfare.
Just to cite a few examples of these efforts, the Strait of Malacca patrols by Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have drastically reduced piracy in those
waterways. Then there’s the newly deployed Economic Community of Central
6 Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium
African States, which has agreed to work together on patrolling waters of mutual in-
terest and to monitor an Operations Center in Cameroon. Another remarkable
and unique example of regional partnership is the Coral Triangle Initiative, an im-
portant environmental program that has gained global support and addresses an
issue of consequence for all of us.
This list is hardly comprehensive and I’m sure that when we meet again in two
years’ time the record of global maritime partnership will have grown substantially
larger. In assessing the fruits of partnership, I think it is also important to consider
briefly the progress we have made in addressing particular tasks. Information shar-
ing and the pursuit of maritime domain awareness remain key focus[es] of our work
together, and I’m deeply satisfied to observe that we have made important gains
over the past two years. For example, navies from the Americas have participated
in advancing the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network (IANTN), a
secure regional communications system.
In another part of the world, Italy has demonstrated vital leadership in establish-
ing a Trans-Regional Maritime Network. Our goal should now be to bridge the
regional security awareness initiatives in support of yet broader awareness and
partnerships.
Besides information sharing, we must also work toward greater interoperability.
There are many ways to improve our interoperability and lessons learned of how to
work together. Those lessons start, again, at the personal level.
At ISS Eighteen, I shared with you my view that we should encourage the interac-
tion of our young sailors, noncommissioned officers, and officers. I do not think we
can overestimate the lasting benefit of such contact, and—in an age of instant com-
munication and, even imperfect, translation software—we have an unparalleled
opportunity to ensure that the naval chiefs a generation from now will have known
each other since their earliest days at sea, regardless of distance or language
differences.
Common training also contributes powerfully to interoperability. My navy has
worked hard in this area and we will continue to do so. Since 2001, for instance, we
have hosted eighty-seven students from sixteen countries in the International Sur-
face Warfare Department Head Course here in Newport. This past summer, sixty-
two U.S. midshipmen deployed with seventeen foreign navies and the United
States, in turn, hosted sixty-seven foreign midshipmen. And the master chief petty
officer of the U.S. Navy hosted a Global Maritime Senior Enlisted Symposium in
Hawaii after a similar symposium in New Zealand, where more than forty nations
attended. Master Chief West, my master chief petty officer of the Navy, is sched-
uled to next attend the Western Pacific Naval Symposium for senior sailors in
Japan in two weeks. So I believe there, too, we are moving in the right direction.
I am also pleased to announce that we’re taking the next step in furthering the
interaction of our people and our cooperative planning for the future. As we have
shown in the past, a well-developed process of operational gaming provides credi-
ble, relevant, and timely information to decision makers. Accordingly, we are going
to conduct the first-ever force-planning game [which] is linked to ISS and [to be]
held in the years between these symposiums. Therefore, next October, we will have
a game with our international partners that will be informed by the results of this
symposium and seeks to address the needs of our partners.
7
Our encounters on land are very important, but there is no substitute for refin-
ing and exercising interoperability under way. USS Cole’s deployment with the
Royal Navy’s HMS Illustrious strike group, for instance, rendered invaluable les-
sons. We can also learn interoperability from combined training exercises that
range from the innovative Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program to the UNITAS
exercise, which, this year, included twelve nations from North and South America
and Europe.
Such lessons can be learned through humanitarian assistance and disaster re-
sponse initiatives, as we saw dramatically in the tsunami disaster relief operation in
2004. The U.S. Navy today stands ready to participate in relief assistance with other
navies for those people affected by earthquake, tsunami, flooding, and typhoons.
And my deepest condolences go out to the victims of these recent natural disasters.
Ultimately, the time we spend learning and improving interoperability is time
well spent when it comes to issues of maritime security. The Joint Interagency Task
Force South is a partnership that has achieved interoperability and leverages the
unique capabilities of each partner. Task Force 150 also stands out as an example
of a developed, mature partnership that is making an important difference in the
Middle East. The Pakistan Navy has made a particular impact there since 2004,
where it has led that task force three times. But there is perhaps no better example
today of maritime partnerships than the work so many of us are doing against
piracy—a navy’s oldest foe—in the Gulf of Aden. The presence there of navies from
all over the world is truly unprecedented and very much needed for a security chal-
lenge that affects such a large ocean area.
So we have made remarkable progress over the past two years and while we
should and have every right to be proud, we must recognize that there are many
more opportunities ahead of us—opportunities that will occur naturally, opportu-
nities that we will create, and opportunities that we can realize only through our
mutual efforts.
I look forward to spending time with all of you throughout this symposium. I
look forward to the rich and important discussions that we will have. And I look for-
ward to working with all of you to develop and bring to fruition the ideas that will
improve maritime security for all. Above all, I look forward to connecting navies
and building partnerships.
I invite you to consider our efforts in historic context. Common use of the high
seas has been a driver of international cooperation and institution building for cen-
turies. Today in the early years of the twenty-first century, I am convinced that our
new partnerships—informal, as well as formal, local as well as global—are writing a
new chapter in the development of international society.
As we begin this conference, I offer two quotes that I think are especially relevant
to our endeavors. The first is from the Indonesian Maritime Forum in August of
this year, where Vice Admiral Nolting made the bold but unassailable assertion that
the twenty-first century will be a maritime one. I couldn’t agree more with my good
friend and partner. Second, Vice Admiral Colbert, then President of the Naval War
College, at the first International Seapower Symposium, in 1969, stated the follow-
ing: “This common experience, this common bond . . . can provide the catalyst for
friendly, cooperative examination. With the unprecedented wealth of talent and
experience mustered here, we may well shed fresh light on current problems and
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potential difficulties and, perhaps, even bring forth previously unrecognized issues
of mutual interest.”
That sounds remarkably familiar to what someone could say today.
And if the original members of the first International Seapower Symposium
were optimistic in 1969, when only thirty-seven countries were present, then today,
with over one-hundred countries in attendance, we have very, very firm ground to
truly believe that on our watch, we will carry forward our mission of improving the
security of the global maritime commons in the interest of peace and prosperity for





The Honorable Ray Mabus
Secretary of the Navy
Admiral Gary Roughead, United States:
It is now my distinct pleasure to be able to introduce our first speaker and theseventy-fifth Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus. Secretary Mabus
has led a life of service in numerous government roles. He was the governor of our
great state of Mississippi from 1988 to 1992, and later, he served as the ambassador
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1994 to 1996. But perhaps for us here, one of
the most important points of his career was that he, too, has worn the uniform of a
naval officer early in his life in service to his country, aboard the USS Little Rock, one
of our cruisers, forty years ago. But I [can] also tell you, in working closely with him,
that he is a principled leader who has a personal appreciation for the importance of
the seas and of the maritime forces and that he has true concern and regard for that
which all of us hold most precious: the young men and women who serve in our na-
vies, our coast guards and in the maritime services—those young men and women
that we ask to go forward and do the hard work of our countries. So, ladies and gen-
tlemen, it is a great honor and privilege for me to introduce the Secretary of the
Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus.
[Applause]
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus:
Thank you to Admiral Roughead for that introduction, but also, personally, [I
thank] Admiral Roughead—I am so fortunate to have him to serve as the CNO,
while I am secretary. America is fortunate to have Gary Roughead serving as our
CNO and the world is fortunate to have him, because of things like this, because of
his interest in the world and in our maritime security.
To the distinguished leaders of the world’s navies, thank you for being here to-
day at the War College and thank you for having me here today. Just on another
very short, personal note, yesterday was my wedding anniversary and I was in New
York for a television appearance on a comedy show and the show was not taped un-
til last night. So I took my wife to New York with me—wanting to have more
anniversaries—and we didn’t go out to dinner until pretty late. After dinner—we
have three children and they were all with us—we went out and got dessert. So last
night was a late night and I apologize for any lack of energy this morning, but I
thought that observing my anniversary was maybe the most important thing for my
well-being in the future. So thank you, thank you for having me.
You know, for 125 years this War College has served as an international profes-
sional university where our officers and officers from around the world have come
together, learned from each other, and worked together to address the issues of
our day. A lot of you know this from experience, having attended as students here.
To you I say welcome back to Newport and to the War College. To those of you for
whom this is a first visit, welcome to Newport. It’s an honor for me to be here, to
participate in this continuing legacy. It’s even a greater honor to be the only civilian
granted the privilege of addressing you. The obligation to be a good speaker is not
lost on me and following our CNO is never, ever an easy task.
The CNO mentioned that early in my life I served as a naval officer, and I served
here. My ship was homeported about a mile from here and I went in and out of
Newport numerous times and I am glad to be back here and particularly glad to be
back with you, because, looking around this room, the depth of experience and the
depth of talent represented here is simply incredible. You collectively hold more
than 3,200 years of maritime experience. That’s why this symposium is so impor-
tant and why, as a civilian leader of America’s Navy and Marine Corps, I want to
talk about where the United States Navy fits into the global maritime community,
as well as address some of the challenges that I see that confront us as an assembly
of nations.
Your presence here at this symposium clearly demonstrates that the bonds of na-
val service and the bonds of mutual respect transcend national boundaries. This
forum is critical to maintaining open lines of communications across borders and
across political divides. It is these face-to-face meetings and the personal relation-
ships that are started or strengthened here that will bear fruit in our dealings with
one another. In a lot of cases, it is your work and the work of your officers back
home that sets the stage for diplomatic engagement and acts as a complement to
the discussions between our foreign ministries.
This symposium is also a reminder to the United States Navy that we are part of
the greater fellowship of the sea, forged by the timeless bonds of wind and wave.
This truth has become even clearer to me as I’ve traveled around the world and
talked to our young men and women in uniform. Our sailors, our marines, at all
levels in the chain of command, increasingly think in terms of joint operations,
combined operations, coalition operations. The junior officers I’ve met with talk of
the links they’ve established during operations with their junior officer counter-
parts in South America, in Africa, in Asia, in Oceania, in Europe. What this tells me
is that our young sailors, our young officers, are reaping the benefits of your efforts
at a senior level to tie our nations closer together and to combat the world’s bur-
geoning maritime challenges. If our junior officers are talking, if they’re
establishing those close, personal ties at an operational level and they consider do-
ing so a natural part of their naval profession, then as those individual
relationships grow, so will the bonds between our countries.
The ocean is a big place and each of us is just one partner in the global maritime
community. The ocean connects us all, it sustains us all, and [it] is the foundation
for the commerce on which the world’s economy rests. Any security challenge that
impacts freedom of the seas and the free use of the maritime commons ultimately
affects the economic prosperity and stability of us all.
The United States is not alone and we recognize that good ideas come from ev-
erywhere. You are the experts in your own regions and you are all confronted by
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individual regional issues that blend into the greater challenges faced by the mari-
time community, challenges that can be better met by multilateral solutions.
We have seen this illustrated globally in the form of resurgent piracy, a universal
problem that requires and is receiving a cooperative international solution. It is the
effort of our navies [working] together that will lead to this improved maritime se-
curity. This begins with creating the ability to communicate with each other and
then using that ability. All around the world, I’m encouraged by the efforts of the
international community to facilitate open communications. As the CNO men-
tioned in his remarks, off the Horn of Africa there are over twenty nations that are
participating in antipiracy efforts. Some are contributing ships, others aircraft, and
still others are prosecuting the criminals ashore that were apprehended at sea by
these patrolling vessels. This close coordination is only possible because of the work
done at the tactical and operational levels to set up common communications fre-
quencies, to deal with each other, to establish procedures for contact, and to share
information between our forces on station. The international community has
united against a common threat and created mechanisms to deal with it. Antipiracy
efforts are obviously a high point and get a lot of publicity these days, but they are
far from the only example and are echoed by operations and initiatives around the
world.
In the Caribbean, Central and South America, thirteen nations work together
under the auspices of the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) and in
concert with CARICOM [Caribbean Community] nations. South American and Eu-
ropean partners locate, interdict, and destroy the flow of illegal narcotics between
nations.
During OPERATION CONTINUING PROMISE 2009, ten nations contributed medi-
cal professionals to medical missions in countries throughout the Caribbean. And
this, I know, has a special place in CNO’s heart, because his daughter was on the
ship that participated in this mission.
Off the west coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea, we’ve joined with West African
states in the Africa Partnership Station to improve regional security awareness and
capability. In response to Cyclone Nargis this May [2008] in Southeast Asia, many
countries provided disaster relief and, worldwide, fifty-five states subscribed to the
Maritime Safety and Security Information System, which shares Automatic [Identi-
fication] System [AIS] data on commercial shipping freely among all nations. It’s
clear and good that we’re already working together: sharing information, combat-
ing piracy, responding to natural disasters, and diminishing the flow of narcotics.
Our efforts matter.
But we, all of us, can do more. Our efforts, as they develop, will continue to im-
prove maritime security and maritime cooperation. Systems like AIS and other
information-sharing exchanges can give a complete and accurate picture of vessels
traveling the seas and when that information is fused with radar inputs provided by
shore stations and ships, we’ll be more able to identify, track, and intercept those
ships that exploit the sea for illegal purposes. We’ll be better able to protect our
ports and our fisheries and we’ll be better able to ensure the free flow of trade
across the high seas.
That’s why we’re here—to strengthen those bonds and to continue to find inter-
national solutions to our common problems. Cooperation and partnership will also
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help us face the crucial issues of the future. As professional mariners tied to the
sea—many of us from island nations, from maritime countries—the challenges
spawned by climate change and our use of the oceans are causing us increasing
concern.
[Regarding] the Arctic, those junior officers now entering the service will be the
ones leading your navies when they confront a polar region free of ice in the sum-
mer and deal with the security, economic, and environmental implications of a
Northwest Passage that is open much of the year. Over the next half century,
overfishing in some areas will send fishermen further afield in search of a catch and
could create disputes about the use of the maritime commons, resulting in chal-
lenges for fishery protection and for enforcement. And globally, energy use and
resource procurement will increasingly become a factor in the decision making for
all of us, as the power requirements of the maritime community continue to grow.
As a result, the global security implications of climate change and energy use will
become [some] of the great challenges for our successors, as they are becoming for
us, and I am committed to placing the U.S. Navy on a path to do something about
them. I’m committed to looking at the way in which our navy uses power and
committed to taking leadership inside the United States and looking for ways to
make our energy use more efficient. I want to find places where we might be able to
shift to alternative sources of energy—in our infrastructure, in our shore manage-
ment, and in the fleet. I’ll look forward to working with you as our international
partners to find solutions to this common issue.
I want to thank you again for your attendance at this symposium. Your atten-
dance here speaks volumes about the importance of international cooperation and
about the importance you place on working together to meet these challenges.
Thank you for the invitation to speak here. We have a lot to learn from each other
and so much we can accomplish by working together. Working together, we can ef-
fectively combat terrorism and deter piracy. Working together, we can stop
weapons proliferation and arms smuggling. Working together, we can counter hu-
man and narcotic trafficking. Working together, we can protect fisheries and the
bigger ocean environment.
An old proverb reminds us that our best protection comes not from fences, but
from friends. As friends, as colleagues, we will turn our challenges into opportuni-
ties and we, together, will make our world more secure. Have a great conference.
Thank you.
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Panel Discussion One
Bridging Regional Maritime Domain
Awareness Initiatives in Support of Partnership
Moderated by
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Jaafar, Malyasia
Panel Members:
Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy
Admiral Ok-Keun Jung, Republic of Korea
Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, Ecuador
Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa
Admiral Nirmal Verma, India
Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:
The professional program in Spruance Auditorium is made up of three paneldiscussions and you can see the subjects of the panel discussions in your pro-
gram. The first one will be chaired by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] from
Malaysia, Admiral Aziz, and the members you see in front of you will each comment
on their regional symposia that they hold in their respective regions and what part-
nership efforts they are undertaking to try to improve cooperation.
Panel Two will discuss Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in practice with
clear-cut examples of how forces are at sea today engaging and exploring coopera-
tive opportunities to work together better and to address challenges of MDA.
Finally, on Friday, Panel Three will discuss leveraging our cooperative efforts to
enhance maritime security operations and the thrust of those discussions will be
operations in the littorals that we are engaged in right now against piracy, against
drug smuggling, [and] against other types of illegal criminal activities. That discus-
sion will take place Friday morning. We have moderators for each breakout group
and we have assistants in each breakout group room. They will record the discus-
sions in the breakout groups and they will then put those into the form of a small
presentation on Friday morning as well. We will have one representative from each
breakout group selected to debrief to the entire assembly the discussions that your
particular breakout group had.
We would like to follow a simple format for the panel discussions and, in a mo-
ment, I’ll call Panel One up. The moderator will introduce each panel member.
Each panel member will make his presentation and we ask that these presentations
be limited to about ten to twelve minutes. The moderator may offer comments, if
he so desires. At the end, we’ll open the floor for questions from any delegates in
this room. We ask you to please use the microphones, and as I said, identify yourself
and your country and ask your question, keeping your questions brief to allow the
respondents to reply. Please indicate to whom your question is addressed, if it’s
addressed to a specific panel member. In honor of the forthcoming World Cup in
South Africa, and because it’s a game that the whole world understands, we have
adopted a football—soccer-football—method for the moderators to control these
panel members. That is, if the time is drawing close, the moderator may hand the
speaker a yellow card. If it gets really close to the end of his time, he may give him a
second yellow card. And if he goes over his time, we all know what happens then.
We hope that is not necessary at the Seapower Symposium, but Admiral Aziz is
armed with his red and his yellow cards.
So, at this time, Admiral, could you please come to the stage, and the other panel
members, and we’ll begin panel discussion one. Panel members are invited to speak
either from your seated place, or you may go to the podium if you prefer to stand.
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you, Chairman. Admiral Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations; the sympo-
sium sponsor, Rear Admiral Wisecup, the President of the Naval War College; dis-
tinguished guests; ladies and gentlemen: a very good morning to everyone.
First of all, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Admiral Roughead for
the kind hospitality extended to us the moment we arrived in Providence and New-
port for the Nineteenth ISS. I also thank him for the honor he has given me to
moderate the first panel discussion, entitled “Bridging Regional Maritime Domain
Awareness in Initiatives in Support of Partnerships.”
Ladies and gentlemen, the spectrum of the present maritime challenges faced by
the global maritime community is enormous. The possible solution to this challenge
is through establishing partnerships among regional countries. It is considered to be
the means of overcoming the challenges faced by seamen and sailors at sea. Within
the context of today’s symposium, partnership is loosely defined as like-minded
countries working together to overcome common challenges at sea. The regional ef-
forts to build such partnerships are mostly at full speed amidst the understanding of
the benefits that could be gained. The partnership effort could be made effective
through the establishment of Maritime Domain Awareness. Maritime Domain
Awareness, or MDA, is defined as the effective understanding of anything associated
with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or envi-
ronment. MDA will be achieved by improving our ability to collect, fuse, analyze,
display, and disseminate assembled information and intelligence to operational
commanders. Thus, Maritime Domain Awareness enables decision superiority.
Allow me to share the successful effort by the Malacca Strait’s littoral states, who
have been working together in a partnership to address maritime challenges in the
Strait of Malacca. The partnership, as was mentioned by Admiral Roughead ear-
lier, is known as MALSINDO and [has been] boosted through the effective MDA
that has successfully enhanced the fight against sea robbery in the Strait of Malacca.
The reduction in sea robbery incidents in the straits from a high of thirty-eight in
2004 to a low of just two cases last year is very laudable. The efforts undertaken by
the littoral states, namely, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, have
greatly contributed to this positive outcome. The littoral states have also cooperated
in the collaborative information sharing in the region. There is the Internet-based
system called the Malacca Strait Patrols Information System, or MSP-IS. A similar
system is being developed by the Singapore Navy, it seems to be an updated
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version, and it is named the Regional Maritime Information Exchange Initiatives,
or ReMIX.
Ladies and gentlemen, it will be wonderful if such regional partnership
collaboratives could be reached to create a global Maritime Domain Awareness. I
believe such an initiative is possible and we are fortunate today to have five chiefs of
navies representing five different regions to enlighten us with their experiences
and success stories. With me on stage this morning is, on my right, Admiral Paolo
La Rosa, Chief of Navy, Italy. He is representing the Regional Seapower Sympo-
sium for Mediterranean and Black Sea. To his right, Admiral Jung, the Chief of
Naval Operations of Korea, and he will be talking on behalf of the Western Pacific
Naval Symposium. To his right is Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, the Chief of Navy
of Ecuador, and he will be speaking on behalf of the Inter-American Naval Confer-
ence. On his side, Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, the Chief of Navy of South Africa, and
he will be representing the Sea Power for Africa Symposium. And, finally, on the far
right, is Admiral Nirmal Verma, the Chief of the Naval Staff of India, and he will be
representing the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.
Ladies and gentlemen, these distinguished speakers will discuss the ongoing
and planned activities within their respective regional symposia. They will also dis-
cuss the strategic environment in their regions, the opportunities and challenges
toward further regional collaboration, how their respective visions could achieve
common goals, objectives, and future efficiencies in maritime security.
Before I hand over the floor to them, allow me to just remind everyone that I
have these two cards, a yellow and a red card. It has been explained by the Chair-
man [Mocini], and I hope I will not be using the red card. I request the speakers to
observe the decision, as we need to remain on schedule. So once all the five speak-
ers have completed their presentation[s], the floor will be open for the question-
and-answer session. Ladies and gentlemen, without further ado, I would like to cor-
dially invite Admiral Paolo La Rosa, the Chief of the Italian Navy, who is
representing the Regional Seapower Symposium for the Navies of the Mediterra-
nean and the Black Sea Countries, to present for you. Please, Admiral.
Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy:
Sea World, Orlando, Florida. Have you ever been there? I was there this weekend.
Like a child, I admired that amazing celebration of the ocean and I could have a
good idea of how our realities are connected to the sea.
There are many different viewpoints among us, but one common insight: any-
time, anywhere, anyhow, the sea’s a driving force of civilization, prosperity, and
social development.
We sailors are well aware of the prominence of the sea, specifically for its impact
on security, stability, and peace. It is, therefore, our mission to endorse the impor-
tance of a sea-centric perspective of the world, thereby rejecting sea-blindness,
whose dangers have always [been] evident through history.
A well-suited, sea-centric approach needs to be supported by proper initiatives:
several of them are already in place quite effectively, mainly regionally focused.
Our challenge today, besides stimulating new initiatives, should therefore be to de-
velop their connectivity though global partnership among all international actors
involved. For the evolution of individual, regional initiatives into connected global
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systems, I acknowledge the crucial role of the International Seapower Symposium,
[for] which I wish to thank Admiral Roughead for sponsoring and Rear Admiral
Wisecup for organizing with so many distinguished colleagues and friends from so
many navies, to whom I address the best respects on behalf of the Italian Navy.
On alternate years, since 1996, the Italian Navy biannually hosts in Venice a Re-
gional Seapower Symposium and now a consolidated venue for the naval
community of the Mediterranean and Black Sea region.
Several extraregional players also attended the last two editions of the Venice
Symposium, enhancing its focus on the wider Mediterranean, a region whose stra-
tegic environment is characterized by instability factors and impending threats,
among which I would like to recall terrorism, illegal migration flows, piracy, and
other criminal activities. In terms of outcomes, important results have been
achieved by developing a regional network for Maritime Domain Awareness. I re-
fer to the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center (V-RMTC) conceived in 2004,
fully operational since 2006, [and] currently supported by twenty-nine navies
worldwide.
The system is based on a flexible model, also applied to subregional and bilat-
eral contexts—such as the maritime dimension of the Five Plus Five [5+5]
Initiative, focused on the central-western Mediterranean; the ADRION Initiative
[the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, the AII], focused on the Adriatic and Ionian basins;
and the Italian-Lebanese network—[and is] quite useful to the United Nations
Maritime Task Force operating in the eastern Mediterranean.
Further partnerships for MDA are on their way to establish a major community
with countries in the Gulf region, along with the development of a maritime dimen-
sion of the Eight Plus Six [8+6] Initiative. All these effective initiatives provide
satisfactory evidence of a strong dependence of our countries [on] the sea, adding
credible answers to the need of a sea-centric approach for global security through
regional initiatives. Now, there is more to these initiatives that we need to promote
by fostering their interactions through the development of their global connec-
tions. With this in mind, during the 2007 session of the ISS, I launched the idea of
families of regional networks to be federated for global maritime data sharing. On
the results achieved by the V-RMTC and its regional basis, I offered to sponsor a
new project then named as Trans-Regional Maritime Network (T-RMN). The year
2008 was focused on assessing its technical feasibility, which was discussed in Venice
by demonstrating the V-RMTC’s compatibility with the Brazilian system
SISTRAM, the Singaporean OASIS, and the Indian MSIS. During 2009, much ef-
fort has been put into the definition of a legal framework for the T-RMN, through
the agreement of a dedicated operational arrangement.
This document has been already been approved by nineteen out of twenty-three
members in the V-RMTC wider Mediterranean community, plus two of our three
extraregional partners. This makes me confident [we will] readily achieve general
“consensus” from all members already involved, following an “inclusive approach”
that avoids [the possibility] that somebody may feel excluded from such a successful
process.
It’s a matter of willingness to do it, not a matter of time, although I would say that
the sooner we do it, the better. This is the message that I would like to leave with the
global maritime community. It’s about the importance to leverage on regionally
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focused initiatives as a primary way to develop global systems. It’s about the T-RMN,
conceived to bridge regional initiatives: the very first tool already providing inter-
nal interoperability evidence to the theme of this panel. Thanks to its federative
approach to global connectivity, the T-RMN merges legal and operational build-
ing blocks by avoiding complex, overarching models.
Following this concept, I believe the regional dimension is the appropriate con-
text to effectively develop basic cooperation. The same cooperation gets into the
global dimension by linking regional MDAs to meet the dynamics of maritime traf-
fic and threats. As a matter of fact, a merchant vessel may depart a region, sail
through another, and end up in a third one. Similar cross-regional considerations
apply to maritime threats and operations.
In addition to the primary task of defending the maritime interests of our coun-
tries, our navies can therefore take a proactive role in contributing to the
international community through cooperative activities in the framework of peace
support, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations.
The ongoing coordination effort to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden is the best
demonstration of this positive attitude, as well as of the existing scope for
improvement.
I would like to conclude by highlighting that, when it comes to global security
and peace, we should all be convinced that cooperation is key to overcome hurdles.
In this light, the International Seapower Symposium, which I consider the driver of
the regional seapower symposia flourishing around the world, can provide true in-
sights for regional activities. I therefore look forward, with much interest, to the
outcomes of our works, to better tailor the Venice Symposium, which is already
scheduled from the nineteenth to twenty-second of October, 2010, another chance
to promote a sea-centric approach in our common endeavor to global security, sta-
bility, prosperity, and peace. Thank you.
[Applause]
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you, Admiral La Rosa. I think being soccer world champion, you don’t require
additional time to finish a game, as he is capable [of finishing] within ten minutes.
Thank you.
During the ten-minute presentation, Admiral La Rosa mentioned a few very in-
teresting points. Sea-centric, you mentioned, elaborating on V-RMTC, the Virtual
Regional Maritime Traffic Center, while also mentioning about the newly feder-
ated T-RMN. RMN stands for Royal Malaysian Navy, that’s where I come from; but
actually in this regard, T-RMN stands for Trans-Regional Maritime Network. He
also spoke about a wider Mediterranean community, about expanding it to two or
three other regional, extraregional, partners; and in his concluding remark, he
mentioned cooperation and he was just echoing what Admiral Roughead had just
mentioned earlier, that cooperation is key to overcoming hurdles.
Thank you, Admiral La Rosa.
The next speaker will be Admiral Jung, the Chief of Naval Operations of Korea.
He is going to talk on initiatives that have been taken by the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium towards bridging regional Maritime Domain Awareness. Please, Admi-
ral Jung, you have the floor now.
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Admiral Ok-Keun Jung, Republic of Korea:
Honorable CNO Roughead, my colleagues, and all the CNOs from all over the
[world], commanders and distinguished guests, thank you very much and nice to
meet you all. I am Admiral Jung Ok-Keun, the Korean CNO. It is a great pleasure
to meet you all at the U.S. Naval War College. For the next ten minutes, I would like
to brief you on the results of the plenary of the 2008 Western Pacific Naval Sympo-
sium (WPNS), which was hosted by the Korean Navy.
Here is the order of my briefing: first, the overview of WPNS, then the plenary of
the 2008 meeting, and then conclusion.
WPNS is a multilateral naval cooperation scheme among Western Pacific navies
to enhance cooperation in maritime security. The plenary is every two years for
CNO-level officers, and a workshop is every year for staff-level personnel. For the
history of the WPNS, in 1987, during the Ninth ISS, the chiefs of the Western Pa-
cific navies agreed to hold biennial meetings. In 1988, the first WPNS plenary was
held in Australia, and in 2008, Korea hosted the Eleventh WPNS plenary.
For the current membership of WPNS, we’re about a total of eighteen countries,
including Australia, and the current status of total membership is as you can see on
the slide, and then there are six observer countries, including Bangladesh. Now,
the key activities of the WPNS so far: The WPNS charter and doctrine were adopted
in November 2000. We described the purposes of the WPNS, the rules and re-
sponsibility of the member countries and observers, and we built the Malacca
Strait Joint Surveillance System. We have also been conducting MCMEX [mine
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countermeasures exercises] and DIVEX [diving exercises], also humanitarian assis-
tance and disaster relief tabletop exercises [HR/DR TTX]. We are also developing
ReMIX, which is hosted by Singapore, and, in Australia, we are developing multi-
lateral simulation exercises. Other than this, we are holding various seminars for
maritime security cooperation and building a human network.
Next are the results of the WPNS plenary, 2008. The 2008 WPNS plenary was
held in Korea on October 8, and sixty-three delegates from twenty-three countries
participated. They analyzed the activities of the past two years and discussed the ac-
tion plans for the next two years. Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, the United States,
and Australia made presentations and led the discussions. Details of these will be
explained on the next slides.
The Singaporean Navy made a presentation on realizing a safe and secure sea
for all. They emphasized the need for information sharing and interoperability to
counter maritime threats and challenges. They also introduced examples of success
cases through information sharing during counterpiracy operations. They intro-
duced the ReMIX, which was developed by the Singaporean Navy, and they
emphasized the need to develop multilateral protocol for information sharing.
The Indonesian Navy introduced Integrated Maritime Surveillance System
[IMSS], the purpose of which is to build C4ISR [command, control, communica-
tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and maritime
security. This includes coastal surveillance and ship surveillance systems. In the
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future, [the] Indonesian Navy will establish exercises and CONOPS [concepts of
operations] and develop a rapid-reaction system.
During the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force presentation, they emphasized
the exchange program for the next generation, as they introduced the SONG, the
[Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation], and the SRP [Ship Rider Program].
The SONG is for the commander- and lieutenant commander–level officers get-
ting together to talk about leadership and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific
region. The Ship Rider Program is for lieutenants junior grade, ensigns, and
midshipmen.
The U.S. Navy introduced the results of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Re-
lief (HA/DR) Tabletop Exercise 2007, and emphasized the role of navies and
mutual cooperation during the HA/DR operations. As a main result, they noted im-
proving interoperability and planning capability. The future plans, they said, will
include holding joint seminars and developing maritime CONOPS.
The Australian Navy presentation discussed how to increase interoperability
with simulation. This method is using a voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)
simulation model amongst WPNS member countries. At the pre-exercise level,
they’ll use voice procedure practice and, during the in-port phase, they’ll use in-port
simulation facilities. As a result, they will be able to increase interoperability with
less cost than that of an exercise.
The various action plans agreed upon during the 2008 WPNS plenary:
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• The Australian Navy will talk about WPNS support for having simulation
interoperability,
• The Canadian Navy will talk about member and observer applications,
• The New Zealand Navy will talk about the senior petty officer programs,
• The Korean Navy will come up with Joint Research Initiatives on “Building
Mutual Cooperation Systems” and “Developing Effective Information Shar-
ing Systems,”
• The Singaporean Navy will carry out the development of the SOP [standard
operating procedures] for the ReMIX Information Sharing,
• The Singaporean and Indonesian navies will jointly host MCMEX and DIVEX
in 2010, and
• The U.S. and Singaporean navies will jointly hold HA/DR TTX.
This is a total of seven tasks agreed upon and to be carried out.
The twelveth plenary will be held in Australia in the year 2010, and the
thirteenth plenary will be held in Malaysia in the year 2012. The major action plans
up until the year 2010 are, as you can see, on the slide.
So far, as I said, WPNS member countries agreed on the necessity of cooperation
to counter transnational threats through various activities, and we prepared practi-
cal, realistic measures for cooperation of regional navies, allowing us to create
greater consensus on the pending maritime security issues, and further contributed
to regional peace and prosperity.
Thank you very much.
[Applause]
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Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you, Admiral Jung. Another world-class performance all completed within
ten minutes. Thank you.
Admiral Jung, in his address, elaborated on the plenary session of the Eleventh
WPNS, held exactly one year ago in Korea. He also mentioned about the agree-
ments, agreed by all the eighteen members participating, plus six others, and he
stressed three key issues.
They all agree on the necessity for cooperation to counter transnational threats.
They also agreed to develop practical, realistic measures for cooperation of regional
navies. By doing these two activities, they will build consensus on maritime security
issues and will contribute to regional security and peace. Thank you, Admiral Jung.
As the next speaker we’ll have Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, the Chief of Navy
for Ecuador. He’s representing the Inter-American Naval Conference and will
share his views on how to bridge regional Maritime Domain Awareness. Please, Ad-
miral Molestina.
Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, Ecuador:
Thank you, Admiral. It is a pleasure and a privilege to be here in my alma mater,
the Naval War College, and to be able to share in this International Seapower Sym-
posium with all of you and talk about the issues that concern us all.
Last year, we had the Inter-American Naval Conference in Ecuador and its main
issue was education. We didn’t directly deal with Maritime Domain Awareness and
that is why I am going to show you how much we’ve progressed in this field of MDA.
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First of all, what we have heard here from our distinguished colleagues and
friends is that the sea is an environment of universal use. It joins us all and more
than 90 percent of goods that are traded in the world use the sea as their road. But
just as the sea has been a common element to bring countries together, I also be-
lieve it constitutes a series of challenges to which we must formulate solutions, and
that is why we are here today. I will cite an example.
If a cargo ship with 120,000 tons of oil travels from one port to another, first of
all, we must be certain that the cargo meets all the necessary standards upon its de-
parture, that the ship was built with all the standards that will guarantee its safety,
and that’s not the end of it. Throughout the transit the ship can be subject to bad
weather and what happens if this ship was to be shipwrecked? All its cargo would
spill out into the ocean and have adverse effects on countries that we may not have
anticipated.
To add to all these problems, we now have an increase in piracy. What happens if
pirates decide to hijack the ship? Perhaps that will cause energy shortages in the
country of destination. All this leads us to conclude that it is high time we harmo-
nize many of the activities that are already in place. The sea powers that we
represent here have always been devoted to securing maritime sea lanes, yet trade
must be focused with a greater awareness of the maritime domain. I believe that the
role of maritime authorities becomes of utmost importance as we now have the
need to become more aware of what happens throughout the sea so we can ensure
the security of maritime routes. I ask your forgiveness, because this presentation isn’t
in English, but I also would like to highlight a number of other elements that haven’t
kept up the pace with globalization, such as technology. Technology allows us to
make decisions as soon as we have the information. Currently, this can be achieved
in real time. In this context, terrorism and drug trafficking fund activities that now
compete with traditional threats in this new world order where regional economic
blocks are predominant and we need to change our view to a multidimensional
context where cooperation among all states of the world is necessary.
Here, we have a slide with the new threats in the region, all of which have been
classified by the Organization of American States. We can see that there are a num-
ber of new ingredients, such as terrorism, organized crime, money laundering,
pollution, illegal immigration, smuggling, climate change, and many others, but
all this happens within an environment that is increasingly difficult to control. That
environment, which is the vast sea and the vast coastlines of each country, is why we
need to join efforts to exercise oversight in the sea.
This is the definition that is outlined by the United States government in 2007
on Maritime Domain Awareness, which applies to all other countries as well. It is
defined as “the effective awareness of everything related to the maritime environ-
ment that could have an impact on human and material security, the economy or
the environment in the United States” (or any other country, as we have mentioned
before). Within this context, Maritime Domain Awareness can be translated into
the means to enable security and protection that could be applicable to all states. I
believe it is our joint responsibility, through the assurance of those communication
lines, which will enable us to control all activities on the seas.
How have we contributed and [how do we] continue to contribute to this control
of the maritime domain? This is something that was mentioned before by my
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colleague from the Korean Republic. I believe we all have capabilities for C4ISR.
Through all this, we have a gathering of maritime data, but also other types of data,
because we’re not limited to things that are happening in the sea. We also have in-
formation from the ports. Next we correlate that data, we move on to analyzing and
interpreting the data, and then we assess the intelligence. This information should
be provided to all countries or agencies that so require it.
What is the problem? The problem is that each country is undertaking individ-
ual or bilateral efforts, and perhaps we are lacking in our capability to interact
internationally in order to gain more awareness of the maritime domain and to act
in a timely fashion against any challenge that is deemed global. So what we want to
have, ideally, is a regional operational framework. This is the cornerstone of the
MDA, which is nothing more than having regional information to determine a
course of action when facing potential threats. And here, I emphasize that we need
joint work to compile, analyze, present, and disseminate the information; in other
words, cooperation and international integration [are] necessary.
This is all based on two aspects that have been mentioned before. First of all, trust.
I believe that we all share common threats and we must be aware of this. Therefore,
we should all contribute and collaborate with each other in a framework of trust so we
are willing to share information and undertake timely measures. Obviously, we must
take advantage of opportunities and show our will. This symposium is a show of that
will, of the willingness that the countries have to cooperate.
What have we done in the Americas to use this information and undertake timely
measures to face the threats? I think there are a number of actions that have been
taken, but most of them are bilateral. We need to strive for more multilateral ac-
tion. The main initiatives are the JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force] South,
CNIES [Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System], the communications
network, and SIANC [Specialized Inter-American Naval Conferences].
Here in this slide [on previous page], we show all the countries that are part of
this network of naval communication; I believe this should be the starting point for
future communication-sharing endeavors. Currently, it’s working bilaterally, and I
believe that a lack of trust leads us to shy away from sharing all the information that
we have. In order to achieve full interoperability—UNITAS and PANAMAX are
clear examples of how, for a long time, the Americas have endeavored in these joint
exercises to overcome any challenges that we might face in reaching
interoperability. I believe that’s going to be an issue that will be covered in the follow-
ing panel.
Here, we have a long list of agreements [on previous page], which lead us to
Maritime Domain Awareness and, in the interest of time, I will only mention a few.
There is the MSOC [Marine Security Operation Center] between Canada and
the United States. There is also the Security and Prosperity Partnership [SPP] be-
tween Canada, the United States, and Mexico for facing joint threats. There are
other agreements for meteorological information, others for tsunami alerts, and
others for creating sea charts with accurate bathymetric data.
We also have CONVEMAR [Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el
Derecho del Mar, or UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea], the sea convention that deals with drug trafficking and the protection of the
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maritime environment. In other words, there are a number of instruments from
which we can obtain information.
I will make some final remarks, because I’ve just been notified by my friend,
Aziz, that I have two minutes left. I should point out that Admiral Jung in his pre-
sentation said that he would yield two minutes to me and that the game could go
into overtime by two minutes. Nevertheless, these are my final remarks.
Safe maritime routes are essential to peace and prosperity in the region. The sea
is the route for transit and trade of resources upon which our economies depend.
The seas and the resources that move over them must be protected. The economic
crisis, the rise in unemployment, immigration, and illegal activities are all critical
factors in the role of policing the seas.
Transnational threats are a risk to maritime safety. It is necessary to unify our ef-
forts to coordinate actions and to exchange information without infringing upon
national sovereignty to identify, monitor, and intercept all those transnational
maritime threats in a way which is consistent with national and international legis-
lation. To this end, it is necessary to continue to strengthen current agreements.
What direction should we move it towards? We need to develop a common opera-
tional framework. We need to integrate and share information between the
countries through their operation centers. Is CNIES enough? I believe not.
We need more information and joint operations within the framework of the
joint operations that already take place. I believe that it is necessary to support
countries that have insufficient development in technology in order to contribute
to situational analyses.
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In sum, we need more will, more trust. This is a problem that affects us all. I believe
that within the context of each state, we have a territory that is sovereign to us, but the
sea belongs to us all. It deserves our cooperation. Thank you for your attention.
[Applause]
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you, Aland. Thank you very much for keeping to the time. He is my good
friend; we were together here at the Naval War College in 1995–96. We have an-
other guy, Admiral Álvaro Echandia, please stand up. We are together in the NCC
Class of ’95–’96. I think he kept good time. Aland, thank you.
In his fifteen-minute presentation, Admiral Aland Molestina mentioned the role
of maritime authorities has been increasing in its importance. He mentioned tech-
nology, how technology must be optimized to allow us to make some real decisions
to counter maritime threats, the many maritime threats mentioned. He also men-
tioned the existing initiatives, CNIES, UNITAS, and also PANAMAX. He also
[mentioned] in his concluding remarks that the CNIES [is] not enough. In his own
words, he proposed that more efforts towards information sharing and joint opera-
tions must be conducted among the Inter-American Naval Conference members.
Thank you, Admiral Aland Molestina.
Next, I would like to invite Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, the Chief of Navy of South
Africa. He is going to speak representing the Seapower for Africa Symposium, and
he will share his views on how to bridge regional Maritime Domain Awareness and he
will give his own perspectives on how well they have done. Please, you have the floor.
Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:
Admiral Roughead, distinguished guests, I’ll only rise just for a minute as Admiral
Teuteberg, my Chief Director of Maritime Strategy, will do the presentation. But
I’m rising, Admiral, to say since 1969, like the poet W. B. Yeats said, we can see “a
terrible beauty born.” The fact that today—so many of us committed and believing
in one another and believing in the freedom of the seas—we have come once again
in Newport to author this new chapter in the true spirit of our forebearers. Admiral,
also allow me to say happy birthday to the whole college for having turned 125
years old. Members, I give you Admiral Teuteberg to do the presentation on behalf
of the Chief of the South African Navy. Admiral Teuteberg.
Rear Admiral Bernhard Teuteberg, South Africa:
Admiral Aziz, Admiral Roughead, Admiral Wisecup, distinguished flag officers,
chiefs of navies, other officers, colleagues and, indeed, friends. It is really an honor
to be speaking on behalf of the South African Navy and, perhaps, on behalf of the
Seapower for Africa Symposium.
I use this definition, this quote, from Admiral Gary Roughead. “MDA is where it
all begins. We cannot conduct the operations that we must if we don’t have a good
sense of what is out there, moving on, about or under the sea.”1
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1. Rhumb Lines, August 2007.
And it reminds me of an occasion not too long ago when we were standing in the
middle of the bush in South Africa [after] searching for lion, having found lion, and
then [watching] the sun set over the plains, having left our game vehicles, [and] en-
joying refreshments. Admiral Roughead decided that the better part of valor would
be to create a laager, therefore—to create a circle of people facing outward—whilst
we were having our refreshments, so that we could warn each other of the threats
faced [from] lion in Africa. And I really understood that Admiral Roughead under-
stood what it meant to have domain awareness.
MDA is all about generating actionable intelligence, which is the cornerstone of
success for maritime law enforcement operations. It is really about understanding
the intent of the blip on the radar. It’s not the blip on the radar; it is what that blip
actually represents. From an African perspective, we are slowly moving in that di-
rection, but our responses to issues of terrorism, piracy, [and] people and drug
smuggling, are not harmonized as yet. However, there are advantages that cannot
be ignored. This, if we do this in partnership with each other, will reduce our re-
quirement for platforms and sensors at sea. It spreads the responsibility amongst
many and in this instance small navies, in fact, can have an equal status.
So what is this MDA? The focus of MDA differs substantially from the narrow na-
val requirement to provide task force awareness, to a much broader requirement of
providing security for the full spectrum of maritime activities, ranging outward
from the arteries that link the harbors with the sea and onward to the extent of the
EEZs [exclusive economic zones] and onto the high seas.
In Africa, MDA is aimed at the strategic level at this stage and focuses in regional
and continental integration and the exchange of information to identify emerging
threats and allow sufficient time to generate an appropriate response. It must be a
joint venture and, it has been said, it must be about partnerships.
What is [important to] Africa with respect to MDA? Africa has vast sea-based re-
newable and nonrenewable resources that require continuous monitoring and
policing. More and more ships are actually coming around the Cape of Good
Hope. It is necessary for us to understand the threats that come with this. At the
same time, maritime crime, ranging from piracy to illegal bunkering, is still stifling
the economic growth and prosperity of our continent and its people.
In Africa, we are following a regional approach. I’ve used three examples:
• In the Southern African Development Community [SADC], through the
Standing Maritime Committee, our aim is to promote cooperation at all levels
and the exchange of maritime information.
• In ECOWAS-CONSAC 2009 [Economic Community of West African States—
Chief of the Naval Staff Annual Conference] our colleagues in Nigeria are the
key player in promoting MDA in the Gulf of Guinea region, the aim being
protection of the offshore hydrocarbon resources.
• In EAC [East African Community], Kenya, on the other side of the continent,
plays a key regional role with the aim of preventing maritime crime.
The third Seapower for Africa Symposium was held earlier this year in Cape
Town, and I must just reiterate that the Seapower for Africa Symposium was, in
fact, born here in Newport, Rhode Island, and based on the concept of the
Seapower Symposium when the founding fathers—being Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
31
32 Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium
and South Africa—came together and decided that we must do a similar thing for
Africa.
We adopted a number of resolutions.
• The need for structured continental and regional cooperation;
• The requirement for continental, regional, and national harmonization of the
requirement for platforms, capabilities, designs, technologies, logistics, and
information sharing;
• The need for the generation of a comprehensive maritime policy for Africa,
which will be discussed next week in Durban by the Ministers of Transport and
Defense on behalf of the AU [African Union]; and
• The need for a representative continental working group, in order to address
Maritime Domain Awareness.
In Africa, we have many role players and, perhaps, our greatest challenge is the
fact that, at the moment, within our own country, there are twenty-four agencies in
some way involved in Maritime Domain Awareness; the same in the countries to the
north of South Africa. We need to bring all these countries together.
So what are the challenges facing MDA in Africa? First of all, information and
communication technology to establish the required information networks, our
limited capacity both in sensors and platforms, and infrastructure requirements
[are] problems. But, I think above else, having all of that will help nothing if there is
distrust, mistrust, between nations and we need to do this in partnership and I
think that was really well said this morning. No one can do this alone, and although
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there are lines painted on the ocean, which indicate maritime zones, ships do not
recognize that when they pass from one zone to the other.
In conclusion—I was very worried about the yellow card because, in South Africa,
it means you’re off the field for ten minutes—a term which we heard from the Royal
Navy at the Seapower for Africa Symposium in Cape Town earlier this year [was]
“no more sea blindness in Africa.” We need to make our politicians aware of the im-
portance of the sea. Maritime security: this is not only a military problem, but more
a security problem—all agencies, all countries need to work together. This is a joint
venture at the strategic level. We need to build trust. In order to build trust, we need
to work together; we need to walk the path together through common exercises
and visits such as these.
It requires persistent wide-area surveillance and monitoring. It’s a complex
challenge that requires both vertical and horizontal integration of data and intelli-
gence across multiple boundaries.
Stable and safe maritime zones contribute to Africa’s growth and stability. The
fisheries in South Africa provide work for 42,000 people, but that only accounts for
50 percent of the fish caught, because the other 50 percent is illegally caught in our
country. The African process is currently in its infancy and developmental stage but
with a full will and determination to progress from here and learn from other na-
tions. We need patience; MDA will take time to develop in Africa.
We [who] come from Africa understand that we must face our own lions collec-
tively and that the only common enemy we should be facing as seafarers is the
inherent dangers of operating on, in, under, and above the sea. Thank you very
much.
[Applause]
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you, Rear Admiral Teuteberg, representing Admiral Mudimu. In his pre-
sentation, he outlined the challenges faced by the Seapower for Africa Symposium
and, during the final minutes of the presentation, he listed four MDA challenges
faced, again, by the Africa Symposium. Namely;
• ICT [information and communication technologies], the need to establish the
required information network;
• The limited capacity;
• The requirement for infrastructure; and also
• The requirement to build confidence and trust, which has been amply high-
lighted this morning by Admiral Roughead.
Once again, thank you, Admiral Mudimu.
So we will have to go next to, the final speaker of the first panel presentation. I
would like to invite Admiral Nirmal Verma, the Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian
Navy, and he will be representing the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. He will de-
liberate on initiatives in support of partnership toward bridging regional Maritime
Domain Awareness. You may have the floor.
[Applause]
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Admiral Nirmal Verma, India:
Chiefs of Navies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. It gives me great
pleasure to be here, to share my thoughts on initiatives to bridge regional Maritime
Domain Awareness under the banner “Connecting Navies, Building Partnerships.”
At the outset, I would like to thank the International Seapower Symposium and
Admiral Gary Roughead, CNO, United States Navy, for giving me this opportunity
to interact with eminent strategists, academicians, and my esteemed professional
colleagues from other nations. The world that we know today is very different from
the one that it was just a decade back. In many ways, it has become a lot more un-
predictable and uncertain. Amidst this twin paradigm of unpredictability and
uncertainty, fundamental shifts are taking place, not just in the Indian Ocean re-
gion [IOR], but globally. This is true not only of the present financial condition, but
equally of the complex security situation. As is the case of the financial situation,
which necessitated a global response, the security situation is no different.
The Indian Navy, in this past decade of unpredictability and uncertainty, has
worked towards building bridges of friendship across the oceans. By initiatives I have
included MILANs, or get-togethers in Indian parlance, at Port Blair in the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands, which are attended by our neighboring neighbors, including
the Southeast Asian navies, and bilateral interactions at sea with many navies.
A major step taken in this direction has been all navies of the Indian Ocean re-
gion coming together and forming the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, or IONS,
which has the aim of fostering regional cooperation in the maritime domain. Let
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me put forth the drivers for this regional maritime cooperation. Trade and interde-
pendence, undoubtedly, are the first driver that catalyzes regional maritime
cooperation. The Asia-Pacific region is home to some of the fastest-growing econo-
mies in the world and, consequently, economic factors are central to this region’s
security concerns.
The second is a need for energy. The continuous and assured supply of energy
resources for both the developed and developing nations in this region needs no
emphasis.
Thirdly, many of the sources of terrorism, with ramifications to the Indian
Ocean region and beyond, lie within the Indian Ocean region. Zones of instability
and violence do exist in the region. Tackling them requires not only some amount
of hardball, but even a greater exercise of softball. The recent past has also high-
lighted the issues of proliferation, both nuclear and missiles, a concern that is vital
to the world as a whole. WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation must be
viewed seriously and holistically. At times, proliferation has had a maritime dimen-
sion and stoppage of this activity requires a multilateral maritime effort.
Fourthly, low-intensity maritime conflict, waged by nonstate actors, can also be
tackled better through a multinational response. With the thinning of the line be-
tween terrorism and other illegal activities, the scenario at sea is even more
complex. Unlawful activities, like piracy, armed robbery, or gun and drug running,
can get intertwined with terrorism.
In the coming years, cooperative use of maritime forces would be required to
counter the challenges posed by such threats. And, lastly, we must also uphold our
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responsibility to assist in United Nations–sanctioned operations as and when they
are authorized. Ladies and gentlemen, awareness of entities and happenings
within the maritime domain is a key to effective operations by any navy, and this au-
dience, more than anyone else, understands this.
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium also recognizes this fact, and has taken the
first steps to address the issue of Maritime Domain Awareness, as part of its re-
gional maritime cooperative initiatives. In years to come, it is hoped that IOR
navies would collectively execute these solutions.
Maritime Domain Awareness is an all-encompassing term that involves being
cognizant of the position and intentions of all actors, whether friendly, hostile, or
neutral, in the constantly evolving maritime environment and in a defined area of
interest. The gaps in the knowledge of all awareness available at various levels [are]
sought to be filled by surveillance and sharing of information. Information on ship
movements can help provide early detection of threats. Information on fishing
fleets and craft engaged in usual maritime activities and their confirmed presence
at a location also helps in clarifying picture compilation and providing early warn-
ing of suspicious activity. On a constant basis, MDA also enables more efficient
coordination of search and rescue. MDA is critical for effective decision making at
all levels of operations. Though, at each level, the nature, application, and modes
of collection differ. At the strategic level, MDA demands awareness of the longer-
term intent and prognosis that leads to threat evaluations and likely operational-
level countermeasures. Domain awareness, at the operational and tactical levels,
encompasses activities related to generation and synthesis of an integrated picture,
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enabling naval forces to become more effective and efficient in encountering ma-
levolent players.
I’m sure you would agree with me that the principal purpose of bridging re-
gional Maritime Domain Awareness is to generate actionable information. No
single navy can efficiently bring out actionable information over the large expanses
of sea, and hence, there is an indubitable need for cooperative engagement and for
generation of a common operating picture.
However, sharing of information in the maritime domain has its own challenges.
In a sense, this symposium and IONS within the IOR are important waypoints to-
ward building a mechanism to generate that common operating picture. A number
of bilateral, multilateral, or other arrangements already exist and synergizing them
is the need of the hour. Technically, a single common architecture to support shar-
ing of information for Maritime Domain Awareness needs to be developed to
enable it to be universally effective. This is a major challenge, given the security is-
sues, national sensitivities, and varying levels of technological capabilities in
individual navies.
Today, many navies have put into place their own mechanisms to build credible
information architectures for their own use. Some of these have integrated with
each other with patches, if you like, so that information can be exchanged. To be-
gin with, this is one method that can be expanded on.
Presently, much of the information being exchanged is streaming AIS [Auto-
matic Identification System] data, which is based on the concept of target
coordination. While this is the first logical step in enhancing Maritime Domain
Awareness, the seafaring community would have to soon take the next steps. What
could they and should they do to bolster the lookout capabilities and nonlethal,
onboard countermeasures? Merchant mariners would do well to look at the wa-
terline as often as they do the bottom line.
Soon, we would need to progress beyond the streaming of AIS data on mer-
chantmen at sea, to integrating our individual ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] efforts on a collective architecture. Such an effort over time could
then be used to overcome the scourge[s] of terrorism, piracy, drug running, and
human trafficking.
Another issue that is intertwined with MDA is the freedom of the seas. All of us
here are committed to maintaining freedom to use the seas. In a manner of speak-
ing, the level[s] of security and freedom are inversely related, as far as the offer of
collective protection is concerned. Seafarers would, therefore, have to accept the
contradictory aspects. Finally, as we put into place structures for regional and extra-
regional Maritime Domain Awareness, issues of sovereignty of nation-states should
not be overlooked. In the Indian Ocean region, as part of the IONS initiative, this is-
sue is considered important so that all nations, irrespective of the physical
dimensions, geographic location, or size of the navies, would be equal stakeholders
in all our efforts. It is with this intent that the next chair of the IONS, the UAE
[United Arab Emirates] Navy, will host a conclave early next year on a most appro-
priate theme: “Malevolent Non-state Actors and Non-traditional Security
Cooperative Solutions for the Indian Ocean.”
In sum, at the first instance, we need to facilitate not just bilateral arrangements
but regional or even global ones with the objective of enhancing MDA so that gaps
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in information are eliminated. At the same time, data-sharing linkages between
transregional data centers, particularly between the Asia-Pacific, Black Sea, Medi-
terranean, American, and the Indian Ocean regions, would be the next logical step.
Even as we attempt to put into place such MDA networks, nations without assets,
such as ground-based radars or the necessary infrastructure to share information,
would also have to be brought on board as equal stakeholders. This is true not only
of the Indian Ocean region, but is a reality reflective of all regions of the world. The
paramount question therefore would be how do we solicit support for building a
single transnational MDA network, thereby improving global maritime security. A
possible solution would be through efforts sponsored by the IMO [International
Maritime Organization] or United Nations, with all nations, irrespective of their
size, being equal stakeholders in this global initiative. Such an endeavor would pos-
sibly galvanize the architecture for sharing of information on the maritime domain
and put it in place in a relatively short span of time.
In conclusion, I will only reiterate the fact that all these challenges for collecting
and sharing of information in the maritime domain need to be overcome. It is
bound to happen in the future, sooner rather than later, in the larger interest of
seafarers.
As I speak these words, I’m reminded of the days that I sat in this very audito-
rium, sixteen years back when I attended the NCC in 1992–93, listening keenly to
speakers [talk] about common challenges that would confront navies. I have in the
audience my close friend and colleague from the NCC Class of ’93, Admiral
Guillermo Barrera, Chief of the Colombian Navy, and it’s really nice to see you in
the audience today.
Those days we talked about bridges of friendship between navies. The theme, in-
cidentally, chosen for the Indian Navy’s first International Fleet Review in 2001—
and, hopefully, this should now lead on to another theme—was “Bridging Regional
MDA.” As the chiefs on watch and as senior leaders of navies represented here, that
should be our hope, as well as our agenda, for a safer world. Thank you.
[Applause]
DISCUSSION
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you, Admiral Verma. In essence, Admiral Verma reiterated the importance
of overcoming challenges to sharing of information and the belief that MDA is criti-
cal for any decision making and there is a need to develop a mechanism of MDA for
the use of regional nations.
Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the symposium sponsor, I would like to
thank the panel members for providing us with an insight for the way forward in
addressing MDA initiatives. Indeed, bridging the regional MDA requires some ef-
fort but, as pointed out by the panel, it is not impossible.
Ladies and gentlemen, I believe most of you are eager to seek clarification and
discuss or comment on the points raised by the panel members; but, before we start
with the question and answer session, I would just like to remind [you] of a couple
rules. First, please keep your questions short, within one minute. Secondly, use the
microphone in front of your seat and you only will speak when I acknowledge you.
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And please identify yourself first. Be short and be brief, because we will have only
twenty-five minutes of this session and I believe the session is so important.
With that, I would like to open the floor for the question and answer session.
Kindly raise your hands. [Pause] Wow, I think everyone is looking forward to lunch.
Colonel Abdullah Dashti, Kuwait:
Listening to the five speeches, India has got many dimensions and some of these
dimensions are nonmilitary. My question is how important to future regional
seapower symposia are nonmilitary agents—private sector, NGOs [nongovern-
mental organizations], meaning civilians—to fill these gaps. Thank you very much.
Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy:
I think that it’s very important. As a matter of fact, as for the Venice Symposium, we
try to integrate all the ideas, the suggestions, which come from different actors,
concerning maritime questions. For example, we always invite—and they
participate—IMO members, IHO [International Hydrographic Organization]
members, and even national agencies, because nowadays, maritime security and
maritime safety and are not only military problems but are general problems.
That’s why I think it’s very important to maintain a regional level of symposia, a re-
gional dimension of symposia, because it’s much more and much easier to call all
these different actors to the meetings and, of course, all these symposia have a
driver importance, have a driver role for our activities as military organizations, as
institutional organizations. We have always to confront our issues, our positions,
our activities, with other members of the maritime community. So I believe that
they must be involved, to the extent we can [allow], in our activities. Thank you.
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you. Would any panel member like to add on?
Admiral Aland Molestina, Ecuador:
Yes, indeed, your comments are very correct. In the comments made, it was made
clear that problems affecting the sea are multidimensional. In other words, these
problems not only have to do with the navies of the world and the utilization of sea
power. This, indeed, has already been standardized, and this is what the interna-
tional community has been pursuing. In addition, we must say that the leaders who
are in this room, as well as the countries where we do hold these types of meetings, we
tackle these issues in a multidimensional manner, as I said earlier. And to give you an
example, and my apologies for using my country again, but we have a serious prob-
lem at sea that has to do with oil pollution as a result of fuel smuggling. This is some-
thing that the navy cannot combat in and of itself. We have a combined system with
the customs offices, with the taxation departments, with organizations that do the ac-
tual invoicing, and with the maritime authorities, which in the case of Ecuador, is the
navy itself. What I mean to say is that, indeed, this issue has to be approached in a
multidimensional way in that you’re very right in what you have stated.
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Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:
Not wanting to be doing overkill on this particular issue, I think the answers pro-
vided suffice. But, as the people indicated, there are a number of agencies that are
concerned with the issues of Maritime Domain Awareness—there is a department
of transport, environmental affairs, all these departments. What is important,
though, is that annually we head a type of a conference that involves all stake-
holders so that we map out a common strategy for us addressing all these issues. So,
it is important that the civilian component and the military are involved, because,
in certain instances, the lead agency can become the department of transport. In
another instance, the navy becomes the lead department. So it is important that we
have an integrated approach towards this issue; and, therefore, the regional semi-
nars are highly recommended.
Admiral Nimal Verma, India:
What I also want to say has been partly covered. It is true, and I think it came out in
the presentation also, that there were twenty-four agencies involved, as far as the
maritime domain is concerned and, obviously, they all have a stake in it. But, as far
as coming to solutions is concerned or tackling the problem, it has to be navy led.
It’s only the navy of a nation which can bring these different organizations,
which will be pulling in different directions, to work together. So I will say that as a
navy, talking of my example, it should be my task to ensure that the twenty-four-
odd agencies, which are involved in my country, are brought together, flesh out an
agenda, and then we discuss it at the regional level. Otherwise, it might become a
problem which is uncontrolled. So the navy should retain the leadership for opera-
tions such as this.
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you so much. We shall move to the next question.
Captain Guillermo Jimenez, El Salvador:
This question is directed to Rear Admiral Molestina. Sir, how do you perceive the
future of intelligence sharing after the FOL [forward operating location] at Manta,
Ecuador, is closed, which is coming very soon?
Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, Ecuador:
Well, thank you for your question. If we remember what has been said, we talked
about two basic issues to be able to obtain information. One of them is the will and
trust. In the case of the Americas, the official system that we have in place to obtain
information up to now is the inter-American network for communication, CNIES.
Now, Manta was one of the ways of obtaining information that we had. That infor-
mation will not be lost, because my understanding is that the U.S., with their
planes, will continue their reconnaissance, and they will continue sending the in-
formation to an operational center and, based on that trust that I’ve mentioned, all
of us have to share that information so that we can take actions together with the ar-
mies, the navies, of our friendly countries.
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Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Next question, please?
Admiral Mark P. Fitzgerald, United States:
My question goes to Admiral Verma and Admiral Mudimu. We talked about two
different concepts of data sharing. Admiral Verma talked about global data sharing
and Admiral Mudimu’s presentation was more about regional. When you look at
the types of data sharing we have to do, some of it’s historical—the number of what
kind of ship, when it was built, where it’s been in the last few years. Some of it’s cur-
rent, which is what’s on the ship, what cargo’s on the ship, what people are on the
ship. Some of it’s type of vessels—some of it’s commercial vessels, some of it’s a fish-
ing vessel, and sometimes it’s a pleasure vessel. How should we bring all of that to-
gether? Should there be regional databases where the region shares? Should it be
under IMO, as might have been suggested by Admiral Verma, or should it be under
some kind of a military-civilian organization that brings us all together? Thanks.
Admiral Nirmal Verma, India:
Well, I’d say that what I’d mentioned was certainly that eventually we must look at a
global methodology for getting the answers; but the stepping-stone will be through
the regional arrangements because the type of confidence that is required to be
built up between players, it is best started at the regional level. An example that co-
mes straight to my mind is the way the Southeast Asian nations have been cooperat-
ing. We look at Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia because the level of confidence
they have in each other is perhaps what contributes to working together and shar-
ing of information. So that, in my view, would be the starting point, and then you go
on to a larger area where such information is shared and eventually you have the
handshake and go onto a global level.
Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:
I think he’s correct there—what Admiral Verma is saying. Perhaps you’ll also agree,
Admiral, that the fundamental starting point will be to deal with the issue at the lo-
cal level, taking it to a regional level and, of course, whatever we do, we need to be
mindful of the fact that the navy operates at the international level. There must be a
degree of information that we’re able to share with our friends, with our colleagues.
Even if it’s a commercial vessel, we need to know, because the danger will not neces-
sarily come from the military. It will come from all the quarters. So at the regional
level, we need to strengthen the regional structures and from there be able to share
this information with international brothers wherever they may be. Whether that
goes in terms of the shipbuilding—like we build the ships in Germany, we then ex-
ercise annually, biannually, with the German Navy. We exercise with their navy
when their ships are around and then we are able to deal with the issues of
interoperability, the type of information that we need to impart to one another.
Things like this are working very well.
I think about the ability of the region also to share. Recently we met for an exer-
cise with a Namibian naval vessel in terms of an exercise called GOLFINHO where
we were checking the various elements of information sharing with the elements
that we involve from Angola, and so forth and so forth. So the region is very
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important. Step-by-step we are moving towards international communication and
shared, open information.
Admiral Nirmal Verma, India:
I’d just like to add, when initial discourse started on MDA, the example that used to
be often discussed was “what happens in the realm of civilian aviation?” You know
exactly which aircraft is flying from which airport to the next one, and the intention
was that even in the maritime domain, we should come to something similar. I re-
ally wouldn’t be able to put my finger as to how the system evolved as far as the civil-
ian aviation role is concerned, but today, it’s not really a military operation, per se. I
mean, it is a system which is fully functional and in place, and in due course of time,
as I see [it], [if] the MDA matures as we’d like it to, it could, perhaps, be IMO led,
possibly.
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
I hope the two responses have met up to your expectations, thank you. We have
about five more minutes for maybe three more questions?
Major General Ahmad Al-Mulla, Kuwait:
I would like to ask Admiral Jung: When you think of the mechanism you proposed
within your regional symposium, how can we stop our adversaries from benefiting
from such a system and mechanism while allowing the regionals to share informa-
tion within the MDA? Thank you.
Admiral Ok-Keun Jung, Republic of Korea:
The word adversary, when we use it in a maritime context, I think we would under-
stand that to be those opposed to the safety and security in the maritime division.
That is my understanding. I think when we share information, we need to guaran-
tee that we are able to share information, and, at the same time, we have to make ef-
forts not to leak some information so that we are able to protect our information
and our allies.
For example, in terms of the pirates in the seas around Somalia, as we monitor
the activities of the pirates, not only do we have to prevent the activities of the pi-
rates [but], more importantly, we have to have a plan not to leak our plans to the
pirates themselves. So, a prevention of information leakage is one thing that we can
do to protect information.
Brigadier General Zakariya Mansoor, Maldives:
Thank you very much on behalf of myself and the minister for our first-time partici-
pation at this most important gathering.
My comment goes to the moderator and also the distinguished panelists. You
have recognized the importance of the maritime security demand but, my com-
ment is, I think it is time for us to move to the second phase. When an actual
incident happens, for example, in the Maldives, Mauritius, and other vulnerable
countries on the ocean face, what are the ways and means with which we are going
to face and address that kind of issue?
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For instance, the Maldives is in the Indian Ocean, in the middle, and very re-
cently we had a situation where a spill of about 80,000 tons of fuel was approaching
our islands. Also, we are facing maritime terrorism threats with threats coming
from as far as the Seychelles or on the Somali coast. And there are many other chal-
lenges, as a lot of ships pass through the Maldives as well. So it is my humble
request to know if there are any suggestions or comments that you would like to
hear from the different parts of the world, from organizations which have been
mostly formed within the maritime domain area. Thank you very much.
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you and it is nice to welcome you to the symposium.
You ask about the importance of MDA, what is next, what should we do subse-
quently after attaining the MDA?
I would propose that for Maldives to be able to participate actively in any organi-
zation you would have to participate or align yourself to the regional symposium
and this is done through the IONS, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.
We have come to realize that MDA is so important and it is critical for any deci-
sion making. The ability to know what is happening in the region would be able to
help you prepare, to overcome issues at hand, resulting from any situation. So, in
this regard, the ability for the Maldives and the other regional countries to be work-
ing closely, developing their own MDA framework, would help facilitate
overcoming any future incidents at sea. You mentioned about the oil spill
operation—perhaps by having a regular surveillance in the region, the information
could be passed to any countries nearby for them to take necessary measures. And I
hope that has answered your question. Maybe somebody would like to add
something?
Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, Ecuador:
I’m going to talk a little bit about this situation in the Americas, something that I
mentioned; and I would also like to add something to the previous question.
The officer mentioned about the security of the information. That security of in-
formation is based on trust. I’ll give you an example. Most of the countries in the
Americas have a monitoring system in place for the fishing vessels. Some are afraid
of that. They say if that information—let’s say where the fishing vessels are lo-
cated—is known to another fishing fleet, perhaps they will start stealing the
product. For that there is concern. I’m just giving you a very commercial example,
and if we are talking about very delicate, classified information, it’s something else.
Even so, I repeat, I think that trust is the key element.
Of course, to be able to share information you have to have security and safety
measures in place.
Now, the officer that asked how to share information and how to benefit from it,
I think that we have to remember that the issue of sovereignty; political will; and
the EEZ Convention, [which] establishes zones that go from the twelve maritime
miles to two hundred maritime miles; and what the rules of engagement are all
have to be agreed upon. I think that for the benefit of all the states, we have to agree
on these rules. I believe that this will benefit all of us. Therefore, what I mean by
saying this is that your country needs to define the political will and establish your
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exclusive economic zone, whether it’s twelve nautical miles or two hundred nautical
miles.
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
I’m sorry, we have time for only one question.
Colonel Abdourahman Aden Cher, Djibouti:
The admiral answered already my question, if you will, because the solution should
be at the regional level. But what if one country is not playing its role, what do we
do? We have Somalia, as an example. So what to do in a case where a country is not
playing its role in the international arena?
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
I would like to respond to that question. Firstly, there must be, again, the trust and
confidence. Secondly, there must also be the political will and the military will to
curb any threats that are common to both countries, to other regional countries in
the region. There must also be an understanding among regional countries to per-
haps remind one another that it is so important for everyone to cooperate. We talk
about cooperating; we talk about partnership. If you want to be a partner of a suc-
cessful cooperative, you must, everyone must, perform and function in their own
respective roles. I don’t know which country you’re referring to, but if that particu-
lar country does not do what she’s supposed to be doing, we have an alternative
here, an option here, perhaps, to refer to the world governing body, the United
Nations. I think that’s what we have done. That particular country has to be re-
minded and to be sanctioned. That much we can do. Again, as maritime users, we
have the responsibility to ensure a safe, secure area and, thereby, countries form a
collaborative to help patrol and secure that region. So only one body can sanction
another country and that is perhaps the United Nations.
Admiral Paolo La Rosa, Italy:
Yes, on the question as to which kind of approach to maritime security, from my
point of view, the first approach must be a national one and in this national ap-
proach, you have to look to an interagency approach. You must cooperate with
other agencies, as we mentioned before, giving a central role to the navies in this in-
teragency, national approach.
Then, we have to act regionally, using the relevant regional partnerships. There
are many all around the world. The Mediterranean and Black Sea is one clear ex-
ample. In this arena, we must interact with international organizations, like United
Nations, IMO, IHO, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], EU [European
Union], and so on.
For bridging all these local, regional initiatives, I think I’m looking for a federa-
tion of systems, of these different systems. Why federation? I mean, I’m thinking a
single global system would be too complex—we need a simple entity. I cannot
imagine a system of systems where we each could request the same configuration
for all the systems. We have different systems around the world. Let’s only federate
those systems so that we can maintain the global MDA under a critical threshold.
This critical threshold we see in our regional system, the V-RMTC—works in units
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of ten, twenty, thirty, forty navies—no more than that, just to keep it simple. And
then we have neither technical nor legal issues to complicate this federation. I’m
thinking that with a federation it could be much easier to manage the database it-
self. Let’s think that for the V-RMTC we exchange no less than five to six thousand
new contacts, meaning tracks and their history, every day. This federation could be
even more flexible, allowing all of us to maintain a distributed architecture and not
a more complex architecture. This must be done out of an operational interest
without issues of business or ownership being considerations. We all must be share-
holders of this system that we have in mind and we try to do this with the V-RMTC,
for example. Thank you.
Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, Malaysia:
Thank you very much. With that remark, we have come to the end of our first panel
presentation. I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has made
this first session a very meaningful and successful one.
[Applause]
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Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Thank you, good morning. My first words are to express my sincere gratitude toAdmiral Roughead for his invitation to participate as moderator in this
Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium, and also to thank Rear Admiral
Wisecup for hosting it. Thank you again, Admirals.
Being here at this prestigious academic institute when I was part of the Naval
Command College, Class of 1997, is an important milestone in my professional
life, and certainly an honor. It’s great to be back.
The issue before us, maritime security, from a navy’s connectivity perspective
and [in] the building of cooperation initiatives, is a challenge nobody can deny and
is growing in importance every day. From the beginning of the decade, the United
States Navy has led the effort in promoting the concept that the comprehensive
understanding of Maritime Domain Awareness [MDA] is a key element in the
building of a global maritime security system. All of us in this symposium know very
well that the objectives established to accomplish an effective global Maritime Do-
main Awareness are ambitious.
Many different factors of type and intensity converge to accomplish the estab-
lishment of a robust, effective, accurate, and real-time maritime security system
that will not only allow us to know what is really happening within the global mari-
time domain, but will also allow us to act in a timely manner against potential
threats, safeguard human life at sea, and provide safety and security to navigation
and maritime trade.
The Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium provides the opportunity to
link forces in order to resolve the problems that affect the conservation of this
system and it is a significant opportunity to lay the necessary groundwork for its
implementation.
Please allow me to briefly share with you what the Chilean Navy, which I have the
honor to command, has been doing to contribute to global Maritime Domain
Awareness. We have been the host nation for two Western Hemisphere MDA work-
shops and we have adopted a series of measures designed to improve the exchange
of maritime information, such as the participation of MC’s network with our own
net of AIS [Automatic Identification System] stations, the establishment of a long-
range identification and tracking system known as LRIT, and the creation of a data
center, certified by the International Mobile Satellite Organization, IMSO.
We also organized a series of exercises of naval cooperation and guidance for
shipping, such as the transoceanic, trans-American BELL BUOY series, and we are
actively participating in the experiment called Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic
Center Americas (VRMTC-A), which is already demonstrating success. I can assure
you that the Chilean Navy is ready and will continue to encourage these initiatives
in order to maintain good order at sea.
Today’s panel is composed [of] five distinguished lecturers from different parts of
the world. Their experience and knowledge on Maritime Domain Awareness issues
will be shared through their interesting presentations. First of all, I would like to in-
troduce Rear Admiral Chew Meng Leong from the Singapore Navy, who will present
“Regional Information Sharing System—Link to a Global Information Grid.”
Then, we have Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad, Chief of Staff of the Royal Swed-
ish Navy, who will present “Sea Surveillance Cooperation, Baltic Sea (SUCBAS)
System: From Idea to Reality.” Next will be Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto,
Commander of the Brazilian Navy, who will present “Prioritizing and Crafting En-
gagement Opportunities.”
Rear Admiral [M.] Stewart O’Bryan, U.S. Navy, Director of Maritime Domain
Awareness, will present to us “Benefits of Open Maritime Data-Sharing, Regional
and Global Networks.” And, finally, Vice Admiral Dean McFadden, Commander of
the Canadian Navy, will present “Integrated Maritime Domain Awareness: Can-
ada’s Integrated Approach.”
Now, let’s review what Dean Vincent Mocini stated yesterday about the panel’s
procedure. Each one of the lecturers will have ten to fifteen minutes to give his pre-
sentation. I will signal that you have five minutes to finish with this lovely yellow
card, [and] two minutes left with another yellow card, same one. If it is really neces-
sary, I will show this famous red card and I will blow a whistle like this, as in soccer. I
am also taking Admiral Aziz’s words from yesterday’s panel, “I also hope I don’t
have to do it.”
At the end of the session, we have time for questions and answers. I will signal to
the person who wants to ask a question. At that time, please stand up, use the micro-
phone that is in front of you, give your name and country, and state if you want to
ask a question or give a comment, as well as indicate to whom it’s directed. Thank
you very much. Admiral Chew, you may take the floor.
Rear Admiral Chew Meng Leong, Singapore:
Admiral González, I have to say I’m terrified of the whistle, so I will try not to incur
it. Admiral Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, USN; Rear Admiral Wisecup,
President, Naval War College; distinguished leaders of navies and coast guards
from around the world; naval colleagues; distinguished guests; ladies and
48 Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium
gentlemen—a very good morning. First let me take this opportunity to thank Ad-
miral Roughead and Rear Admiral Wisecup and the Naval War College for inviting
all of us here and organizing this very important symposium, and for the very warm
hospitality that has been shown. If you’d like to quote a term we have used before,
this can be seen as the “Super Bowl” of naval symposiums. It is a very significant
gathering of naval and coast guard leaders from around the world, and I think if we
leverage on this opportunity in a correct way, we will be able to, I think, make real
and substantive progress in terms of collaboration to deal with common security
challenges in the maritime domain and for the benefit of each country, and, of
course, the larger international community.
It was apparent from yesterday’s session that there was a strong consensus
amongst participants that interdependency between agencies and countries [is nec-
essary] for safe and secure seas. Concerted efforts by various agencies from
different countries in collaboration, despite differences in political outlooks, na-
tional interests, and territorial coverage, [are] needed to deal with the issues
effectively. There’s a need to build a common shared awareness, so as to better un-
derstand the prevailing situation. The term quoted yesterday was “no more sea
blindness.” Navies can leverage this shared awareness and translate it into coopera-
tive transboundary actions; and underpinning such collaborations would be the
need for interoperability.
By and large, all countries have acknowledged the need for collaboration in one
way or another, but in order for such collaboration to truly succeed, an alignment
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of interests will be critical. In Southeast Asia, the Malacca Strait Patrol, or MSP, is a
prime example of such a successful collaboration. The littoral states of Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, which joined in October last year [2008], share
a common goal in assuring the safety and security of shipping in the Malacca Strait.
This alignment of common interests has allowed us to move beyond dialogue to
embrace a cooperative security approach towards tackling the piracy threat in the
Malacca Strait in a focused manner.
Conceptually, our cooperative security approach has three broad categories of
actions: information sharing and sense-making, coordinated operational re-
sponses, and collaborative deterrence. To illustrate the collaboration in MSP, let
me share a real-life example.
Now, the MSP is comprised of three subunits: the Intelligence Exchange Group,
the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol Group, and the Eyes in the Sky Combined Air Patrol
Group. In February this year, the ocean tug MLC Nancy 5 was hijacked in the north-
ern Malacca Strait. Within hours, all four participating armed forces were actively
exchanging the latest updates on the ship. This was actually facilitated through the
MSP-IS, or Malacca Strait Patrol–Information System, an info-sharing platform
linking the four littoral states. The sharing and corroboration of the information
then led to coordinated responses, with one of the armed forces quickly tasking its
naval assets to the scene of the hijacking to investigate. MLC Nancy 5 was eventually
found and escorted back to port.
51
Such collaborations occur on a daily basis. Day to day, there is information ex-
changed between the Monitoring and Action Agencies, or MAAs, of the four
countries. In terms of coordinated responses, an air patrol is provided by one of the
littoral countries, on a rotational basis, to provide surveillance in the Malacca Strait.
The air patrols are manned by a combined maritime patrol team. The combined
air patrols fly across territorial water boundaries of littoral states and allow pooling of
limited air surveillance assets to maintain a presence over the wide expanse of the sea
lane on a sustained basis. The successful collaboration has contributed significantly
to reducing the number of reported piracy incidents in the Malacca Strait.
To catalyze collaboration in the region, especially in the area of information
sharing, the Republic of Singapore Navy, or RSN, established the Information Fu-
sion Center, or IFC, in April of this year [2009]. Now, the IFC is a hot setup,
operated around the clock by an integrated, international team comprising inter-
national liaison officers (ILOs) and RSN personnel to facilitate maritime info-
sharing cooperation and collective sense-making.
The ILO Initiative is a flexible arrangement which sees partner countries deploy-
ing a midranking officer to the IFC. As the single point of contact, the ILOs will reach
back to their respective operational centers to access and share maritime shipping
information, and prompt collaborative action where applicable. In addition, the
ILOs also collaborate with other ILOs when maritime incidents occur. As of the first
of October [2010], six countries have committed to deploying an ILO to the IFC,
with ILOs from France and the U.S. already working out of the IFC today. Another
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seven countries are finalizing their deployments, and should deploy their ILOs soon.
We expect to see six to eight ILOs working out of the IFC in the coming months.
As a regional info-sharing hub, the IFC is currently linked to the operations cen-
ters of fifteen different countries. The IFC collaborates with these countries through
Internet-based, multilateral, info-sharing platforms, such as the MSP-IS, which I
mentioned earlier. To reach out to the wider regional community, the IFC also uses
the Regional Maritime Information Exchange, or ReMIX system. All the countries
within the WPNS [Western Pacific Naval Symposium], for example, are able to access
and share information via ReMIX.
In mid-June this year, ReMIX was actually put to good use as we tracked the
movement of the North Korean–flagged ship MV Kang Nam 1. This was immedi-
ately after UN Resolution 1874 was passed. Many countries were naturally
concerned about the transit of the ship. Countries wanted to be apprised in good
time. Through ReMIX, we shared some of the ship’s information with our partners.
Eventually, Kang Nam 1 turned around and returned back to its home port. The
value of information sharing and the need for regional info-sharing hubs like IFC
to meet regional requirements became clearer.
Indeed, in other parts of Southeast Asia, potential collaborations have also been
proposed. Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy Admiral Abdul Aziz, for example, has
mooted the idea of the Maritime Information Region (MIR) in the Celebes and the
Sulu Seas regions between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines for sharing infor-
mation. I think as more ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] member
countries understand the value of maritime info sharing and as more such MIRs in
the ASEAN region get set up, an ASEAN-centric, multilateral, info-sharing system
may eventually take shape. Such an ASEAN multilateral, info-sharing system could
link up to and leverage on the IFC in Singapore to connect to other regions and
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facilitate the translation of information shared into coordinated operational
responses.
So how do we move from here? Well, in my assessment, the information-sharing
juggernaut has actually gained momentum, especially at the regional level. We
have already seen the proliferation of many shipping databases and maritime cen-
ters regionally and extraregionally, triggered largely by regional needs. In
yesterday’s sessions, you have heard about the information-sharing system estab-
lished across the various regions. Allow me to give you a collated overview. Within
Asia, I have mentioned about the MSP-IS for the Malacca Strait Patrol countries
and the ReMIX system for the wider, WPNS community. Moving westward, the In-
dian Navy has also established the Maritime Shipping Information Systems
(MSIS), as well as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) for countries in the
Indian Ocean region.
In Europe, there is a NATO Shipping Center functioning as part of the NATO
Maritime Component Command. There’s, of course, the V-RMTC (Virtual Re-
gional Maritime Traffic Center), established by the Italian Navy. V-RMTC’s focus
centers on the wider Mediterranean community. Similarly, the Royal Navy has
made a significant contribution to the UK Maritime Trade Office in Dubai, being
linked synonymously with extensive coverage of the shipping situation in the Gulf
of Aden. The European Union Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa (EU
MSCHOA), is also well known to mariners with an extensive coverage of the mari-
time security situation in the same area, and provides very useful advisories.
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I think you know in North America, the USN’s MDA program serves as a
linchpin. The scale of the U.S. MDA effort is significant, with a sizable impact in en-
hancing maritime security situation awareness worldwide through linkages
established. Of course, there is the U.S. Department of Transport–developed Mari-
time Safety and Security Information System, or MSSIS, which has successfully
fused shipping information from various international partners around the world.
In South America, both the Brazilian SISTRAM [Information System for Mari-
time Traffic], as well as Chilean GRAFIMA systems have been in existence for a few
years, and are also considered regional information-sharing systems in their own
rights.
So having given you a recap of the regional info-sharing initiatives, I would like
to offer my perspective on how we can move ahead, as well as address the concerns
of countries which have yet to partake in info-sharing collaboration. Currently, na-
vies the world over are facing capacity issues, exacerbated by manpower, budget,
and [other] competing demands for resources, a point that was not lost yesterday
[during discussions at the breakout session]. The regional info-sharing systems
provide opportunities to build added awareness through collaboration, which may
obviate the need for further direct investments to achieve wider surveillance. Coun-
tries should, therefore, plug in now to information sharing and not hesitate and be
left behind. I think the time is right now.
I have mentioned about the IFC in Singapore, which we hope will serve to cata-
lyze regional cooperative action. I would even hasten to add that interested
partners could look to the IFC for possible collaborations.
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For those countries that do not embrace info sharing, a first step would be to
plug into one of the existing systems. There’s no necessity to create a brand-new
system, which would be costly. Rather than being consumed by the “what-ifs,” I
would say that countries don’t need to share all their raw information. All that’s
needed is to share potential threats that are moving out of our very own backyards,
since we have greater awareness in our own area of operations. The larger princi-
ple, however, is this: by sharing critical information in a timely manner, one can
help other countries to enhance their own security, which, in turn, will yield bene-
fits that can eventually enhance one’s own.
For countries with an existing regional info-sharing system, it’s up to us now to
link together to build a global awareness. I think to engender commonality, we
could look into a common, technical, architectural framework for info sharing.
Quite clearly, I think the maritime challenges today take all countries, working col-
laboratively, to deal with [them].
International collaboration remains key to any working solution. We can start
with information sharing, developing a shared vision of an extensive information-
sharing collaboration at the regional level. These regional information-sharing sys-
tems can then link up to one another to form a global information-sharing grid.
This will enhance a common awareness, allowing us to detect potential challenges
and be able to coordinate actions in a timely fashion. Most of all, I think it will limit
the operational space afforded to potential threats, strengthening maritime
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security, providing collaborative deterrence, and, hence, bring about safe and se-
cure seas for all. Thank you.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Thank you, Admiral Chew. Admiral Anders Grenstad from Royal Swedish Navy,
you have the floor, sir.
Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad, Sweden:
Thank you very much. Chief of Naval Operations, distinguished admirals, gener-
als, it’s very nice to be here. Since this is the third time I have actually attended the
International Seapower Symposium as the Chief Naval Officer of Sweden, I’m go-
ing to risk a couple of yellow cards, if that is okay with you, Admiral González.
Thank you.
As we just heard, regional maritime cooperation is nothing new, and we’re fully
aware of the different kinds of cooperation that already exist. I would like to stress
that this presentation I give you now is merely another example of maritime sur-
veillance cooperation, so my aim here today is to focus and give you some insights
in maritime surveillance in the Baltic Sea region and we call this SUCBAS coopera-
tion, Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea:
1. How we are translating sharing information into action, and, additionally,
2. What the country of Sweden is doing to enhance maritime surveillance
throughout our European Union presidency, which we are having right now,
July through December 2009.
In September 2008, Finland and Sweden presented the idea to go from SUCFIS
(Sea Surveillance Cooperation between Finland and Sweden) to SUCBAS (Sea Sur-
veillance Cooperation Baltic Sea). So why did we do that now? Well, firstly, the
SUCFIS cooperation was a kind of success, so why not go further with more partici-
pants? For us and our neighbors, the Baltic Sea area is our common interest.
Furthermore, we saw that sea surveillance cooperation gave added value, which I
will show you in the presentation right now.
In SUCBAS, we often use the phrase “the national input receives a multinational
output.” So how did we start it then?
Well, we introduced this idea in September last year [in 2008] and saw that it was
a common interest to enhance the maritime situational awareness in the Baltic Sea.
We started on a low level, just to create a culture of multinational cooperation
within the maritime domain. We used a step-by-step approach, where the first step
is very easy to take. It’s just to exchange thoughts and start to exchange relevant in-
formation. Depending on the participants’ will, they can then choose to go further
or stay at a certain level, still sharing information, of course. The cooperation at
this level is also transparent and very cost-effective.
This is the Baltic Sea region, with its nine coastal states, extensive maritime activ-
ities, and sensitive maritime environment. The region has approximately two to
three thousand ships at sea at any given moment. This complex situation calls for
effective, coordinated sea surveillance and preparedness to act towards a multitude
of threats and incidents.
Historically, there has been no common maritime picture. Cooperation between
countries and agencies has gradually evolved in certain sectors, where SUCFIS was
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one example. However, the maritime picture remained fragmented and we needed
to see the full picture. We saw that [with] cooperation we would be able to get more
than our national picture.
It’s all about moving from a limited national picture towards a common mari-
time situational awareness covering the whole region. In order to develop a more
comprehensive maritime picture, we, the Baltic Sea states, have initiated coopera-
tion for exchange of maritime information and, today, eight out of nine Baltic Sea
states are members. And, of course, there are several advantages.
SUCBAS permits the users to share sensor and AIS transponder information, as
well as other types of intelligence and knowledge. Fragmented data can be com-
piled into usable and valuable information. The SUCBAS initiative is up and
running today using existing national systems with a common interface. The par-
ticipants of SUCBAS can determine their own level of cooperation.
So, what does the first bullet mean? What do we mean by intelligent informa-
tion? The Baltic Sea region, as I just mentioned, has approximately two to three
thousand vessels at any given moment. The dense traffic makes it difficult to sort
out relevant information.
The AIS transponder system reduces the number of unidentified vessels. Other
sensors, such as radars and cameras, can further reduce the number of unidentified
vessels. Even with air and surface assets added, there are still a number of unidenti-
fied vessels. But by processing and analyzing information in the SUCBAS
community, vessels of particular interest can be identified. This makes it possible
for the appropriate national agencies to respond, if necessary.
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As an illustration of intelligent information, AIS transponders provide informa-
tion corresponding to this two-dimensional picture of a cargo vessel. With
international cooperation and the subsequent access to more information of differ-
ent origin, however, perhaps a more interesting picture is revealed.
This is the advantage of intelligent information.
One other important advantage of SUCBAS is that cooperation is based on exist-
ing national systems rather than developing and procuring new and often expensive
solutions, and the key words here are simplicity, effectiveness, and affordability.
One important aspect of SUCBAS is the interagency cooperation between civil-
ian and military agencies. SUCBAS cooperation allows the relevant agencies to
share their information, which, in turn, gives added value.
To exemplify this, I’ll tell you a true story that happened about a year ago.
This is a picture of an island named Väddö [on next page], where one can find an
old and popular summer camp for children. This island is not so far from
Stockholm.
During the night, a cargo ship loaded with thousands of tons of toxic chemicals
and acids was on a collision course with this island. The consequences could have
been substantial, with extensive pollution in a sensitive marine environment. How-
ever, by the cooperation between Swedish and Finnish authorities, a disaster was
able to be avoided in the last minute.
Not every SUCBAS member needs to participate in the cooperation at the same
level. It’s like a Swedish smorgasbord, where each participant decides what options
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they want to have, and this is an example of what different levels of cooperation can
look like.
As was said earlier, each participant uses his own system, whether civil or mili-
tary; depending on the chosen level of cooperation, information is exchanged
through virtual private network tunnels based on a pull and push system.
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As I hope you can see on this slide, there are no connections between the na-
tional terminals. The connection is made through a common interface in an
Internet environment choosing VPN (virtual private network) tunnels. I think the
easiest way to tell you how we are translating shared information into action is with
this fictional case stressing international and interagency cooperation. The exam-
ple starts with intelligence from the Finnish Border Guard reaching the Swedish
Coast Guard of a ship having loaded illegal goods in a Finnish harbor—sorry, Fin-
land, but this is the case—making it a vessel of interest. The Swedish Coast Guard
sends a request for information to the Swedish Navy regarding the vessel. The
Swedish Navy designates the ship as a vessel of interest in the SUCBAS community.
Through SUCBAS, the Finnish Navy provides more information. This vessel of in-
terest continues on its course, east of the island of Gotland.
Sweden and Finland continue to track the vessel of interest with all available sen-
sors. Finland provides Sweden even more specific information from [its] database.
In the vicinity of the island of Gotland, the vessel of interest is lost. The AIS tran-
sponder is no longer sending information, and other information is inconclusive.
In order to find the vessel of interest again, more sensors are needed and by using
common air and sea assets, without drawing any attention, the ship is detected and
positively identified again. When the vessel of interest gets closer to German and
Danish waters, Germany and Denmark are alerted through a notification and I will
stop the example here, so I don’t get any cards. I hope this scenario, anyhow,
showed how SUCBAS can be a tool for different agencies in the maritime domain.
It’s just an example of how the interagency and cross-border cooperation could
give added value, may it be [in] safety, security, environmental protection, or the
law enforcement field.
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As I said earlier, in less than a year SUCBAS has evolved from idea to reality. The
key has been that SUCBAS isn’t based on an expensive and complicated technical
system. The basic foundation is, instead, the mutual agreement rather than a tech-
nical solution.
Now to some words [about] what’s going on in the European Union during Swe-
den’s presidency of the European Union. We will continue the ongoing work for
outlining a way ahead that will allow for further interoperability between civilian
and military system[s] for maritime surveillance. Furthermore, facing new de-
manding EU operations, as for example, OPERATION ATALANTA, EU military
maritime forces similarly find themselves equipped with different systems and a
mix of different standards, which inhibit[s] the development of maritime situation
awareness. In order to cooperate effectively, actions are under way to create a sys-
tem that can provide a recognized maritime picture for the maritime forces
deployed on crisis management operations. With a view to increasing knowledge
and providing ideas for future possible civilian and military cooperation in the EU
as a whole, Sweden would like to initiate a discussion about increased inter-
operability [and] connectivity between existing military-civilian systems, and aims
to hold practical technical demonstrations on the ongoing maritime surveillance
cooperation in the Baltic Sea.
As I said earlier and finish up with now, the basic foundation is a mutual agree-
ment, rather than a technical solution.
Thank you very much.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Thank you, Admiral Grenstad, and Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, you have
the floor, sir.
Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, Brazil:
Thank you, Admiral González; your Excellencies, the rest of the heads of navies
and coast guards, distinguished delegates, officers, other authorities, ladies and
gentlemen, good morning. I would like to thank Admiral Roughead, sponsor of
this important symposium, for the invitation and for the wonderful way that you
have received all of us and our spouses in this kind city, and Admiral Wisecup for
hosting this event.
Initially, I would like to emphasize the importance of the oceans for the world
prosperity, which demands they are used in a rational and secure manner. At this
precise moment, it is estimated there are over fifty thousand large ships sailing in the
seas, conveying 80 percent of global trade, 60 percent of the oil produced on the
planet, and 11 million passengers. Maritime lanes are responsible for approximately
95 percent of exchange between countries, where resources of over $4 trillion circu-
late annually.
Much attention has also been given to the huge potential of the marine environ-
ment, as well as to increasingly more sensitive issues concerning pollution of the
waters. In a word, that leads to increasing globalization characterized by a growing
and continuous commercialization. The surveillance of the seas acquires a definite
significance due to its importance to international economics.
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In order to achieve complete Maritime Domain Awareness, you have to consider
the political, economical, strategic, physical, geographical, and cultural aspects,
which influence the maritime activity.
It’s not an easy task. For one, the ocean cannot be administered in the same
manner as the land, where the concepts of territorial political division, independ-
ence, and national sovereignty are clearly defined.
On the water, however, these issues acquire different dimensions. Borders are
often defined by virtual lines, usually there are many complex negotiations, and
they are not always supported by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the UNCLOS, or by other agreed mechanism.
Several different activities take place in the oceans and the most important ones
are commerce, which has already been mentioned; fishery; environmental preser-
vation; tourism; scientific research; exploitation of oil, gas, and minerals; and the
military operations.
However, there may also be found illicit activities, presently known as “new
threats,” such as smuggling, drug trafficking, piracy (the worst threat these days in
some areas like the vicinity of Somalia), terrorism, environmental crimes, and ille-
gal immigration. Therefore, we have [to] look for a judicial administrative format
and go in with all the sectors, the states, and international organizations, commit-
ted to the process.
Joining this, there are also difficulties faced by several countries to establish ade-
quate surveillance in their areas of responsibility, creating a perception of
impunity, which encourages actions by illicit agents who are reaping increasingly
more rewarding gains.
I understand that for an effective Maritime Domain Awareness to be achieved,
there will be a need for a structure [encompassing] the gathering of data, monitor-
ing, [and] sensors of naval and air units to allow timely decision making. It should
also be pointed out that the navies would be engaged in an ever more relevant role
in their countries and in the international context, so that they can lead the defini-
tion of the new judicial instruments and execute the operational procedures for the
appropriate protection of waters.
In my point of view, these mechanisms should have three dimensions: global, re-
gional, and national.
In a worldwide dimension, the possibility of the establishment of a global net-
work for sharing information should be taken into account. Occurrences at sea
usually demand complicated solutions. Therefore, the joint effort of all actors in-
volved becomes imperative. Ideally, the most developed navies should take the
initiative to promote collaboration, encourage discussions and exchange of experi-
ences, and maintain permanent contacts within a constructive global perspective.
For this concept to become feasible there should be neither mistrust nor privilege
between the parties who [participated] in the sharing of what is known. With regard
to the sharing of confidential information, there’s a need to establish procedures
for the enrichment of mutual trust that will enable the enactment of specific bilat-
eral agreements. The main purpose should be the establishment of efficient world
maritime governance.
64 Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium
In a regional dimension, the main parameter to be considered for the establish-
ment of geographical distribution of regions should not be the traditional division
of continents, but of oceans.
For instance, in the case of Brazil, we are placed in the South Atlantic, which en-
compasses the countries of the eastern border of South America and the western
border of Africa, from the 16th degree north parallel south to Antarctica. Within
this dimension, the countries should increase the exchange of data, always aiming
for the improvement of the security of the respective area.
The regional organisms should contribute to the activities of global organisms
and there should be no competition between them.
In a national dimension, taking into account their own national legislation, the
states should assess the need to invest in the installation of equipment and systems
which could contribute to widening the knowledge and the control over the waters
under their responsibility. Thus, persuasion of the political power and of society in
general is essential in each country.
In Brazil, maritime authority is exerted by the Commander of the Navy, who,
consequently, is responsible for the management and coordination—together with
other military and civilian organizations and institutions, both private and public—
of all occurrences on the oceans and internal waters.
Its main projects are control of maritime traffic, navigation safety, prevention
and repression of water pollution and predatory fishing, search and rescue, secu-
rity of sea oil-extracting platforms, meteorological forecast, and prevention and
repression of the “new threats.”
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Its operation relies mainly on our Maritime Traffic Information System, known
as SISTRAM. It maintains the tracking of ships and the search and rescue area of
the country, and it receives data supplied by the Automatic Identification System,
the AIS, and the Long Range Identification and Tracking System, the LRIT,
among others. It is permanently updated and technologically improved.
In addition, the SISTRAM receives information from other systems and two of
them can be highlighted by their entirely Brazilian conception. The National Fish-
ing Vessels Satellite Tracking System, also known as PREPS, aims at the satellite
monitoring of the Brazilian fleet of vessels over 15 meters in length. And the Ocean
Monitoring System to Support Petroleum Activities, known as SIMMAP, monitors
all boats and vessels involved in such activities.
The Brazilian Navy is open to considering the transfer of relevant data con-
tained in its Management System to other countries, encouraging a bilateral and
multilateral exchange of information.
It should be pointed out that regionally, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay established the South Atlantic Maritime Area in 1966, in order to track,
control, and protect the maritime traffic in the western part of that ocean. For this
purpose, they conduct exchange of data via signal and, [in] 2010, the Regional
Center for Exchange of Maritime Traffic Information will be created, allowing inte-
gration of the national systems of these four countries.
We are adopting the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center, the V-RMTC, a
system developed by the Italian military and presently used by the navies of the
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Mediterranean and Black Seas, among others, in order to increase the knowledge
exchange between the regions.
We are also sorting out the technical problems so that we can adapt the Maritime
Security and Safety Information System, the MSSIS, developed by the U.S. Navy.
The information contained in the database of the V-RMTC is already integrated
into SISTRAM and integration into MSSIS should occur soon.
To conclude, I stress that Brazil will support all actions from multilateral forums
which can contribute to increase the world’s maritime security and to achieve effec-
tive harmony of the oceans.
As a final message, I would like to share a thought with you: International cooper-
ation is the best approach to equate and resolve the big issues present in the oceans.
Thank you for your attention.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Thank you, Admiral Moura Neto from the Brazilian Navy, for your good and brief
presentation. Please, Rear Admiral [M.] Stewart O’Bryan from the United States
Navy, you have the floor, sir.
Rear Admiral M. Stewart O’Bryan, United States:
Good morning, Admiral Roughead, Admiral Wisecup, chiefs of navy and coast
guard, delegates, ladies and gentlemen. It is truly an honor to speak to such a dis-
tinguished audience here at the Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium. I
would like to take this opportunity to discuss the benefits of open maritime data
sharing, regional partnerships, and global networks.
First, I believe it’s fitting to mention a few historical MDA references throughout
history, given the historical nature of this gathering.
Regional partnerships and the sharing of ideas have been around since the be-
ginning of recorded history. One of the first historical references occurred in 480
B.C. when an alliance of seven city-states came together at the Battle of Salamis and
subsequently turned the tide of the war. Similarly, trade via sea routes has also been
around for a long time, one of these first notable examples being the Venetians who
circumnavigated Africa as they plied the seas for trade. I mention these historical
references because when I attended the Naval War College, my first two papers
were about these two events. I got a B, so I’m hoping with my mentioning them to-
day that Phil would give me an A.
There have been several constant factors throughout the millennia. Countries
have relied on commerce to transfer commodities into and out of their [territories],
with most of the commerce being transported via the seas. However, such factors
have changed since those very early days. While some old threats to the maritime do-
main, such as piracy and sea robbery, are still very much a concern, several new
threats and challenges have emerged. Transnational threats, human and drug
smuggling, terrorism, narco-terrorism, the demand for environmental disaster re-
sponse, and humanitarian assistance are just a few of these newer threats and
challenges that have affected, to some extent, the capabilities and missions of navies.
Constant advances in technology, weaponry, navigation, and communication
have allowed navies more autonomy, the ability to operate further from land for
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longer periods of time, to conduct a broader array of missions, and to communicate
more effectively in real time.
Additionally, burgeoning populations, increasing industrialization, globaliza-
tion, and the liberalization of national economies have fueled free trade and
growing demands for consumer products. More than 90 percent of all interna-
tional trade is being moved by commercial shipping and the amount of shipping
continues to expand yearly. Commercial shipping is quite complex and each of
these ships can be considered a floating, multinational enterprise. For example, it
is relatively common that a ship is flagged by one country; has owners of a different
country; is managed by yet a third country; mortgaged, insured, and reinsured by
still other countries; crewed by a seventh country; and carrying cargo to and from
ports of still yet different countries. This type of arrangement is a matter of busi-
ness convenience, but adds complexity to the navies’ challenges.
Understanding the dynamics involved with this vast and very complex domain
falls primarily to each country’s navy and coast guard. While these organizations
perform their assigned missions well, no organization has enough resources—
whether money, people, or equipment—to do it all. This was stated here two years
ago at the International Seapower Symposium, and it has been mentioned on sev-
eral occasions throughout various remarks on earlier panels. This is true for the
United States Navy. Our budget is tight and we’re limited in our ability to invest ev-
erywhere we see a need.
Through open maritime data sharing, navies and coast guards collectively have
a better understanding of the maritime domain in order to perform their missions.
I see the benefits as fitting into six main categories:
1. Improved situational awareness, sometimes referred to as sense-making abil-
ity. Terrorists, illicit networks, pirates, and rogue states are becoming more
agile in their ability to disguise illegal activities in the flow of legitimate com-
merce. Knowing exactly what ships are operating off the coast, where they are
coming from and where they are headed, what ports they call at along the
way, and what cargo they are carrying supports our ability to discover these il-
legal activities. This improved situational awareness increases safety and
security by allowing countries to act proactively instead of reactively.
2. Second, increase trust and cooperation by having neighboring navies operate
jointly at the tactical and operational levels. Our personal equipment can be
surged as conditions warrant; trust and cooperation cannot be surged and can
only be developed over time. This also has been mentioned in earlier remarks
and panels. The sharing of information is a prerequisite for multinational op-
erations. It develops a bond between navies, builds familiarity, resulting in
increased trust and cooperation. This can be especially vital in responding to
situations involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or during
times of conflict.
3. Third, data sharing facilitates the safe and due course of commerce. The vol-
ume of cargo transported aboard ships has seen a relatively constant increase
in excess of 4 percent per year in the recent years. This translates into more
ships of all types and sizes navigating the world’s oceans every year, transport-
ing people, carrying trade between countries, transiting through choke points,
and making multiple port calls during their voyages. Through the raised
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awareness of ship operations allowed by the sharing of maritime data, ports are
better prepared to accommodate these many merchant ships, reducing poten-
tial delays, streamlining port operations, and increasing port safety and
security.
4. Fourth, sharing of best practices between regional navies and coast guards, as
well as sharing and integrating lessons learned from ongoing initiatives, such
as the fight against piracy. Close collaboration and partnering between navies
allow for the advances possessed by a specific navy to be spread throughout the
region, benefiting other navies, enhancing the synergy, and improving the
maritime capability of the region. Especially in this era of fiscal constraints, col-
laborating with regional partners can enhance the overall capacity in the
region by calling upon the shared strength of regions, navies, and coast guards.
5. Fifth, data sharing enhances security and achieves common interests. With
more than 95,000 vessels of 100 gross tons or more plowing the seas along
with millions of smaller vessels, information-sharing efforts on the national
stage are just as critical as the international efforts. Providing maritime safety
and security does not begin or stop at the ports; it is also affected by activities
on land and it involves law enforcement agencies, nongovernmental organi-
zations, and many other agencies.
6. And, finally, increase partnerships, enhance maritime safety and security,
and promote global prosperity by helping with training, providing equip-
ment, participating in exercises or by means geared toward the goal of
building capacity. As an example, the Royal Australian Navy is providing
some island nations in the Pacific with small boats to patrol their coastlines
and assist in providing a better understanding of maritime activities in their
area.
Several networks and partnerships that have been mentioned today have been
specifically established towards this goal of connecting navies by sharing maritime
information and enhancing the regional maritime safety and security with great
levels of success. One example is the Regional Maritime Information Exchange
System, which provides the Western Pacific Naval Symposium navies with a re-
gional situation picture. The recently opened Information Fusion Center at
Changi Naval Base in Singapore is another example of building partnerships and
regional information sharing. Lastly, the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Cen-
ter, maintained by the Italian Navy, connects navies and shares information in
continually building partnerships.
A common thread between these networks and partnerships is that they share
Automatic Information System, or AIS, data as the primary input to their respec-
tive network[s]; and this, I believe, is a great baseline for these networks. Many
navies have decided to make use of the wealth of information AIS provides by
building ground stations and antennae to capture the information and process it to
develop a better understanding [and] awareness of their respective maritime do-
main[s]. The next evolutionary step in this data-collection process was developing a
means to share this information with other countries in the region.
What is the way ahead? I offer several possible steps to enhance data-sharing and
building capacity.
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[First], increase collaboration and openness between regional navies and coast
guards to continue to develop the required trust and cooperation that is essential to
providing regional maritime safety and security. There are a number of exercises
that aim [at] enhancing in interoperability, increasing regional stability, and build-
ing and maintaining regional relationships with other navies and coast guards—as
an example, exercises such as the annual UNITAS event with the Latin American
partners, or the biannual Rim of the Pacific [RIMPAC] when navies in that part of
the world enhance tactical capabilities and cooperation [with] participating navies
in various aspects of maritime operations at sea. These exercises connect navies
and further develop the requisite trust and cooperation between the participants.
Second, encourage participation in associated networks. This can be accomplished
through either the expansion of current partnerships, the creation of new networks, or
joining existing partnerships on a trans-regional scale. The partnerships and networks
already in existence are providing great coverage for their regions, building capacity,
and connecting our navies.
Third, share data on a more real-time basis to enhance regional maritime safety
and security. As with any source of information, locating data rapidly grows stale as
it becomes more time-late. Some of the collaborative partnerships today have data-
sharing stipulations to transfer only a daily snapshot of ongoing maritime activi-
ties for different regions. Real-time data would allow for better and more accurate
decision-making capabilities.
Fourth, establish a standard information-sharing model to facilitate and expe-
dite information exchanged between navies, between common operating forces. A
standard model would ease the process of federating various networks and could,
in the long term, allow for a more seamless, and, hence, quicker sharing of infor-
mation. Since all involved parties would employ the same model, cost would be less,
since no new technologies would have to be developed to share the information,
and it would ultimately serve in the best interests of the nation, the region, and the
global maritime safety and security. In closing, I would like to emphasize [that] the
successes of Maritime Domain Awareness and associated benefits hinge on the will-
ingness of countries to share information. This sharing of information is the
foundation of Maritime Domain Awareness.
In addition to enhancing awareness of maritime activities, the sharing of infor-
mation builds trust amongst neighboring nations and fosters cooperation. These
efforts promote regional safety and security, leading towards global prosperity.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak and your attention.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Thank you, Admiral O’Bryan. Admiral Dean McFadden from the Canadian Navy,
you have the floor, sir.
Vice Admiral Dean McFadden, Canada:
Thank you. Admiral Roughead, Rear Admiral Wisecup, distinguished colleagues
and friends.
We’ve spoken over the past few days of the methodology by which MDA can be de-
veloped, with, I think, a general acceptance that local and regional structures must
form the basis of any globalized system—the challenge being to ensure that regional
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awareness can feed a larger system, that structures are sufficiently compatible to al-
low information to be shared and a cumulative global understanding to be produced.
But we’ve acknowledged that, even at a national level, there is considerable diffi-
culty in bringing many of the players in the marine environment to share
information and so develop this initial building block of MDA. This is a subject that
has matured [as a] concept very rapidly over the past few years; and, as I remarked
yesterday in the heads-of-service discussion, the issue for us in uniform is not if or
why MDA is necessary. It is necessary. But how can it be achieved?
I just thought it might be useful to examine in some detail the “how” of what we
have developed in Canada and its connection to structures in the United States. It’s
undoubtedly unique to our circumstances and not intended as a model. It’s, in fact,
very different from the structure that has just been described by the Commander of
the Brazilian Navy, who acts as the integrator and director of all Brazilian jurisdic-
tional authorities. But the motivation and process by which this has been brought
into being in Canada is, I think, instructive, partly because it does show that our so-
lutions are different.
We’re embarked as never before upon a program of interdepartmental coopera-
tion across the whole of our federal government. But much of what we’re
developing must also function and, to a degree, integrate with structures develop-
ing in the United States, with whom we share extensive maritime borders. You’ll
note that I continue to use the word “developing.” What I will describe, I think, is
not an end state, but rather a snapshot of where we are today. I’m extremely
fortunate to be leading in what I refer to as a “live” bit of an experiment and thus
much of what I will describe has been developed and implemented by initiatives of
my navy.
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It is worthwhile to start, I think, by reiterating why, even though I don’t exercise
the range of authorities that encompass coast guard activities, this development
has such a large military component and why it’s not just an exercise in government
reorganization for efficiency. Until a decade ago, the context within which much of
our military forces was organized and structured was that of the Cold War. For this,
NATO and, in the case of Canada and the United States, NORAD [North American
Aerospace Defense Command] came into being, to counter a massive, but well-
defined and geographically fixed, military threat. Today, the potential of a deliber-
ate attack on Canada has shifted from the Cold War era’s threat of a nuclear strike
to a threat posed by global terrorism in association with criminality.
Since 9/11, it’s apparent that those who wish to do us harm can no longer be easily
defined and fixed, and the threat they pose is as a result of their ability to exploit the
vulnerabilities which exist in an open society. To even detect and subsequently coun-
ter this threat requires what has been termed a whole-of-government approach.
But even the use of that term brings with it a changed context and that is that—
rather [than] being presumed to be trained, ready, and waiting to engage in the
fight when it occurs—our citizens at home now expect that their governments, in-
cluding their military forces, are engaged each and every day in ensuring their
domestic security and safety. The Canadian Navy has always needed to be able to
carry out operations both at home and overseas. However, in the current security
environment, the line separating domestic threats from those abroad is becoming
less definitive. This environment is now global in nature and is characterized by its
diffusion, and by this I mean the threat vectors are many and rapidly changing. Soft
targets that we are unable or unwilling to defend are the most vulnerable.
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This has required that we place greater emphasis on security at home, in defense
of both Canada and North America, than in the past. This, I would opine, is truly a
paradigm shift for those of us who live in the North American continent. No longer
do our citizens see the challenge to them addressed by fighting wars “over there,”
wherever “over there” was. Today, the need is most significantly demonstrated to
them by the conduct of our operations in Afghanistan, where the cost in casualties
makes evident the fact that for us, the choice is not either-or—either engagement
overseas or security at home—it is both. And in doing both, we use a range of capa-
bilities and options available.
Abroad, our engagement is orchestrated to achieve stabilization and develop-
ment, a 3D-and-T approach, but involving very well-defined agencies: defense,
diplomacy, development, and trade. At home, the amalgam is of military power,
law enforcement, and intelligence capacities to detect and counter the attacker, as
well as the use of regulatory authorities available to federal, provincial, and munici-
pal agencies to identify and harden targets and make them more difficult to attack.
Interagency collaboration is what produces a whole-of-government approach,
and that is critical if we were to bring the nation’s full capabilities and resources to
bear on the national security challenges we face today, and those we’ll face tomorrow.
So let me now walk through the organization and structure that has been estab-
lished in our marine environment to address these challenges.
Canada’s ocean area and maritime approaches are the purview of several federal
departments: Fisheries and Oceans, which includes the Canadian Coast Guard; our
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Border Services, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Transport Canada; and, of
course, our navy; and for the purposes of defense cooperation, the navy of our
American neighbors. Unlike the situation in the U.S., [which] precludes the use of
military forces in support of domestic law enforcement, the Canadian Navy has
routinely supported other federal departments in a variety of ways, including fish-
eries patrols, maritime drug interdiction, and measures to curb illegal migration
from the sea. But these arrangements have undergone substantial change.
In 2004, a national security policy articulated, among other things, the require-
ment for federal agencies to improve cooperation in order to strengthen our
maritime borders—to, in essence, close the seams that existed between their indi-
vidual regulatory authorities. Transport Canada was established as lead agency,
but the navy was given some specific responsibilities: first, to develop an operations
center on each coast, where the players shown here could be brought together to
coordinate activity; and second, to be prepared to coordinate, not necessarily lead,
an on-water response to a threat, should one be required.
The intent in establishing Marine Security Op[erations] Centers [MSOCs] was
not to militarize the environment or give new regulatory authorities to the Cana-
dian Forces, but, as an institution, we were well-placed to bring these centers into
being.
First, we’re already animated from a threat perspective and postured for contin-
gency planning and response. That, in essence, is what guys like us in uniform do.
We’re hardwired to conduct an intelligence preparation of the battle space, identify
potential threats and vulnerabilities, and posture forces accordingly.
Second, we have established functional relationships with all of our federal de-
partments who have maritime jurisdiction, and with the United States Coast Guard,
predominantely at the start for search and rescue operations in the northwest Atlan-
tic, and with the United States Navy under the auspices of defense cooperation.
Third, and as a result of that defense cooperation, we maintain a recognized
maritime picture that is built and shared with alliance partners. But the real chal-
lenge in establishing security operations wasn’t simply to expand this picture by
wider pipes carrying more data, or by creating an expanded architecture, although
that, in itself, can be difficult. The problem is not physical, but rather cognitive.
The operations center was conceived out of the need for greater interdepart-
mental cooperation; however, the desire was for this cooperation to be achieved
whilst maintaining the integrity of each partner’s legislative authority. In fact, the
national security policy articulated a jurisdictional approach to maritime security
and for good reason. In a free society, there is reluctance [toward], and thus a pre-
scription to prevent, the unfettered sharing of information between government
agencies. For example, our customs agents should not make all that is known to
them of the habits of Canadian citizens available to our federal police, the Mount-
ies, for the purposes of criminal intelligence.
There remain appropriate restrictions on what can and should be passed and
thus [we have] segregation of databases of information. Not to do so would be an in-
fraction of individual liberty. But to limit the flow to that which existed in the past,
and thus slavishly remain within our jurisdictional lanes, means there is little possi-
bility of closing the seams that we say exist.
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Collaboration to a greater degree than existed before is required. In the United
States, creation of the Department of Homeland Security was one of the means
chosen to address that issue. In Canada, we have adopted a different model, in-
tended not to supplant authorities but to better coordinate and extend activities.
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Coming to grips with a structure that would synthesize the information avail-
able to these entities was undertaken at the same time as we fundamentally
altered the organization of our military forces to address the new perspective on
threat[s] to the homeland.
In the United States, Northern Command (NORTHCOM) came into being as a
distinct combatant command. For the first time, we, in Canada, viewed our own
country as a single theater of operations and established Canada Command
(CANADACOM) as a single joint structure tasked to conduct ops. This was a com-
mand that I held until appointed head of the navy this summer. Prior to that, I held
dual responsibilities as Commander of Maritime Forces in the Atlantic and as the
Joint Task Force Commander in the region, with twin chains of command shown
here by the arrows.
I was responsible to the head of the navy for development and generation of
maritime forces, and to Commander of Canada Command for employment of
land, sea, and air forces in the east, and so, in the recent past, have been through
both of these streams and thus engaged fundamentally in getting this right.
These dual responsibilities undoubtedly added levels of complexity to how we
did business, but as I hope to show in the next few slides, they allowed us to build
upon what were and continued to be superb navy-to-navy relationships at the
coastal and numbered fleet levels, to achieve effective integrated structures that op-
erate at the nexus of defense and security.
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So on both our Pacific and Atlantic coasts the foundation of our understanding,
certainly in the defense realm, was evident in the creation of a Recognized Mari-
time Picture [RMP]: a shared, classified database, part of a global system that
involves other national entities and other allies. Information, although not all clas-
sified, is shared predominantly on a need-to-know basis and involves such things as
the position and movement of naval units, ships, submarines, as well as vessels of
specific defense interest. Although still maintained separately, added to this pic-
ture is information gathered by our security partners, primarily for the purposes of
marine transportation security. For us, this is the responsibility of Transport Can-
ada, a federal regulatory and safety department. But the creation of the Marine
Security Op Centers, with Transport Canada as policy lead, functionally repre-
sented the initial stages of de facto MDA centers in Canada. In the U.S., similar
authorities evolved to the Coast Guard, with the Department of Homeland Security
construct, to include security responsibilities beyond the “legacy” programs of
transportation maintenance, waterway control, and environmental protection.
Within this layer is another order of magnitude of data. The [dotted] lines shown
here show the flow of classified information and [solid], that of information that is
generally available, or perhaps sensitive for the purposes of privacy or economic in-
terest. We’re talking about things like merchant ship movements, current voyage
and connections, engineering states, confirmation of compliance with safety and
environmental requirements, the historic usage of the vessel, et cetera.
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You will note that I refer back in the inset to the navy-to-navy basis upon which the
RMP is based, and I do so to make the point that this second layer is not military in its
structure or purpose. It relates to the evaluations of security, not defense threats.
But, of course, domain awareness, to be effective, must bring these perspectives
together—not just for the purposes of evaluation and understanding, but to allow
coordinated action. Again, the small inset reinforces how this would be effected in
the military domain were the threat to be one of defense. [In the event of] an armed
attack upon Canada and/or the United States, that response would be directed
through joint operations entities, using whatever assets were most appropriate:
navy, air, or special forces, with defense arrangements between Canada and the
United States being sufficiently robust to allow this to be planned and executed in a
combined, binational fashion.
However, as was to be expected, most situations for which a response is needed
are not related to defense but rather security concerns—the shipment of drugs, ille-
gal migration, health threats of pandemic proportion, illegal fishing activity, or
environmental threats. In these cases, evaluation, understanding, and response to
the threat remain within the purview of Public Safety in Canada and Homeland Se-
curity in the United States.
In Canada, this is the matrix of decision support processes that bring distinct
regulatory authorities to bear from within our MSOCs.
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The vertical columns show the specific agencies represented within the centers
with the ministries they report to. It’s not important that you know the details iden-
tified in each of these columns, but rather that they exist and that they represent
the line of authority by which the regulatory mandate of a specific department is
brought to bear. The existence of the MSOCs does not obviate this responsibility.
Rather, it allows for the horizontal information and intelligence sharing. It pro-
vides for a level of understanding that could facilitate a problem being identified
and an alert raised and for planning to be conducted collaboratively in formulating
a response.
This is undoubtedly a busy slide and a complex structure. I show it not to cause
you to drift off to sleep, although that is often the effect on me when I show some-
thing like that, but rather to hammer home what I think is a critical point and a
lesson that many of us find difficult to accept.
There are many players involved in the process of developing Maritime Domain
Awareness and many who have distinct, jealously guarded, and entirely appropri-
ate mandates for action. There’s never going to be a simple organization chart of
responsibilities for this but, in my experience, just because it briefs ugly does not
mean that it won’t work. In fact, the longer I’ve done this, the more I’m convinced
that one overarching culture or institution is not the most effective way to organize
our resources. Our efforts should not be in achieving a streamlined structure, but
rather in breaking down barriers to communication and information sharing be-
tween different regulatory agencies.
The environment will be multi-jurisdictional. Barriers to information sharing
will, in some cases, be founded on strong and appropriate legal principles, but
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more often, communications are impeded by culture and by a lack of understand-
ing and experience. The old adage of “I never did it that way before” too frequently
means “I’m not going to change”; and yet, change we must.
My challenge is to help build and share a common understanding of the security
situation in the air and sea approaches to North America, while respecting the sov-
ereignty of two independent nations and the jurisdictional authorities of multiple
departments across three levels of government, which exist in both nations. To do
so successfully, I believe we must build on trusted organizational relationships and
expand these to incorporate the strengths of many agencies, both military and
civil. The result cannot be a bureaucratic entity, but rather one with the capacity to
operationalize, process, and effectively harden our maritime borders, such that
there are not evident seams that can be exploited by our enemies. We may not
achieve a principle of military operations to which we may aspire—unity of com-
mand—but we must achieve unity of effort.
Integrated Maritime Domain Awareness can be achieved by the alignment of or-
ganizational structure and process. Those engaged in this activity must be
cognizant of not only operational, but also legal constraints upon the sharing of in-
formation. We must remain free and open societies, but we must also be animated
by the existence and the severity of a threat to our societies. This demands a mea-
sured and balanced response on the part of us all.
Ladies and gentlemen, it has been a privilege to speak to you today. I would like
to thank the College and you, sir, for this opportunity, and I’d be delighted to par-
ticipate in addressing any questions you might have.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Thank you, Admiral McFadden. We have had a superior opportunity to listen to
the opinions of five distinguished navy leaders. We have seen how difficult is the
task [of] finding a procedure to share information between partners. We have a
long way to go to find the solution, but I have no doubt that we will find an answer.
Before the question section, I would like to highlight some of the challenges that we
still need to address.
First, the technological gap between navies. We must be interoperable, so we
need common type[s] of systems, doctrine[s], and procedures. If we want to act, we
need the right tools to do it rapidly and accurately. Integration seems to be the cor-
rect approach highlighted by Admiral McFadden during his presentation to face
the same geography, but in a new context.
Second, keep on pushing for regional initiatives on information sharing as Rear
Admiral O’Bryan told us in his presentation. It seems that there is improvement on
this subject, but we need to maintain the effort and export it.
Third, the V-RMTC, Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center initiative, cer-
tainly is a step in the right direction, as Admiral Moura Neto from [the] Brazilian
Navy stated; as well as [are] the IFC, Information Fusion Center, discussed by Ad-
miral Chew during his presentation, in the Strait of Malacca; [and] the SUCBAS
system in the Baltic Sea shared by Admiral Grenstad from the Royal Swedish Navy.
Fourth, we must increase the amount of multinational exercises in order to im-
prove interoperability and the knowledge between partners. Trust comes after
knowing each other.
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And, finally, we need to work on an international legal framework that will allow
not only the exchange of information, but also the ability to take actions against po-
tential threats.
Thank you very much, Admirals, for your insightful presentations, and I am sure
your views have made an impact on the audience, and perhaps they have generated
some questions. So, at this time, I would like to open the floor for them, following the
rules that I am sure they already know. Please, the floor is open. Admiral, sir.
DISCUSSION
Rear Admiral Rusli bin Idrus, Malaysia:
I have one question. As keepers of the sea, we have always been dealing with this
fact of balancing between the freedom of navigations and positive control of the
sea. As for today, we all have agreed that sharing information is vital in the context
of keeping the sea safe.
I would like to raise this question to Admiral Grenstad. So my question is, after
this, how do you foresee more positive and comprehensive action between navies
and the law enforcement units in the future? At the moment, we have all agreed
that even with information sharing there are some problems, but now as we go for-
ward, how do you foresee more collaborative and comprehensive actions between
navies and law enforcement units? Thank you.
Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad, Sweden:
Thank you very much for that very easy question, which I will answer with a yes and
a no. I think [of] what the American CNO did with us last night, when he took us
here and we started to talk, talking in a small group, creating trust, feeling and see-
ing that we actually are heading the same way. I presented SUCBAS and it looks
very easy—eight countries, and we have been there for thousands of years, but,
when you go back in history, it has been a closed-door environment. Sweden has
been locked into itself, in some kind of neutrality. To go on with [building] this
trust—talk, talk, talk. Dialogue makes things easier and easier and the funny thing
is now it’s much easier to talk between navies than [to] talk between agencies on the
national level. So, that is the next step. Thank you very much.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Next question, please? Admiral, sir?
Rear Admiral Victor G. Guillory, United States:
Good morning. This question is for Admiral Chew. First, thank you very much, sir,
for your presentation and overview of all of the domain awareness systems that ex-
ist. My question is one of analysis. The systems, in many cases, are based upon the
nation having an understanding of maritime traffic, abnormalities that may exist,
and being able to then act on what is different. I would appreciate your thoughts on
how do we address this from a larger framework, a global framework. Do we need
analysts with new skills or is there a technology, technological solution? Thank you.
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Rear Admiral Chew Meng Leong, Singapore:
Thank you very much for your, I think, very apt question. Earlier, I highlighted the
ReMIX platform, which I showed in my presentation. What you may be interested
to know is actually, we have gathered within the platform a database of almost
200,000 ships. Now, the difficulty for all regional info-sharing systems is that you
want to derive useful information from the largest database that you have. Ulti-
mately, the goal—I think it was highlighted yesterday by Admiral Nirmal Verma in
particular—is to achieve early warning of potential threats, to be able to zoom
down to what could well be a vessel of interest, and then to drive action on the na-
tional level or coordinate responses amongst a group of countries. I think that is re-
ally the ultimate end goal.
I don’t have a very good answer for this, but I have to say that different entities,
different info-sharing groupings, are actually experimenting today with trying to
figure out how to analyze the vast amount of data that we have. In the IFC, we have
a system which we call SMART. It’s a simple system where we write down the rules
of what could well be things that we are going to look out for, trends. The idea is to
profile particular ships. For example, it would be maybe a ship that’s changed its
name too many times, changed ports too many times, or carrying cargo which
you’re not very sure of. So by creating this rule set it allows us to zoom down from
the large database to a smaller set. Then we drive down further to figure out
whether, amongst a smaller group, they are contacts of even greater interest. Then
we take the information and bring it to all our partners, so that they can look at it. If
they have additional information, they bring it back to us and we do further analysis
and finally determine if this is indeed a potential threat or otherwise. If it’s not,
fine. If it’s a potential threat, we have to deal with it. The general term that we apply
to this whole endeavor is called “sense-making.” It’s not a term that’s invented by
us; I just want to be very clear. The original person who came up with this term was
a guy called Dave Snowden of the Cynefin Centre. He talks about analyzing chaos
in order to derive useful data. This is an area where I would say that I think we do
need a lot of collaboration—not only within the region, but right across the world—
because nobody really has the best answer. We all want to, amidst all the data, find
where the anomaly is, ultimately to derive useful data that will allow us to plan for
coordinated responses.
So I think a framework would be useful. I think more dialogue on this whole sub-
ject is probably needed. I think we need to elevate this dialogue probably to the
people who really understand. This is quite involved. Sense-making is really an in-
volved process. It’s a lot of processes involving technology; but, ultimately, it is the
rule sets that we need to put together and then translate into a system that will help.
So I hope that this is something that is [a] subject for consideration for all navies
around the world.
Commander Mark Mellett, Republic of Ireland:
My question is addressed to Admiral McFadden. How important is political will for
Maritime Domain Awareness?
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Vice Admiral Dean McFadden, Canada:
It’s essential and [it is] one of the reasons why I think we need to reiterate for what
reasons we are going through all of the work that needs to be done to get the better
understanding of the domain. If there isn’t an ongoing pressure to get it right, in-
stitutions who are, you know, diffuse in their responsibilities and have very differ-
ent perspectives of the world will drift apart. The actions upon which they will need
to devote resources will be driven by things other than a threat perspective. It re-
quires political will to ensure that you continue to advance based upon the belief
that there’s a threat that you need to accommodate. Seams that exist between regu-
latory authorities are the areas that are the most difficult ones to close. That’s why I
took some time to explain why I think we need to do it. It’s not for the purposes of
efficiency. You need to have political will established and reinforced on a continu-
ing basis, or the very complicated structural and collaborative methods that we’re
trying to put in place, bureaucracy will pull apart.
Major General Ahmad Y. Al-Mulla, Kuwait:
My question is to Rear Admiral O’Bryan, please. The question is—we have poor
nations, and we have nations with some resentment to[ward] joining the regional
system that exists—the word “respect” was used over five times today by Admiral
McFadden regarding the MDA system, but can the system today be very optional
for countries to join when it can be offered to them to have it? How important do
you think it is to have an international umbrella over the MDA system, like search
and rescue, and like other systems, one that will be compulsory in the future for
states? Thank you.
Rear Admiral M. Stewart O’Bryan, United States:
Thank you, sir, for the question. It is my belief that an international umbrella or a
global network could be some aspirations in the distant future. But, when you start
getting that complex, that bureaucratic, it gets very complex and difficult and there
are different levels of participation. So it’s my understanding that you kind of build
to that. The regionalization and the networks that are going today, if they become
too bureaucratic or complex, will complicate people’s abilities to join or willingness
to participate. So, starting with a less complex baseline of information sharing and
then building upon the current relationships is probably the stepping-stone
needed to get to an international umbrella; and maybe the next step would be
something where you federate your regionals where you can share amongst the re-
gions and then build to that step. I hope I answered your question. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Mario Caballero, Peru:
This is a question for Admiral Moura Neto, please. Admiral, linking the panel to-
day with the previous panel and referring to the previous person’s remarks, we can
reference two systems or two preferred systems—[one] that seeks a global organi-
zation or a system preferring regional organizations. It seems that there is a di-
lemma between the two in the case of Brazil and the case of Canada and others.
They are seeking levels that offer solutions for their countries—in the case of Can-
ada, as they seek solutions in joint efforts with Mexico, in the case of Sweden and in
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the case of Admiral Chew, you have sought integration among countries with the
regional alternative.
On the other hand, there has been mention of the difficulty that arises when
other agencies are included, because it’s not only a maritime solution. There are a
number of government institutions that have links to other institutions in other
countries, and the solution becomes increasingly complex. What would you think
of the opinion that this solution is not exclusively in the hands of the navies or the
coast guards, but also the International Maritime Organization, which can also con-
tribute with funding, because not all countries have enough resources to
implement the systems that have been presented here today? Thank you.
Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, Brazil:
I believe that everything starts at the domestic level. You have to be aware that
countries must have sovereignty of their waters. I think that’s where things start—
being aware of that and being aware of how important it is to protect your waters,
either through the navies, coast guards, or by a group of agencies. It’s important
that the country is aware of the fact that the country itself has to be responsible for
its waters. Understanding that, the country is able to develop a system to make sure
that all the vessels that come into the waters under its jurisdiction are documented
and reported to the country. So, like that, we can identify all the countries and all
the vessels that come in and display abnormal behavior. It makes it easy for the
country to control and do the surveillance of its waters.
In addition to that, we will gather data so that each country can take care of its
waters. We add information at the domestic level, at the global level. I think it’s im-
portant that each country is aware of what is happening and that there needs to be
political involvement, so that the country is able to understand how important the
sea is. The countries that are able to recognize the importance of the sea, they are
able to establish a system of surveillance. All the rest are just tools that aid in taking
care of this task. That’s it.
Rear Admiral Chew Meng Leong, Singapore:
Just let me add to this particular subject. In the case of the Malacca Strait Patrol,
when we developed the collaborative system, there was very clear alignment as far
as interest and we actually had agreement, at least at the political level, of the prin-
ciples that would govern the actions for Malacca Strait entry. Ministers of the origi-
nal littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore came together and actually
agreed on three overarching principles that would drive the collaborative effort.
One is that [it is] the littoral states who have primary responsibility for the Malacca
Strait. Two is that user states and also international organizations can have a role to
play in the security in the Malacca Strait. Number three is that all actions taken
must, of course, respect the rule of law and also the sovereignty of the littoral states
involved. Because we have quite clearly articulated the principles there, it actually
becomes the overhanging framework so that collaboration in the Malacca Strait can
take place. To be fair, it’s not only limited to navies. The navies have taken the lead
to provide collaboration, to share information, to bring certain assets of surveil-
lance and presence in the Malacca Strait; but, having said that, the situation is a lot
more complex than just having the navies to work on collaborative deterrents.
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There needs to be also discussion and cooperation amongst various maritime agen-
cies involved. Within the Malacca Strait framework, there is also what we call Tri-
partite Technical Expert Groups (TTEGs) comprising agencies other than the
navies. They are basically providing the other complementary actions to help en-
sure the safety and security of the Malacca Strait. So, that is something that I would
like to share with you, thanks.
Colonel Abdourahman Aden Cher, Djibouti:
[Simultaneous translation from French follows] One recommendation first and
then a question. As for my recommendation, I think that the panel presented dif-
ferent regions in the world that have implemented numerous endeavors. Malacca,
for instance, is where cooperation between the four states has reduced the acts of
piracy. In my region, I come from Djibouti, we have a number of maritime forces in
my region and you will recognize, as I do, the actions of the Korean Navy show the
interest, the global interest, in my region. Yet all the maritime forces that are in my
region do bring some security without reducing the activities of pirates along So-
malia’s coast. My recommendation is the following: since the presence of all these
forces is there, why not help the countries of the region establish the interconnec-
tion, in order to reduce the acts of piracy as Admiral Chew discussed regarding his
region? My question is to Admiral Chew—if one of the countries were not to play its
role, would it really work?
Rear Admiral Chew Meng Leong, Singapore:
Thank you for your rather interesting question. I am not sure which country is not
playing a role in the region, that’s not for me to say. I think there are some lessons
that we can take from our experience in the Malacca Strait Patrols and bring them
forward to the Gulf of Aden. I’m not the foremost expert, so [to] speak, as far as the
situation in the Gulf of Aden—that is a very complex set of issues—but I think it suf-
fices to say that the collaboration of navies within the region from CTF [Combined
Task Force] 151, from OPERATION ATALANTA, from ships, and the national tasking
in some way I think has limited the operational space for the pirates. I don’t think
we are going to be able to eliminate the piracy problem, because the problem is
very complex and is serious. Until such [a] time [as] we are able to solve the prob-
lem on land, I think this problem is likely to stay. Then the question is, what kind of
larger framework can we bring to the region? Again, I am not the foremost expert,
but some of the ideas that we have seen actualizing in other regions can actually be
transported into the region.
In fact, I’d like to highlight for you that there was a study team by the Yemeni
government. They came to Singapore to look at our information-sharing systems
under quite a separate setup among civilian agencies, to see how is it that they can
create a center that will enable information sharing, and they have taken ideas
back. Of course, it is now for the Yemeni authorities to implement, I suppose with
assistance from supporting countries. I think this is an issue that is not going to re-
ally go away, but I do think that the region does require support from coalition
maritime forces and other forces that operate in the area. I think one way in which
we may want to start is to investigate how we can strengthen the level of information
sharing within the region and, also, [among] the forces that are in the region, so at
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least they can target their actions against pirates that operate within what is a very,
very large area. I remind you it is two million square miles, or something like that.
It is a challenge, but I think there can be a start. I suppose Singapore can relate ex-
periences. I don’t think we are in a position to take any lead in the particular area,
but having said that, I think it does require all countries, big or small, to make an ef-
fort; because, ultimately, the important point here is no one country and no agency
has ability to solve this rather difficult challenge. I think collaboration must be the
way to go.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Admiral Grenstad, do you want to add something?
Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad, Sweden:
Okay, I do want to add something. As you remember, Colonel [Cher], I visited Dji-
bouti a couple of weeks ago and we had a nice talk. I realized then, having three
ships in the area, we didn’t share that much information with you. The Americans
are helping out a little bit, as I understand, so you’ll get radar information for your
combat information center, and I think when you have that one up and running
you should ask the European countries, anyhow, to help out and help you to get the
more recognized maritime picture. I think you are doing a fantastic job there, but
we can actually help out much more than we have been doing.
Admiral Edmundo González, Chile:
Okay, we have room for the last question. Good. Well, as a closing remark, I would
like to say that remembering my strategy classes here in this famous auditorium has
brought back happy memories of our professor, Dr. Michael I. Handel, who, unfor-
tunately, is no longer with us. I may conclude [with the thought] that we are facing
something similar to what Clausewitz called the friction in war. Eliminating friction
that interferes with the establishment of global Maritime Domain Awareness is the
great task we have as leaders of the world’s navies. Clausewitz proposed to us a rec-
ommendation to eliminate this friction:
Perseverance in the chosen course is the essential counterweight, provided
that no compelling reasons intervene to the contrary. Moreover, there is
hardly a worthwhile enterprise in war whose execution does not call for infi-
nite effort, trouble, and privation; and as a man under pressure tends to give
in to physical and intellectual weakness, only great strength of will can lead to
the objective. It is steadfastness that will earn the admiration of the world and
of posterity.1
The key, in my opinion, ladies and gentlemen, is perseverance.
Thank you very much to the admirals here and thank you for your time.
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An Address
Admiral Thad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Admiral Gary Roughead, United States:
Well, as Vince mentioned earlier this morning, we’re not going to take a break,so for the elder gentlemen in the audience, like myself, this will be a test.
I would like to take this opportunity to introduce my good friend and shipmate,
Admiral Thad Allen. Regrettably, I’m going to be leaving, because for my cultural
experience this afternoon I get to go to a meeting in Washington. That’s what I’m
going to be doing culturally. But I cannot think of a better partner in the endeavor
that we have under way in our country—and, indeed, working with navies and coast
guards around the world—than Admiral Thad Allen, the Commandant of our
Coast Guard. As you know, he, Jim Conway, and I unveiled and signed our Mari-
time Strategy two years ago and he has been steadfast in the pursuit of that strategy
and the approaches that we have defined in that. I will tell you on a personal level, I
have no better shipmate, partner, confidant, or bulldog than Thad Allen, because
he understands the problems, he’s so practical in achieving solutions to those prob-
lems, and he has great drive and consideration for those who are working on the
problems. So, it’s a great pleasure for me to introduce my good friend, shipmate,
and partner in partnerships, Admiral Thad Allen. So, Thad, thank you for coming,
thank you for being here.
Admiral Thad Allen, United States:
First of all, let me thank my shipmate, Gary Roughead, for the chance to talk to you
all this morning. It was two years ago that I stood on this stage with Gary Roughead
and Jim Conway and we each described our part in developing the Cooperative Strat-
egy for 21st Century Seapower and we laid out some goals that went beyond the projec-
tion of naval power. If you’ll remember, we talked about maritime security,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief–type operations. If you look at the con-
tent of the conversations that you have been having over the last couple of days and the
ones that I just heard as I joined the conference, there is definitely a significant body of
work for navies, coast guards, and other agencies that have public safety responsibili-
ties, to come together to integrate, to deal with asymmetrical threats and transnational
threats.
I’d like to go over a couple of issues that I have been working [on] with Gary
Roughead, our partners in the United States, and our international partners, to
frame not only the importance of the Maritime Strategy, but the importance of mov-
ing beyond the traditional view of the projection of naval power and the integration
into what Dean McFadden earlier called a whole-of-government approach.
I would start off by reminding you, and many of you already know this, there is no
single model for what a coast guard or a coast guard–like agency is, [including] the
breadth of their missions and their reporting chain in government. When I meet my
counterparts from around the world, I find that the minority are actually inside a de-
fense organization. We have very many coast guards that report to interior ministers,
border guards, public safety ministries, and, in some countries where there are no
armed forces at all, there could be a justice ministry or another ministry. This is a
challenge, but it also is an incredible opportunity to integrate what we are doing, not
only across the United States government, but across the governments of our part-
ners. It allows us to expand the conversation into areas that bear on Maritime
Domain Awareness, such as who has regulatory responsibilities in those countries for
shipping, who has communications responsibility, who controls the data centers, who
is responsible for sharing information, and how are those operational pictures
passed between agencies inside government and then between governments.
So what I have found, in the two years since we promulgated the strategy, is this
has been the basis for discussion that has helped us start to address problems.
As we heard in the last panel, the issue of piracy off the Horn of Africa is some-
thing that was not discussed prominently two years ago, but we know is a problem
that we have to deal with as a community of nations moving forward. When we do
that, it requires a whole-of-government approach, but it also requires us to work as
an integrated international team.
So what I’d like to do is take you through a couple of examples and some of the
visits I’ve had and some of the people I talked to in the last two years since we were
here in Newport and lay out some of the things that are happening. And since piracy
was just discussed, I’d like to describe to you my role in the United States as it relates
to piracy and what we have been doing from the Coast Guard side to integrate.
Now, the actual operations being conducted by the United States over there are
done under Fifth Fleet and Vice Admiral [William E.] Gortney, who was with us at
the conference and who works for General [David] Petraeus in U.S. Central Com-
mand. But the fact of the matter is [that] the real issue over there, and it’s been
stated very well by Vice Admiral Gortney, is if you have an act of piracy, you need
two things: you need a pirate, and you need a piratable ship. And so what we’ve
been trying to do—while it is very difficult to deal with the internal issues inside a
nation to deal with piracy, we can deal with the piratable ships side of that.
In the United States, I am the competent authority for dealing with U.S.-flag
vessels. We do the safety inspection on these vessels, we license the masters and the
mates, and we lay out the conditions for security for these vessels under the Interna-
tional Ship and Port [Facility] Security Code. With that in mind, last May, we
convened a meeting in Washington. It was hosted by General Duncan McNabb,
who is the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command. Vice Admiral
Gortney was there from Fifth Fleet. We had representation from the joint staff, the
Maritime Administration, and I was there.
I announced that day that all U.S.-flag ships that are operating in and around
the Horn of Africa had fifteen days to do a vulnerability assessment related to their
vessels and submit a plan to me on how they were going to mitigate those vulnera-
bilities, up to and including either unarmed or armed security teams if they would
be required.
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The two basic elements that cause concerns and risk and vulnerability over there
are what we call low, slow ships—low freeboard, lower speed, higher risk. We asked
U.S.-flag vessels to give us a plan on how to mitigate those risks. So as we stand here
this morning, the U.S.-flag vessels that are operating over there right now are oper-
ating under enhanced security measures that I required as a competent authority
for the United States over U.S.-flag shipping.
That’s a good thing. We have significantly reduced incidents involving U.S.-flag
ships.
The problem is that most of the tonnage of the vessels that are operating
through there [is] operating under flags of convenience: Liberia, Bahamas, Pan-
ama, Marshall Islands, and so forth. I’ve had discussions with the International
Maritime Organization [IMO] and we have taken the measures to reduce the risk of
piracy, and made those voluntary standards for international shipping that have
been promulgated by the International Maritime Organization. I believe [that] this
is where our Coast Guard, whole of government, transport ministries—people who
have these responsibilities—can work collectively with the navies of the world to
create an environment that reduces the risk and the likelihood of piracy. So my job
as the Coast Guard member of the U.S. naval team, if you will, is to work my statu-
tory, regulatory responsibilities to reduce the threat to the extent that I can, and
we’re doing that.
The next general assembly of the International Maritime Organization will take
place the third week of November in London. I will be leading the U.S. delegation
and I intend to make standards to reduce the risk of piracy a major topic of my pre-
sentations that I will give there at that time.
In addition, the Coast Guard has worked very, very hard within the U.S. govern-
ment, with our international partners, to do one other thing regarding piracy, and
that is to attach consequences to the behavior of pirates; or, as my lawyers would
call it, “a consequence delivery regime.” Sometimes, lawyers are good.
We had a very successful negotiation with the government of Kenya that resulted
in a memorandum of understanding being signed back in January that would allow a
process whereby Kenya would accept for prosecution acts of piracy and we actually
have cases that are under way in the Kenyan courts as we speak. These are the inter-
national agreements, partnerships, and constructs that we are going to need to build
to make sure that we’re dealing with all facets of the problem. There is nothing worse
than interdicting pirates, having them foul your deck, and then having to put them
back ashore with no consequences. So we need to work very, very hard to make sure
that we all work together and we are doing this through the International Maritime
Organization and UN Security Council resolution [1851] to be able to attach conse-
quences to these actions. And we will continue to do that moving forward.
Third area on piracy—the Coast Guard has deployed Law Enforcement Detach-
ments into the Fifth Fleet and they are serving as directed by Vice Admiral Gortney
on Navy ships that are attached in the area. What we’ve been able to do, and this is a
challenge for many of you that I’ve spoken to as I’ve traveled around the world,
we’ve been able to integrate Navy visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) teams for
security with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) that have skills
and competencies in boarding, search, and then how to conduct the required ac-
tions that lead to a successful prosecution, and that’s [including] understanding the
evidentiary requirements. If you’re going to go to court and seek a prosecution,
make sure that evidence is preserved and that you understand the level of proof
that will be required to bring those consequences to bear.
To give you an example, in the case of the Maersk Alabama—you’re all familiar
with the Maersk Alabama. That was the case where we actually engaged pirates with
Navy SEALs. One of them survived, one was already on the ship. At that point, we
needed to treat the Maersk Alabama as a crime scene. So when it got to Mombasa, it
was sealed off and Coast Guard criminal investigators and Navy criminal investiga-
tors went on board and preserved evidence for a prosecution. It gets back to my
point where you have to go on board with the end in mind, and if the end in mind
means to get these folks into court then our ability to put Navy and Coast Guard
people together to achieve the security outcomes you want, but also to hold ac-
countable those pirates and be able to take them to court, is a good outcome and
one we need to continue to work on.
There is a high-level contact group that’s been developed in the United States.
It’s outreaching to foreign partners, and we will continue to do that. But as we move
forward, my goal as the Commandant of the Coast Guard is to use my position and
my authorities, our capabilities, and our competencies to build those other areas
that go beyond the tactical employment of forces just to stop the act and attack the
root causes where we can.
As I’ve traveled around the world, I’ve noticed there are a couple of other areas
where international cooperation and Navy–Coast Guard teams are making a con-
siderable difference. Let me first talk about [our] own hemisphere, here in the
Americas.
We have some of my good friends in the room, Admiral [Guillermo Enrique]
Barrera from Colombia, and Admiral [Jorge] Pastor [from Mexico]. Thank you
very much for being here. We were in Mexico City not long ago for their independ-
ence celebration, El Grito [16 September]. We have talked about the teamwork
between navies and coast guards and coast guard–like organizations to deal with
the drug trafficking threat that we see in the Western Hemisphere. We are having
increased success every year through a number of actions we have taken that inte-
grate international efforts and domestic efforts.
The first is a series of bilateral agreements on what we are going to do in relation
to drug trafficking and how the U.S. and our partner nations who are patrolling
down there with Joint Interagency Task Force South will finally take these fast boats
down and, again, cause consequences to be associated with [the criminals’] action.
That is, either arrest or prosecution in the United States or the countries of jurisdic-
tions where they might be.
Over the course of the years, we’ve been able to develop a number of regional
agreements regarding information sharing that have allowed us to fuse intelli-
gence, pass it quickly, and queue up operations so the nearest country that has the
capability in the jurisdiction can act. Because in the end, we want the drugs off the
water and we want the drug traffickers held accountable.
There is a lot of talk in the United States about our southwest border. As the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, as I’ve told our friends in the hemisphere, the
problem is a hemispheric problem—a commodity that is flowing and returning
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money to drug trafficking organizations is a problem that we all share together. We
can be most successful at [solving] it when we share information and work together
in a cooperative spirit. I’d like to compliment our Mexican partners.
A little over a year ago, we found a self-propelled semisubmersible operating off
the west coast of Mexico. There were no service assets available to respond. We
passed the information to our Mexican partners and, within an hour, they re-
sponded. And Mexican Marine Special Forces vertically inserted onto the self-
propelled semisubmersible under way and took it down. A terrific example of how
we can work together when the information gets passed and you have the right as-
sets in place to address the threat.
Another area we’ve been working together is illegal fishing. As I’ve traveled
around, I’ve made the comment that whether it’s a navy mission, a coast guard mis-
sion, a fisheries and forestry mission, or a public safety mission, we’re really talking
about the things that are critical to national sovereignty. Drug trafficking, illegal
migration, illegal fishing, offshore oil and gas exploration and production—these
are the things that really, really matter, especially in very difficult economic times,
and they all call for integrated, international solutions.
We are working very, very diligently with our partners in Oceania in the South
Pacific, with our French partners, our New Zealand partners, and our Australian
partners, to take on issues like migrating tuna stocks, and the inability of small na-
tions to be able to project presence and enforcement capability to the limits of their
exclusive economic zones [EEZs].
We have done the same thing off the west coast of Africa and the Cape Verde Is-
lands. In some cases, we have made agreements where we will take a Coast Guard
law enforcement detachment, put it on a partner nation vessel, and, again—similar
to what we’ve been doing with the Navy on the Horn of Africa—work jointly to de-
tect illegal fishing and take proper enforcement action. Sometimes this has been a
Coast Guard law enforcement detachment operating off a U.S. Navy ship and
sometimes it’s been a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment operating off a
partner nation ship. In our view, it doesn’t matter; it’s what’s effective, what
achieves the results, and what helps us establish a presence in the EEZ to support
the protection of these fish stocks moving forward.
In each of these cases, we have an example of an expanded view of naval forces
and maritime strategy that goes well beyond traditional concepts of navy opera-
tions to integrate not only a whole-of-government approach, but a whole-of-
nations-of-the-world approach to deal with these very, very critical problems mov-
ing forward.
I’d like to go to one other topic and then I’d be glad to take some questions and
have a conversation with you.
I had a chance last April to travel to India and meet with Vice Admiral [Anil]
Chopra, my counterpart, and discuss the attacks at Mumbai. I’ve had the chance in
the last year to visit with my partners in the Western Hemisphere and talk about the
threat of self-propelled semisubmersibles in the drug trade. We have just talked
about the challenges in the Horn of Africa. I would submit to you that the thread
that goes through those three different threats is unregulated small boats and the
linkage of unregulated small boats to Maritime Domain Awareness.
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Under international law, the cutoff for regulation under our treaty system is 300
gross tons, generally. [At] 300 gross tons and above, there are requirements, if
you’re a contracting nation, to carry AIS [Automatic Identification System], to have
long-range tracking, to create visibility and transparency. And that is good. Since
the attacks of 9/11, this has all happened through international agreement at the
International Maritime Organization, including the International Ship and Port
[Facility] Security Code. But, I would submit to you, we will not achieve Maritime
Domain Awareness, we will not make the seaways safe the way they need to be, un-
less we take on the issue of unregulated small boats.
Now, I say that, knowing that I’m not very popular in my own country for saying
that. I had somebody from one of the boating safety manufacturing organizations
who came up to me a while back and said, “Admiral Allen, driving is a privilege and
boating is a right.” This is a very tough group to deal with.
The other group in our country that’s very difficult to deal with is commercial
fishing vessels, which are virtually unregulated. If we find a fishing vessel at sea
that’s operating unsafely, we can terminate her voyage, but we cannot make an in-
spection of that vessel a condition of operations in getting under way.
So what I have done in my tenure as Commandant, and I’m just over my third
year, [is to] engage in national discussion about the threats of small boats and
where we need to go. Two years ago in Washington, we held a small-vessel security
conference and we focused on four scenarios. One scenario was the use of a small
boat as a standoff platform for a shoulder-held weapon in or around an airport
near water. The other one was a way to introduce a weapon of mass effect into the
country. The third one is a waterborne improvised explosive device and the fourth
scenario, even though it was two years ago, was the Mumbai scenario, bringing a
terrorist group ashore, via small boats, to perpetrate an attack.
I did this knowing that it would not be popular in my country, but I did not want
to go through my tenure as commandant and not at least have the discussion, raise
it up and get visibility [for] it. Things like driving AIS carriage requirements below
the international limit [are] a significant issue around the world. There are many
countries in this room that have far stricter guidelines and greater transparency
than the United States of America does. Singapore comes to mind. Ecuador has
more stringent requirements than we do.
My intention at the next general assembly of IMO is to deliver a speech on trans-
parency of small boats and see if I can’t start to gather a consensus among the
nations to create international standards that everybody would have to comply
with. I’m not sure what the parameters are. It could be length, it could be horse-
power, it could be weight, but I believe we could do better than we are. I believe we
must do better than we are because the vulnerability is too great. Now, the threat
varies depending on where you’re at in the world. There are many places where
there is a demonstrated ability to use these small vessels to be very, very effective in
attacks. I don’t think we should wait for an event to do something about it.
So as we move forward, I’m going into my last year as Commandant and you may
see some clippings where I’m going to get much more vocal about this, okay? My
pension’s assured, I think.
The last topic I’d like to talk about, and then I really would like to answer any
questions or have a discussion, involves cargo security. This is a significant issue in
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the United States and one that I have responsibilities for as the Commandant of the
Coast Guard. There is a particular concern about certain cargoes; liquefied natural
gas would be one. But there are many other cargoes out there that are carried that
can cause serious consequences: ammonium nitrate, chlorine, other certain dan-
gerous cargoes. For that reason, last week in Washington we convened a cargo
security conference to take a look at the threat posed by cargoes, how to reduce that
threat, and, again, how do we, from a whole-government approach, take actions to
reduce the vulnerability and the implications and the consequence of a cargo secu-
rity event happening. Again, we will make that report public and it will be
published sometime in the next couple of months moving forward.
I guess I would sum up by saying first of all, he’s not here, but I would like to
thank Gary Roughead for the opportunity to collaborate on the [Maritime] Strat-
egy and I think it’s been very beneficial for two reasons. Number one, it has allowed
us the ability to talk to you at gatherings like this about the interaction between
marine-type organizations, coast guard organizations, and navies. I think, on the
other hand, it has also allowed us to take a broader view, and I was particularly
struck with Dean McFadden’s presentation. He said it was a busy slide and it briefed
ugly. Folks, government is ugly, you know; but it’s our government, right? I think
coming up with solutions that integrate whole-of-government approaches is what
this strategy ultimately is all about and it extends to the international context. Re-
cently, we had the tsunami in the South Pacific that affected American Samoa and
Western Samoa. Our ability to mobilize aircraft and get relief supplies down there
was key. In fact, a Coast Guard C-130 flew the governor back to Pago Pago from
Hawaii, where he had been for a conference.
During the process of that response, I was in contact with our folks from New
Zealand. General Jerry Mateparae [Chief, New Zealand Defence Force] and I com-
municated with each other through our staffs and with Admiral [Timothy J.]
Keating [Commander, U.S. Pacific Command]. While there were not a large num-
ber of people that were involved in that, it was a significant impact on those
populations. I believe that we did a better job in responding to that event today
than we would have two or three years ago, absent the strategy having these discus-
sions, conducting the outreach, and going around the world talking to our partners
about the problems, sharing best practices, and learning how to cooperate when
these events occur.
So it’s my pleasure to be here this morning; it’s always a pleasure to be with all of
you. I will expand on Gary’s statement. You all are our shipmates and it’s been a
great three years that I’ve been able to work with you and I appreciate it. I will be re-
tired by the time you have another International Seapower Symposium, but I will
be interested in everything you are doing. I will consider all your friendships life-
long friendships, so thank you very much. I’m not sure who the moderator is, or
who gets it from here. Questions? Okay. About fifteen minutes, yes.
DISCUSSION
Vice Admiral Homero Lajara, Dominican Republic:
Admiral Allen, it’s a pleasure to be here with you, sharing this symposium with you.
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I just wanted to share with all of you our experience, the one that we had working
directly with the U.S. Coast Guard, as we established in the Dominican Republic
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, ISPS. This is an interna-
tional program that was established by you, the Coast Guard, and thanks to this,
our country was able to successfully implement this.
We also should mention what we did in the fight against illegal immigration and
drug trafficking in the Caribbean. It is our pleasure to have two representatives
from the U.S. Coast Guard in our country and we are working in the Port State
Control Program.
The types of action and the cooperation we have had with the Coast Guard are a
tool, a basic tool, that we need to be able to control the sea and the Caribbean area,
because we are in a very strategic place. We have more trade, but we also have more
drug trafficking and illegal immigration in the area. So I just wanted to mention
how successful our bilateral operations have been and I also would like to say that
we have to work together and share more training and equipment and keep on
fighting the regional crimes. Thank you, Admiral Allen.
Admiral Thad Allen, United States:
Gracias, Almirante. The admiral raises a couple of very good points.
When I talked about integrating our efforts, one of the areas is the International
Ship and Port [Facility] Security Code. In many countries, the local control of the
ports and the security of the ports may fall under a transportation ministry or an-
other ministry other than the defense ministry. But when raised to a certain level of
concern or a watch level, then there may be the involvement of the armed forces,
when it exceeds the capability of local port authorities. So this is another area where
a whole-of-government approach is required to make sure there is an effective and
efficient hand-off as the threat level rises and different capabilities are needed.
I would also add that our cooperation with the Dominican Navy has helped us
perfect a technology we think is going to be very, very useful in the future. In Mona
Pass, the body of water that separates Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, we
have started using wireless biometrics to actually take fingerprints and wirelessly
check them back to a database and find out whether or not there are outstanding
warrants, and whether or not we’ve got a recidivist, a felon, attempting reentry.
That’s been very successful. We’ve now expanded that up off the north coast of
Haiti and into the Straits of Florida, between Florida and Cuba, as well. So, thank
you, sir, for the comments.
Brigadier General Zakariya Mansoor, Maldives:
Thank you very much, first of all, for the very elaborate and eloquent informative
presentation that you have given and also for the continued support for maritime
security and safety of our region and our country.
I’m a very firm supporter of the small-boat operations regulation. I’m sure it is
very important that the small boats that operate within the Maldives and around in
our EEZ need to be regulated or monitored in one way or the other. So I’m also
looking for a way to regulate our fishermen and our transportation boats moving
around the Maldives. I think the issue that you have raised will be taken to our
political-level authority to discuss in the IMO meeting. So, if there’s any suggestion
that you could add, please, I will really appreciate it, sir. Thank you.
94 Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium
Admiral Thad Allen, United States:
Well, I will tell you my initial conversations with the International Maritime Orga-
nization lead me to believe that the current position that would be taken by that
body is that the internal regulation of boats below the international threshold, in
this case, 300 gross tons, is the province of that nation. So I think what we are look-
ing for as a start would be voluntary standards, best practices, and how you can deal
with these things knowing that there are certain things that you cannot dictate in-
ternally. It’s very hard to get international agreement when I can’t even get consen-
sus in my own country, but, I think as difficult as the question is, we should not stop
trying.
Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, Ecuador:
Good morning. Here in the U.S., the Navy and the Coast Guard are separated. My
understanding is that the Coast Guard was part of the Transportation Department
and now is under the Homeland Security Department. In most of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, the navies and the coast guards are part of the navies. I think that the
exception would be the Argentine Republic. However, in this dual activity, we in
the navy have to work very hard to be able to control these crimes, crimes that are
on the upswing right now. There are other colleagues here that have said that we
have to fight against drug trafficking; however, our economies do not allow us to do
what we want to do. We don’t have the resources. What I want to say is that most
countries that have larger economies should play a larger role so that we could
work together.
Admiral Thad Allen, United States:
I thank you for that comment. I think collective regional approaches to regional
problems are the very best way to attack these problems. I think in the twenty years
since 1989, when we established a role for detection and monitoring for the Depart-
ment of Defense in the United States, which resulted in the establishment, ulti-
mately, of Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, what we have done is
been able to bring what anybody can contribute, put it down there, but coordinate it,
pass the information around, and do it from one central location so we can queue up
what we would call an end gain for law enforcement officials, whether that’s the
United States or one of our partner nations, or executing a bilateral agreement.
Nobody has enough resources to do this alone, not even the large countries. The
space out there that we’re dealing with, you know—the oceans are the last global
commons, the physical global commons if you don’t deal with cyberspace, and they
are largely ungoverned and there are no bright lines. There is no border. [When]
you have a land border, you know you’re in one country or the other. You may ar-
gue about it, but it’s a bright line. We have bands of jurisdiction. We have territorial
seas. We have customs waters. We have exclusive economic zones.
I think the only way you’re ever going to deal with these problems is regional,
through partnerships. Everybody has something that they bring to the table in
terms of hemispheric leadership, training, small boats [experience]. Admiral
Barrera has hosted a hemispheric counterdrug conference in Cartagena last fall.
There are very many examples where, if we work collectively, we may not have the
resources we need, but the resources we have are put to the best use.
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I guess one more, if we have one. Yes, sir?
Mr. Samuel Kamé-Domguia, African Union:
Thank you, Admiral. As you can see, my English is very poor, so I would suggest you
take your headsets, please. [Simultaneous translation from French follows]
Admiral, in your brilliant presentation, you did mention your involvement
around the African coasts dealing with problems of fisheries, illegal fishing, and
you did mention your cooperation with various countries, in this regard. Specifi-
cally, I would like to know if, concretely, there were any results produced in terms of
seizures of boats, boats caught while fishing illegally off the coasts of Africa. That
would be my first question. My second question is about drug trafficking, specifi-
cally off of the west coast of Africa. Because, as you know, we are young countries,
young nations, and the scourge of drugs represents for us a real concern given the
impact that could have on our populations. So are you involved, engaged on this
front off of the west coast of Africa?
If I may be allowed one last point, Admiral. This is about dumping of toxic waste
of all types. Is the U.S. Coast Guard involved in fighting against the illegal dump-
ing of toxic waste, which, for us also, is a devastating factor of our marine
environment? Thank you very much.
Admiral Thad Allen, United States:
Those are three very good questions. Let me start with the last one first. The Coast
Guard does have statutory responsibility over illegal discharge into our waters. We
are the primary response organization in the United States on the water for oil and
hazardous chemical discharges or anything that is illegally discharged. We enforce
the maritime pollution conventions that have been passed through the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization. That also relates not only to discharges from vessels,
but air emissions due to heavy fuels and, actually, areas to be avoided, which allow
you to control maritime habitats by establishing protected areas in and around ma-
rine sanctuaries and things like that. So, we do that as part of our mission set in the
United States Coast Guard.
Regarding fisheries, and I have to acknowledge Admiral [Mark P.] Fitzgerald
[Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Africa], sitting here, [as] our partner.
We kind of both deal with the European Command and the Africa Command as far
as providing resources. Our resources are very, very small, but quite often, we’re
able to leverage naval assets, like working with Admiral Fitzgerald to actually get
our law enforcement teams on Navy ships.
But I’ll give you two [recent] examples and we will try and get you some more de-
tail, because I may not remember all the facts. We’ve had two very successful
fisheries enforcement operations. First were the Cape Verde Islands and most re-
cently was Sierra Leone. The case of Sierra Leone was very interesting, because we
actually caught foreign fishing vessels illegally inside [its] exclusive economic zone
and we brought them into port. It was a very interesting thing; it was almost like the
issue of piracy—once you got them, what do you do with them? And it begged the
issue of whether or not there were statutory provisions in place that would allow
prosecution. So one thing I would tell you, based on our experience, as we start to
look at illegal fishing and what we’re trying to do about it, we need to make sure
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that the proper statutes and codes are in place to allow for a successful prosecution
once something is detected. I think sometimes that’s not thought about and, when
you start to bring them to port, then the issue[s] [are] what crime did they commit,
is it punishable under statutes, and can they be brought to trial?
Now, all that ultimately happened, but since it had never happened before in
that country, it took a while to kind of work through the legal issues associated with
it. That’s the reason that you kind of need to think about that ahead of time. We can
[be] and have been effective in fisheries patrols off the west coast of Africa.
[A] final thing on drugs. In the last three years, we have seen a significant diver-
sion of cocaine coming out of South America to the west coast of Africa and the
Iberian Peninsula. It is clear, undisputable, that there is increased cocaine trafficking
to those two parts of the world. Our European partners have set up a maritime oper-
ations center to coordinate their activities in Lisbon, Portugal, and I have visited that
center. The director of Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West has also vis-
ited there and the Serious Organised Crime Agency in the UK has been involved as
well.
There are some intelligence gaps about exactly how much is moving, where it’s
moving, and how it is moving, but it’s undeniable that there has been a shift in co-
caine trafficking. Now, the majority goes north, but there are two flows that have
emerged—one, west coast of Africa, Iberian Peninsula; the other one, Dominican
Republic and Haiti—that we’re very concerned about now and working with our
partners moving forward. That is something we’re going to have to come to grips
with. Right now, we’re doing the best job we can in trading information.
I think it would be useful for the African Union to take a look at the coordination
mechanisms that have been created in the Caribbean through bilateral agreements
on how we patrol, how we exchange information, and how we operate in and out
[of] and close to the territorial seas of sovereign nations. I think there’s much to be
learned from the last twenty years’ experience we’ve had in the Caribbean and I’m
sure we’d be glad to share that with you.
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Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:
I would just like to say a word about the dinner dance last night. I think it was agreat event. It was the first time we’ve done it over at Belle Mer. I think it was an
excellent location for the dinner dance and I have to say that, after participating in
my third ISS [International Seapower Symposium], the dancing prize has to go
Rear Admiral and Mrs. Grenstad from Sweden. Of course, they were not the only
dancers, but they were, enthusiastically, the first dancers.
One other thing that I would like to note this morning—I’d like the delegates
from Peru to stand, please. Rear Admiral Caballero and Rear Admiral Ormeño, I
know you’re here. Yesterday was the 188th anniversary of the founding of the Peru-
vian Navy, and so I ask all the delegates to join me in a round of applause for this
significant event.
[Applause]
So we’re going to begin the day with the third panel discussion, Leveraging Coop-
erative Effort to Enhance Maritime Security Operations, and you can see the names of
the panel chair, Admiral al-Tenaiji, and the other flag officers in front of you. In a
moment, I’ll ask them to come to the stage. Upon conclusion of this panel discus-
sion, we’ll move immediately to the same venues for lunch as yesterday; delegates
in the Naval Staff College wardroom and the staff in Mahan Rotunda. Then, I’d
like, if possible, all the delegates in Colbert Plaza by 1330, so we can begin to set up
for the photo and we will have a diagram out there and some staff to assist you in
your seating. But, as I showed you in the photo yesterday, it will be a trapezoid-
shaped formation with the first four rows seated, and those seats will be by name. So
the staff will help you find your assigned seat. The ones seated will be primarily the
chiefs of navy and chiefs of delegation. Then, standing behind, will be the other
delegates and there will be individual places marked for you to stand so we hope we
get a nice formation. Hopefully, by 1330, the photo is completed, [and] we will move
back into Spruance Auditorium, where we will present the breakout group seminar
reports.
After that, probably about four o’clock, Admiral Roughead will close the Nine-
teenth Seapower Symposium. This evening is a free evening for the delegates
remaining. For those that would like to have dinner in the Hyatt, there will be a
dinner provided in the Hyatt. If you have other plans that might include some local
establishments in town, I don’t own any of them, so I’m not going to mention any by
name, but I hope you enjoy the last evening in Newport and if you are leaving this
afternoon or tomorrow, as most of you will be, I wish you good travels.
So, without further ado, if Admiral al-Tenaiji and the members of his panel
would take their places on the stage, we will begin panel number three.
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
[Translation from Arabic follows]1 Admiral Roughead, thank you for inviting us to
attend this symposium. Today, I am proud and happy to be working among this
group of distinguished figures and to be chairing the Third Panel of the Nine-
teenth International Seapower Symposium. Today is the fortieth anniversary of
this symposium, and this demonstrates a long-lasting commitment. Thanks are
also extended to Rear Admiral Wisecup for hosting this activity at the distinguished
Naval War College, the college that I am proud to be returning to today as Com-
mander of the United Arab Emirates naval forces, fifteen years after arriving here
for the first time as a student on a leadership and staff course.
Distinguished colleagues, generals, naval forces and coast guard representatives,
and civilian officials: I do hope that your trip to Newport was easy and convenient.
You undoubtedly agree with me that the benefits of this conference will be nu-
merous: it will encourage the spread of regional and international initiatives that
will serve as the principal means of ensuring maritime security, stability, and safety
and, hence, collective prosperity.
After hearing the guidelines [that were presented to us], we come together for
this third and final plenary panel to start our discussions about its topic. This
panel’s goal is to create the means for expanding cooperative efforts through re-
gional maritime partnership, to build mutual confidence, to develop cooperation
and joint action, and to promote multilateral opportunities for training so that sig-
nificant responsibilities may be assumed to achieve the common goal of maritime
security. And that is considered one of our most important priorities.
In the very near future the naval forces of the United Arab Emirates will assume
command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 152, just as the naval forces of the King-
dom of Bahrain did in 2008. This demonstrates the determination of the countries
of the Gulf Cooperation Council—and of the United Arab Emirates—and their
commitment to the success of building an effective partnership that seeks a com-
mon maritime goal for all countries around the world. Today, the Arabian Gulf,
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including the Strait of Hormuz, represents a choke point for the world trade sys-
tem, and it is one of the world’s most sensitive maritime strategic and commercial
theaters. As chair of this discussion session, I seize this opportunity to express my
hope that all the states that are located on the shores of the Arabian Gulf, including
Iran, will work together to secure the region. I am also hoping that international
participation in CTF 152 can be expanded.
All naval units, and particularly the coast guard, are involved in maritime secu-
rity. In this regard I would like to point out to you the significant task that the
Emirates’ coast guard is performing as a component of the Emirates’ armed forces.
Since it was established four years ago, [our] coast guard has been securing our ter-
ritorial waters by reducing [the number of] maritime crimes. With regard to the
various [unconventional] threats [that we face], we have to be more cooperative. To
become [more] effective [in this regard], an agency for protecting vital installations
and facilities was established last year, and the coast guard and elements of the
maritime police were combined.
Let me shed light on some aspects of the symposium, given the strong opportu-
nities [it affords us] to leverage cooperative efforts. There is, for example, the
Indian Naval Forces’ Initiative that is associated with the Indian Ocean Naval Sym-
posium (IONS), which is a regional initiative.
A technical symposium that was attended by representatives of eighteen navies
from the littoral states of the Indian Ocean was convened three months after the
IONS. Some of the issues that were discussed at that symposium were setting stan-
dards for joint action, technical cooperation, and procedural interoperability
among IONS states, and increasing logistical support to ships upon deployment in
the Indian Ocean region. And last week a technical workshop was held in
Mombasa, Kenya. There is no doubt that naval cooperation among the littoral
states of the Indian Ocean is proceeding apace.
Through this goal of maritime cooperation a maritime security conference was
convened in the Emirates in July 2008, and another conference on maritime secu-
rity was convened in May 2009. I am pleased to remind you that in the next few
months the Emirates will host in Abu Dhabi the second IONS. The United Arab
Emirates will chair this symposium in March 2010.
Maritime security has been a topic of major concern throughout history for
countries that are seeking to facilitate commerce. Ever since the earliest ages of his-
tory maritime piracy has been a common threat. Then the time came when
equilibrium was achieved in combating acts of piracy.
Currently, piracy within Somalia’s [territorial] waters has begun to spread to ar-
eas that are far from the coast, and that has attracted the attention of countries
around the world and demonstrated the need for maritime cooperation. At the
present time, two initiatives from the United States and from European countries
have shown that addressing this matter related to maritime security is imperative.
Putting an end to this problem requires close international cooperation. We thank
all the countries that have contributed to these efforts. Putting an end to such prob-
lems requires us to work in a united fashion on a comprehensive project.
Our efforts and our support for finding an appropriate collective solution must
meet with determination and strong resolve. We must all remember the success that
was achieved in Southeast Asia and in the Strait of Malacca in the war against acts of
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piracy in order to secure the seas and to achieve the objectives of efforts to combat
piracy—objectives that were achieved through cooperation among all the partners.
To follow the schedule, I would like to remind you of some procedural matters.
As far as the two previous sessions are concerned, the time designated for a panelist
was set to between ten and twelve minutes. Signals to the speakers [utilized during
those sessions] remain the same: a yellow card indicates that the speaker has from
two to five minutes left, but a red card means that the speaker’s time is up. Now that
we have reviewed the arbitration rules for soccer, we will review those for tennis. A
question-and-answer session that will follow after the panelists complete their pre-
sentations will be open. Members of the audience [who may wish] to ask questions
or make comments will find a microphone hanging on the back of the seat in front
of you. Please state the name of the panelist to whom a question is addressed.
Now that these rules have been made clear, I will introduce the first panelist. He
is Rear Admiral Nils Wang, chief of maritime operations for the Danish Navy. He
will discuss piracy-combating operations.
Thank you for your attention.
Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Denmark:
Thank you very much and I would like to say thank you even though Admiral
Roughead is not present as I can see right now, I would like to say thank you very
much for the exceptionally good dinner yesterday and also thank you to you, Rear
Admiral Wisecup, for hosting this excellent venue in these beautiful facilities.
I will dare to tell a little story from my younger days at sea and, hopefully,
they might not count fully in the fifteen minutes scheduled. It’s about maritime
communication, for better and for worse. I was serving as a chief of staff in
STANAVFORLANT [Standing Naval Force, Atlantic] in 1999–2000 and after
spending eight months in a Canadian destroyer, serving a Canadian admiral, we
had a change of command to USS Moosbrugger [(DD 980)] under an American ad-
miral. I was there as chief of staff, as I mentioned, and, of course, I had to do the
briefing and the continuity between the two commanding officers and make sure
that the new admiral that I hadn’t met yet was fully briefed on what was going on. I,
of course, e-mailed a lot with my new boss and every time there was a decision that
was reaching into his period, I sought his advice and that went very well.
When we arrived in Halifax, there was a lot of turmoil, as there is when you have
to change the flagships, and all the ceremonies; so, after a couple of days, my new
boss from [the] U.S. Navy came to my stateroom and said, “Nils, you and I, we have
to learn to know each other better, why don’t we go to a steakhouse in Halifax to-
night and have a good talk.” I thought it was a splendid idea. So later on that
evening, we went to a steakhouse in Halifax, I can’t remember the name, and this
young waitress came to our table and asked what we would like to eat. When she
heard how we spoke, she said, “Hey, where are you from, guys?” My American ad-
miral said, “Well, I’m from the U.S. Navy, I’m from Washington, D.C. and this is my
good friend Nils Wang from Copenhagen, Denmark.” Then the waitress said,
“Wow, how did you guys meet?” and then I heard myself say, “On the Internet.”
[Laughter/Applause]
I met him again in Singapore recently and we are still good friends. This is my
third ISS and I would like to use the opportunity also to say that although we some-
times feel that things are moving very slowly, it strikes me, actually, how fast we
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have progressed on many of the issues that we have discussed during these last cou-
ple of days. When I think about where we were with Maritime Domain Awareness in
2005 when I attended the ISS for the first time and then look at how we have been
presented with the connectivity between regions and all the rest of it, I think it’s
been tremendous progress, actually. I think it indicates that we, as sailors, are ex-
tremely good at finding solutions together.
Since I’m here as the acting chairman of the Chiefs of European Navies, it might
be relevant to give you just a quick overview to those who aren’t that familiar with
the CHENS, what it’s all about.
The CHENS is an informal, independent, and nonpolitical forum of Chiefs of
European Navies. The forum was formally organized in 1994 and had, at that time,
twelve member nations. Today, we are twenty-five member countries in the CHENS.
CHENS is what you could call a maritime think tank which is exchanging infor-
mation on navies, and naval military views, and we are producing maritime
strategic and operational documents. The viewfoil presented here shows you the
formal papers which have been endorsed by the CHENS over the last years.
Today, I will present you with a brief update on what the CHENS are doing right
now, and I was also asked to address the counterpiracy problem during this session
and, with a little luck, I’ll be able to do both at the same time. Maybe from a little
different angle than you would expect.
I feel tempted to start with a motto that has been repeated over and over again
during the last three days by several of my distinguished colleagues, namely, the
motto “no more sea blindness.” You can almost imagine it on a bumper sticker.
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I’m not sure that we will succeed in curing the world of sea blindness from one
day to the other, because sea blindness is created by a built-in paradox, or a system
error, you might call it: namely, 75 percent of the earth is covered by water, but 75
percent of all joint staffs are manned with army officers. Therefore, you will always
have a land-centric view on things when it comes to cooperation and jointness.
This, of course, gets even worse when it comes to many political-civilian organiza-
tions, including governments, for that matter. So to fight sea blindness is therefore
a constant struggle uphill that all naval officers should make their mission in life.
Let me try to be a little more specific.
If I could be a little provocative, you could call this building [the UN headquar-
ters] the very epicenter of sea blindness in the world. The maritime expertise and
insight in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO], in the UN head-
quarters, is close to zero and this is, in my mind, a major obstacle to many of the
ideas and visions that we have talked about over the last couple of days, simply be-
cause most of them require a global effort.
Last year, the CHENS decided to approach the UN in order to make them aware
of maritime security issues. My predecessor as chairman in the CHENS, Captain
Andreas Ioannides from Cyprus, who is present here today, wrote a letter to the
military advisor of the DPKO, [Lieutenant] General [Chikadibia] Obiakor [of Nige-
ria]. As a follow-up to that letter, and in my capacity as being the chairman this year,
I visited the DPKO in the UN headquarters last Monday before I came up here. I
met with a deputy military advisor [for peacekeeping operations], Major General
[Abihijit] Guha [of India], and present was also a colonel and the collective
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maritime expertise of the DPKO, all five of them. I had the opportunity to inform
Major General Guha that the CHENS, during the next year, have decided to have a
special focus on maritime capacity building around Africa, on the African conti-
nent, and that the three permanent working groups under the CHENS
organization have been directed to focus on the challenges, perspectives, and the
potential of maritime capacity building.
It is my ambition as a chairman that the result of that work will be a paper that
right now has the working title “Adding Value to Maritime Capacity Building in Af-
rica, a CHENS Approach.” It is also my ambition to be able to deliver this work
during the next CHENS summit, in Copenhagen in August next year, by the way,
at the same time when the Danish Navy will celebrate its 500-year anniversary.
It is my impression from the meeting in New York that the exposure of maritime
challenges and operations related to the piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden has
had an impact on the attitude towards Maritime Domain [Awareness] in the DPKO.
It is, therefore, my personal feeling that the timing is right to promote maritime
thinking in the top of the UN, which, in my mind, is quintessential if you want to re-
duce sea blindness, as I had mentioned earlier, in general. I recognize the
tremendous work done by the IMO as a UN organization, but you can only create a
maritime strategic vision if you impact the strategic leadership in an organization.
When I look on the operations in the Gulf of Aden, it contains all the ingredients
required to be a perfect matter for UN-led operations, if you ask me. If you go back
in history, I doubt you would be able to find any example of a military operation
where so many countries are working together, cross-religion, cross-continent,
cross-alliances. On top of that, it is an operation that protects free trade, which is
the prerequisite for growth and prosperity and, therefore, an operation that almost
anyone on this earth can support—in other words, an operation with the exact
same goals as the very raison d’être of the UN.
Admiral Thad Allen used an expression yesterday in his brilliant presentation,
“a whole-of-government approach,” with reference to dealing with maritime secu-
rity. I don’t think you can have that whole world nation approach without a UN that
also thinks maritime at the strategic level.
Why maritime capacity building? Well, through maritime capacity building, we
have the ability to target the root problems of many of the challenges that we face at
sea. We have touched upon that several times during the last days, from various an-
gles, and many have stated that solutions to some of the challenges at sea should be
found ashore. What we can do at sea with warships and coast guard cutters is often
dealing with the symptoms, which is necessary, but the long-lasting solutions can
only be achieved if we support the establishment of sustainable governmental
structures that could control the maritime domain within the exclusive economic
zones. This is not an easy task and it requires a sustainable economy and support of
world organizations, such as the UN.
Last week, I attended the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum in Iceland, where
the Food and Agriculture Organization—FAO, under the UN like IMO—briefed
that the annual global amount of illegal fishing is estimated to be worth 24 billion
U.S. dollars every year. Just to put it into comparison, that is exactly five times the
Danish defense budget. Approximately 50 percent of that illegal fishing goes on in
the vicinity of the African continent. Imagine the impact if just a small percentage
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of that money was channeled into the respective owner countries through a UN-
coordinated effort using naval and coast guard forces together with other relevant
agencies. FAO furthermore reported at that occasion that, concerning the problem
of encountering illegal fishing around Africa, much of the maritime capacity-
building requirements are basic seamanship skills—for example, how to maintain
outboard motors, or how to execute a boarding in a safe manner. It doesn’t have to
be complicated necessarily.
As I mentioned during the executive session the other day, maritime capacity build-
ing requires close cooperation between all maritime agencies, including navies and
coast guards. I think that the U.S.-led Africa Partnership Station is a brilliant example
of how maritime forces can come together and provide maritime capacity building
from the sea. I think this type of operation can prevent future maritime problems. I
also believe that a project like this could be a UN undertaking in the future, but it re-
quires that we get rid of the blindness and create maritime vision instead.
Thank you very much.
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
Thank you, Admiral. I would like now to introduce Admiral Barrera from Colom-
bia. He’ll be speaking about the “International Cooperation for Maritime Security:
The Most Effective Strategy against Narco-traffic.”
Admiral Guillermo Barrera, Colombia:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much in the name of the Co-
lombian Navy for hosting us today, for [allowing] the opportunity to speak with so
many good friends. Some of them I met here, in this Naval War College during my
time here in 1993, as my classmate Admiral Verma mentioned two days ago. My
classmate and I think we are the only ones who are still on active duty, because I
learned that our very good friend, [Vice Admiral] Tamotsu Kato [of Japan], left ser-
vice about three months ago. And thank you once again, because I met most of the
Latin American commanders or chiefs of the navies here in Newport two years ago
in my first ISS.
Today I will talk a little bit of how my country, which ten years ago was a failing
country, has been changed because of cooperation, because of the combined and
cooperative effort in the area. I will talk about a little part, but a very important one,
narco-traffic, which is the impetus for cooperation in my country.
In the local scenario within Colombia, we have the crops and production. In the
national scenario, we have narco-traffic kingpins. But then when we go to the
regional scenario in America, we have distribution, traffic, precursors, drug distri-
butors, [and] money laundering and flow.
In the international scenario, which concerns everyone here, the threats are
transnational crime, narco-trafficking liaisons, international demand, [and] money
laundering and flow. This is the scenario all over and around the world with narco-
trafficking and, as I was talking this morning with Dean McFadden, the problem is
not only the social, which is very important, but it’s the destruction of the will of the
youngsters that will be the future of our countries. If they are not able to govern
themselves, they won’t be able to govern their countries.
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We have been talking for these three days about these matters. Many problems
are transnational threats, difficult to enforce by control of the sea. You have heard
that this is not something that you can solve by yourself. One country, alone, cannot
solve it. But look at the impact of drugs on society, you can count many examples;
in politics, decisions have been made in many countries to try to deal with the prob-
lem and sometimes they have not been successful; on the economy, of course, in my
country, definitely; on violence; and, of course, on ties to terrorism, which could be
very closely related, if they find a way.
This is, once again, the scenario. We have six million square nautical miles in the
area and 9 percent of that is under the jurisdiction of Colombia, but 50 percent of
the illegal traffic moves through my country, which is estimated by JIATF-South
[Joint Interagency Task Force South] at around 1,500 tons of cocaine this year.
That’s a lot.
How are we working together in this area? Yesterday, Thad Allen mentioned
these two export lines besides this one which goes to Africa and Europe. This one
goes through the country of my dear friend [Admiral Jorge Pastor, Mexico], who has
been fighting real hard with no capacity and we are working together to solve the
problems they have. We give the small resources that we have in the area. This is
where the Colombian Navy has been involved, but I have to tell that the Colombian
Navy has the [functions of a] marine corps and the coast guard together within the
navy. As it was mentioned yesterday, most of the countries in Latin America cannot
afford to have separate services. Some countries have it, like in Argentina, which are
very strong services; but, in Colombia, we cannot afford that, so they are combined.
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Operational emphasis for the navy covers coca crops and processing, coca bases,
laboratories, the transportation of narcotics via rivers—we have more than 2,000
miles of navigable rivers and that means that the navy has to control a lot of rivers—
accumulation points on the coasts, and maritime transportation and international
distribution. This is the spectrum of where we are working. Countering drug use
and the laundering of assets produced by drug trafficking is not our navy’s prob-
lem, but we support efforts in these areas with intelligence. Recently, there was a
combined operation between the Mexican Navy, [with Admiral] Jorge [Pastor],
who is present here, and the Colombian police. They were able to catch more than
$35 million in one single day that was bound for South America to buy more weapons.
But sometimes, you have to deal with these issues when you have the people in
the military service that abuse drugs. Then you have to deal with it, you have to
fight with it, and you have to work with the people. We have been working on the
basics, the respect for human dignity, and that helps the youngsters in the services
to build up enough confidence in themselves, but it’s not easy.
This is the improved go-fast boat. As you can see, these blue things here are 55-
gallon tanks. The whole boat is a big tank of gasoline. They have got a space here
and here to carry between 1.5 and three tons of cocaine. It has a very low radar pro-
file and is very difficult to detect—with good radar, no more than four nautical
miles and if the sea is getting rough, it is more difficult. So this is a big problem in
which air capability is quite important.
These are the semi-submersibles and this shows the evolution of them. This is
the one we caught about twenty years ago, very unique. They never submerged, and
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they had to be on the surface, but look at this radar cross section. It’s nothing—very
hard to detect except from the air. That’s why Thad Allen mentioned yesterday the
huge success of the Mexican Navy when they were able to repel from a helo exactly
on top of the machine. This is probably the latest generation and this one was built
about 15 miles away from the sea. Naval engineers were at work here, two screws,
one left, one right, just like the normal thing and all the protection—you can see
here the protection for these machines. We destroyed it right there and it was capa-
ble of carrying up to ten tons of cocaine.
What they do now when they have been discovered is just sink the vessel. They
open the bottom valves and it goes down just like that; in two minutes, it sinks. No
proof. You cannot bring them to court. We have been working together with the
Mexican Navy and the United States to change the laws so you can prosecute these
people that go in those boats. We already have it in Colombia. It was almost an
eight-month process through the Congress in order to approve the law.
These are some of the things we have been improving through cooperation in
the area:
• Development of coast guard interoperability.
• Intelligence and training, that’s very important.
• Improved coordination, interagency, interinstitutional, and legal processes,
as I was mentioning.
• Improved legislation for the control of fuel, fishing areas (that’s very impor-
tant, because sometimes they go to fishing areas and the fishing ships supply
the provision of gasoline), and semi-submersibles law, as I was mentioning.
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• Maritime interdiction has been increased and I will tell about one of the re-
sults we had getting together.
• Information exchange.
• And, this is very important, confidence. Building up confidence means first
you have to open yourself. If you go to talk with your neighbor, with the CNO
of the next navy, just thinking “I need” probably won’t work. The first thing
should be “what I am able to give you.” Then let’s start together.
• And, of course, international leadership.
These are the results of the agreement between the United States and Colombia
that was signed in 1997 and it took about two years of negotiation. It was real hard,
but I think that was probably the best we have ever achieved in my country. And
look at the numbers. These are thousands and thousands of kilos, so we are talking
about tons of cocaine. But the same has been happening with all the neighbors. I
would mention, as an example, [Rear Admiral] Juan Santiago [Estrada García]
from Nicaragua, who’s with us here today.
In fact, be loyal to our governments. We solve the problems at the operational
level; we are never allowed to take them to the political level, as it is not necessary.
So these are things that have allowed increased confidence—talking to each
other, directly by phone, but also, my dear friends, using the Internet.
Information and intelligence sharing are quite important. That is the first step
after you have the agreement. The last one that we have put in action, I would say,
was with Costa Rica. The minister of the interior came to my country about two
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weeks ago. We will be sending our people in November to start the cooperation in
that area. The first part is to start talking about intelligence, real-time intelligence.
Combined and coordinated operations are quite important because nobody has
all their assets at sea to be able to confront the problem. And, in the case of Costa
Rica, the minister was mentioning they have no navy, no army. They are starting to
build up a coast guard and that means a lot of effort and that means a lot of help is
needed for this country that really wants to fight the narco-trafficking.
Logistical and economical support is quite important. Sometimes, you have to
refuel at sea and, for some countries, they don’t have the capability.
There must be an implementation of improved strategies. Let me show you one
example of that. Here, exactly here, two years ago, it was suggested to build up a
symposium on narco-traffic at sea [Simposio maritime contra el Narcotráfico en el
Continente Americano]. That symposium was realized in November of last year [19–
21 November 2008 in Cartagena, Colombia] with the heads of twenty-six countries,
including the ambassador for the Netherlands and eleven international agencies.
Two results came from that meeting. The first one was the International Mari-
time Analysis Center for Narcotrafficking. Seventeen countries came down to
Cartagena last April to work on the technical matters and they produced a paper
that was sent to all the navies. We already have the answers back from three of them
and we will be very grateful if you, the rest of the countries of South America, can
answer the questions that were asked when we sent the paperwork that was created
by these seventeen countries, prior to the next meeting, which is going to be held by
Admiral [Homero] Luis [Lajara Solá] in his country [Dominican Republic] next
year [27 June–1 July 2010], when the CNOs can approve that paper, which will
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create the International Maritime Analysis Center for Narcotrafficking. That will
be able to produce enough information, for example, to be played here in the game
at the War College next year, if possible.
The other product was the creation of the International School of Maritime In-
terdiction: eleven countries in the first course, twelve countries, right now, in the
second course, which has been filled up for next month. We are learning from each
other’s experiences. We are sending the best people to work together and learn
from each other there, to help each other. The narco-traffickers have changed con-
tinually the way they do business. We have to change accordingly.
A final consideration—drug smuggling generates various forms of violence, ter-
rorism being the worst. That is happening in several of our countries. When narco-
traffickers find they don’t get their way, they will kill people. This is something that
my dear friend, [Admiral] Jorge [Pastor], from Mexico, has been suffering through
recently, the killing of enormous quantities of people. And, of course, in my coun-
try too, where terrorism is still alive. We are winning the war, but it’s still alive.
International cooperation is essential to face different threats, such as terrorism
and drug smuggling at sea, but, also, international corporation for maritime secu-
rity should be focused on
• Asymmetric threats, which is not common right now for many nations;
• Information exchange and combined operations to enhance each country’s
law enforcement capabilities at sea;
• The fulfillment of international responsibilities; and
• Asking many of the things that you have been suggesting yesterday and the day
before yesterday. I’m grateful for such wonderful ideas you have been giving us.
I leave you this:
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This is the experience of our almost failing country, which now is surviving and
coming back to life; where the youngsters can have a better life, a better future. As
we say in the navy in Colombia, if we can save the life of just one single youngster in
the world, we are going in the right direction.
Thank you very much and God bless you all.
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
Now, I give the floor to Mr. Kamé-Domguia with “Developments in the African
Union’s Maritime Strategy.”
Mr. Samuel Kamé-Domguia, African Union:
Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Wisecup, thank you for inviting the African Union to
this special event. Please pass on our gratitude to Admiral Roughead, who is not
here this morning. It is indeed a pleasure and a great honor for me to be here and
to share some thoughts with all in the audience on the development of maritime
strategy and the African Union Commission.
My goal for this presentation will be twofold: first, to explore our current chal-
lenges at the African Union and, second, to connect our discussions to the way
forward. To do so, this presentation will focus on security threats to stability and de-
velopment in Africa and share, as I said earlier, some views on the AU’s strategic
plan to address maritime affairs.
As a concept for this presentation, I would argue that in this area of globaliza-
tion, maritime security around Africa is a sine qua non condition of global economy
stability and it is certainly essential for regional and global prosperity.
The density of maritime traffic around Africa is a reality that will only grow with
time and, as it grows, we will have to face a series of challenges. Some of them are
known today. Some will be direct, some will be indirect, and we have reasons to an-
ticipate that new challenges will appear in the future.
Despite all these challenges, we have to strive for a stable, secure, and clean mar-
itime domain around Africa for a lasting stability, vitality, and prosperity of the
peoples of Africa. The constitutive act of the African Union makes clear reference
on the security of African people. While threats undermine the security of the peo-
ple of Africa, responsibility for action lies, to a certain extent, with the AU, which is
the political body of the continent.
Let’s look at some of the threats to our stability and development:
• Oil bunkering. Someone mentioned yesterday or the day before that some fig-
ures are frightening. There was an article published on Reuters citing the
chairman of the Niger Delta Presidential Technical Committee, who said $24
billion worth of oil revenues had been lost to oil bunkering and vandalism in
the first nine months of 2008 in the Gulf of Guinea. Twenty-four billion
dollars!
• Illegal fishing. Illegal fishing is an issue very important to us at the African
Union. Illegal fishing severely impacts food, security, and economy develop-
ment in Africa. The FAO estimates that 200 million Africans rely on fish for
nutrition and 10 million rely on fishing for income. This is a lot of people.
Coastal nations of Africa, both on the west and eastern side of Africa and the
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northern side of Africa, could increase GNP [gross national product] up to 5
percent with effective fisheries regulations.
• Narcotics and arms trafficking. These are of great concern to us at the African
Union Commission. Admiral Allen mentioned this issue yesterday. Some doc-
umented report estimates that today 46 percent of all cocaine caught in
Europe airports is from Africa—46 percent as opposed to 33 percent from
Latin America. As I mentioned yesterday, this is a serious threat for the youth
of Africa.
• Human trafficking. Sixty percent of the world’s human trafficking occurs in
sub-Sahara Africa and it is estimated, in general, that 2.5 to 4 million migrants
cross international borders illegally each year. We believe that organized
crime groups—including recruiters, transporters and escorts, document sup-
pliers, enforcers, support, and debt collection—all these are people involved
in the human trafficking business, which earns criminals $10 billion in profit
annually.
• Piracy at Sea. This is something which is damaging the global economy. Direct
impact on the entire global trade leads to [an] increase of all commodity prices
in Africa and in the world. Some statistics revealed that in 2007, off the coast of
Somalia, we had thirty-one attacks, up from ten attacks in 2006. In 2008, we
had 111 attacks and the IMB [International Maritime Bureau] has already re-
ported more than 150 attacks since the beginning of this year. Most major
coverage highlights the situation on the east coast of Africa, but, as you all
know, we face the same situation on the west coast as well. If the excellent tech-
nicians are ready, I have one minute of film footage to show what happens on
the west coast of Africa.
We have been hearing a great deal over the last year about the problem of piracy
off the Horn of Africa. It’s where U.S., European, and other navies are now focusing
their antipiracy controls because, of course, there were 111 reported attacks there
last year. But over on the oil-rich west coast of Africa, they had forty reported at-
tacks last year, but the true figure, I’m told, is actually over one hundred and here’s
another one from just a few days ago.
Sound Track of Video Clip:
Twilight off the Nigerian coast nine days ago, and a sailor risks his life to film these
pirates, as they circle a Greek-owned tanker. Without warning, they fire directly at
him. Incredibly, no one is hit and the tanker escapes, but this is part of a worrying
trend.
Mr. Samuel Kamé-Domguia, African Union:
The situation off West Africa, I think, is escalating quite rapidly. We’ve seen some
fifteen reported attacks already this year and a lot of those attacks have involved vi-
olence, death, and injury. So, I think it is getting really quite serious.
Somali piracy, on the other side of Africa, has been grabbing the world’s atten-
tion, with parachute drops of million-dollar ransoms and crews held hostage, then
released unharmed. But the growing antipiracy naval task force off the Horn of Af-
rica is not being matched off the west coast, where more than half the attacks are
going unreported.
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Now shipping companies there are bracing themselves for a major high-profile
incident. And the reason I’m told why West African piracy is so underreported is
that the shipping companies moving the oil there are very reluctant to put pressure
on the local authorities. If anything, they’d like to keep the whole thing quiet.
[Recording interrupted]
Some of the threats we face in African waters include pollution and dumping of
toxic waste. I mentioned this yesterday, and the chief of the French Navy on
Wednesday mentioned the case of the oil tanker Erika, which in 1999 caused great
damage to the environment [when she broke apart off the coast of France].
Throughout the ’80s, Africa was the most popular dumping ground for some devel-
oped countries for radioactive waste and toxic chemical processing on our land. We
still face the same, maybe not at the same scale, but we still face the same situation
today with especially the dumping of electronic waste, known as e-waste. This is
something we have to focus on, seeing as we have all these unwanted mobile
phones, computers, and printers, which contain cadmium and which are dumped
in Africa, supposedly for a second use.
We also have natural disasters, which are of concern. Though they are natural, in
2004, disasters caused $123 billion worth of damage. As documented in a report
from the BBC, the Africa profile from 1980 to 2006 revealed that the number of
people killed ranged almost [to] 700,000 and the number of people affected went
over 300 million in Africa.
Let’s have a look now on our challenges. At various levels, we have challenges:
At a national level, we think it is important, and this has been mentioned a cou-
ple of times during this symposium, that we focus on collaborative efforts, on
information sharing, among all the agencies involved in maritime affairs. We be-
lieve that mechanism must also include local communities and interest group[s], as
well as the private sector.
At the regional and continental level, again we need to build more trust among
us. We need to work in a collaborative manner. We have to break the barriers that
divide us, that have been dividing us for decades now, and try to align our interests
in the same direction.
The South African Navy mentioned on Wednesday that they had twenty-four
agencies involved in maritime affairs in South Africa and, you can imagine, at the
level of the African Union, these will be multiplied by fifty-three member states. As
it is shown on this slide, part of our roles, we believe, is to garner a sizable political
will and promote harmonization of our policies between our nations and between
the subregions, what we call the regional economic communities. We also believe
that it might be interesting to organize and launch a continental campaign on the
normal sea blindness issue.
The need for a Maritime Security and Safety Division in the African Union Peace
and Security Department is recognized [and under development]. We can say to-
day that this is part of the priority. Though we have very critical issues at hand to
deal with in Somalia on the land, we have critical issues in many other countries in
Africa. Maritime security is becoming a great concern and this is shown in a state-
ment by the Commissioner for Peace and Security at the UN Security Council
meeting held in December last year [16 December 2008].
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This is what he said in his statement. I like the words “setting the tone to address
maritime security” around Africa. This was the first time a leader at that level in the
African Union addressed the UN Security Council and mentioned the issue of mar-
itime security. As you might be aware, the heads of state and government of the
African Union met recently and they released, for the first time, a decision on the
issue of maritime security in Africa. So the momentum is increasing on the belief
there will be room for greater interest in this domain.
We are striving to develop some action-oriented strategy to raise awareness at
national levels, at the level of the regional economic communities, and, as I said, to
make known what we are doing at the African Union in the global community.
Many people report us to be farsighted and, in this process, we think it is good
that we don’t work for our generation, that we don’t put our objectives for even our
children. We try to put them as far as possible into the future.
As you probably know, the continent of Africa, which is a huge island, has less
than a percent, I think it is 0.9 percent, of the gross tonnage in the shipping indus-
try. We believe there is room for us to build this up, maybe not in[to a] two-digit
percentage, but at least not far from that in the next couple of decades. So we be-
lieve the strategy should not end at just securing the sea, but also building wealth
for, creating wealth for, the African citizens.
In the process of building this grand strategy, we have identified some ends be-
cause, you know better than I do, strategy is all about linking ways and means. We
have identified some ends we expect to meet in the future.
Way Forward
Key Performance Areas (Ends)
1. Capabilities and capacity building (DEBEX 27 Nov 08)
2. Engage:
The whole PSD (11 Nov 08)
Relevant departments of the AUC (5 Dec 08)
Member states, the NEPD [Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act of 1972,
amended 1977, 1989], RECs [Regional Economic Communities], MOWCA
[Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa], the African diaspora, the
private sector, and external partners, academies to include war colleges
3. Manuals development
4. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
5. Interstate maritime boundaries demarcation
6. Strengthen regulatory boundaries
7. Build up the African sea powers
These are the key performance areas we have so far identified and we believe
that this is not comprehensive. We believe the process is flexible. We believe it’s a
dynamic process, a lively process, and, with time, we will make sure that we don’t ig-
nore anything. We will have issues of prioritization. As you well know, we are short
in terms of budget, but we don’t want to leave out [anything] which is not taken into
account, even if we don’t address it now.
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So each key performance area you saw in the previous slide is articulated into
lines of action with clear objectives for each of the lines of action. Each line of action
has a comprehensive plan of action.
So after we have fine-tuned our ends, we have to create some SWOT [Strengths,
Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats] analysis teams to go and conduct the gap
analysis within the subregional communities. Even at the level of the nations, they
need help to express this because, as you all know, we have a long distance to go.
Everybody has talked about sea blindness. This is something we have to address
and, to address it, we will have to know where we are and where we have to head and
what are the gaps you have to fill in.
With a better authority over our maritime domain in Africa, we believe that, at a
continental level, we will be able to participate in the protection of the global trade
as a whole. We believe that we will able to provide relief from natural disasters to
those in peril. We believe that we’ll be able to intercede when societies are torn by
oil bunkering and all the other things I mentioned in the previous slide. Thank you
very much.
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
Now we have “Leveraging African Maritime Strategies” by Vice Admiral Ibrahim,
Chief of the Naval Staff, Nigerian Navy. Please.
Vice Admiral Ishaya Ibrahim, Nigeria:
My colleagues, greetings from Nigeria, the peace-loving people of Nigeria. I feel
highly honored and humbled to be invited to this momentous and historic event,
which provides a veritable platform for strategic review of global maritime security
concerns. I’m therefore very delighted to be afforded the unique opportunity to in-
teract with fellow operational colleagues and other distinguished personalities on
the all-important issues of combating contemporary maritime security breaches,
which presently constitute a serious threat to global peace and security.
To better our understanding of the importance of the global maritime chal-
lenges, I would like to observe that this strength lies in its inherent capacity and
capability to utilize all the sources and possibilities offered by the oceans for socio-
economic development of the country, including its defense capability. This aside
should clearly establish a navy as a veritable instrument of national power that en-
sures security of global commerce and prosperity.
This further affirms the understanding that the protection of our collective inter-
est of global commerce with regard to the twenty-first-century maritime security
challenges demands a well-articulated plan of action. Such a plan of action must be
anchored on building a strategic partnership and connecting our navies through col-
laborative and cooperative efforts for enhanced security of the global maritime
domain.
It is in this regard that I consider the theme of the Nineteenth International
Seapower Symposium very apt. Consequently, I will discuss African maritime secu-
rity with emphasis on the Nigerian maritime domain, the Gulf of Guinea, which is
attracting much attention now. Africa is bordered by the great waters of the world,
Atlantic and Indian oceans and the Mediterranean Sea, with an abundance yet to
be realized by their citizens.
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I would like to provoke your thoughts here by posing this question: if Africa were
to be a maritime power, how would it have impacted on the world today?
Be that as it may, let me say that Nigeria is part of the Gulf of Guinea and has a
coast of 435 miles, [and a] two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone with
an area of 84,000 square nautical miles. There is a continental shelf out to 350 nauti-
cal miles.
Similarly, this water is contained in the Gulf of Guinea, [which] stretches from
the boundary line between Nigeria and Benin up to Angola and encompasses eight
states that constitute the Gulf of Guinea Commission.
These states have overlapping exclusive economic zones and consist of Angola,
Cameroon, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon, and Nigeria. The Gulf of Guinea is en-
dowed with abundant mineral and natural sources, particularly oil and gas, which
contributes significantly to the global prosperity. It is also a veritable medium of
commerce and communications.
Strategic Credentials of Gulf of Guinea
• Nigeria has about 187 trillion standard cubic feet of gas reserves
• Major source of energy for developed countries
• Veritable medium for global commerce and communication
• Excellent medium for recreation, scientific/oceanographic research
• High economic value to both littoral and landlocked states
• Renewed interest of BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, China] nations on account of
new deep offshore discoveries.
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[These attributes have] led to significant increase of activities by multinationals,
thereby attracting increased crime. The emerging maritime security challenges in
Africa include political instability, inefficient resources management, and poor
Maritime Domain Awareness. Others include limited or absence of capacity for
maritime law enforcement, poor environmental management capability, terror-
ism, pollution, environmental degradation, as well as difficulties enforcing sea
control in the vast maritime domain.
As a result of this inadequacy, threats of militancy, sea robbery, and piracy, as
well as poaching and smuggling, are prevalent. Furthermore, there are threats of
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, disruption of shipping activities,
and crude oil theft.
In the face of these threats, the capacity of most African navies, particularly [in]
the Gulf of Guinea, has been grossly limited due to lack of human resources, inade-
quate platforms, and [lack of] logistics to sustain naval operations at sea. Also, most
of these threats are transnational in nature, requiring collective, regional efforts to
contain them. The maritime environments in Africa are therefore prone to serious
risk on account of these detected threats. These threat situations deny the African
citizens’ ability to fully recognize the economic benefit derivable from their mari-
time environment, which creates a serious threat to their national security. The
security of the African continent maritime domain is therefore pivotal and crucial
to the attainment of the national interest and aspiration of the member states.
The strategic credentials of this maritime environment and the attending
threats require the need for it to be adequately protected to promote economic
growth and national development. The Nigerian Navy’s concept of operations is
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anchored on the three processes of surveillance, response initiative, and enforce-
ment. In order to ensure and enhance Maritime Domain Awareness in Nigeria, the
current democratic government has in place the following capabilities:
• Acquisition of maritime patrol aircraft, acquisition of helicopters;
• Acquisition of surface platforms for internal waterway patrol and coastal pa-
trol vessels as well as ongoing effort to improve the capabilities and features of
platforms already established; and
• Acquisition of coastal defense radar network, acquisition of unmanned aerial
vehicles, and satellite imagery techniques.
To further enhance surveillance abilities, efforts are ongoing to establish an in-
tegrated command and control center for the collection, analysis, and destination
of information that is needed to generate a response for this type of reporting.
Global maritime security is concerned with an ever-increasing sophistication in
criminal activities; there has been a change that has [re]defined the concept of mar-
itime security from conventional to asymmetric challenges.
The African Union recognizes the need to develop a regional platform for coop-
eration in order to address common maritime security threats. Consequently, in
2004, the chiefs of the naval staff of Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana con-
ceptualized the idea of Sea Power for Africa Symposium with the following
objectives:
Three sessions of this symposium have been held: twice in South Africa [2005
and 2009] and one in Nigeria [2006]. Arising from these symposia, some African
navies have embarked on exchange programs through the provision of training
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opportunities in the various training colleges and the development of concepts to
enhance the collective security of the maritime domain. The fourth symposium is
proposed to be held in Ghana, [in] 2010.
In order to further leverage on a cooperative effort to enhance maritime security
within Africa, the Nigerian Navy, in September 2009, organized the Chief of the
Naval Staff Annual Conference. I invited representatives of South Africa, Kenya,
and Ghana. Areas to further strengthen our cooperation were discussed including
the suggestion for a 100-ship naval force to be set up for policing of the Gulf of
Guinea in line with the 1,000-ship navy concept. Presently, discussions are ongoing
for the bilateral and multilateral cooperative effort between African navies of the
Gulf of Guinea Committee for enhanced maritime security of the area.
A four-nation arrangement for the patrol of the northern Gulf of Guinea has
been in place by arrangement between Nigeria, Cameroon, São Tomé and
Príncipe, and Equatorial Guinea.
The Nigerian Navy also collaborated and cooperates with navies of other coun-
tries, particularly the United States Navy, the Royal Navy, and French Navy, to
mention just a few. This has provided several opportunities for enhanced Maritime
Domain Awareness and similar capacity development for the Nigerian Navy. This
effort has also provided many opportunities for Nigerian forces, both afloat and
ashore. Some of the programs in the Nigerian collaborative effort with other navies
include EXERCISE ENDEAVOR conducted in July 2008. Similarly, with provision of
the Africa Partnership Station, Nigerian naval personnel have participated and
gained experiences in some of the important sea exercises with the United States
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Navy. In response to asymmetric warfare and search and rescue, other collabora-
tive efforts include U.S.-sponsored Maritime [Domain] Awareness initiatives in
some African countries, such as the establishment of Regional Maritime Awareness
Capability Centers in Nigeria and São Tomé. Also, the establishment of a special
boat section training center with the assistance of the Royal Navy.
It is instructive to observe that Maritime Domain Awareness provides only sur-
veillance capability. Therefore, for common maritime safety decisions, response
initiative, and enforcement ability must be contingent with Maritime Domain
Awareness. It is within this context that I acknowledge the ongoing collaborative ef-
fort for enhanced maritime awareness between the Nigerian Navy and the United
States Navy. While mindful of this, it is necessary to state that the next issue and fo-
cus of the collaborative effort must be the development of response initiative and
enforcement capability of less empowered navies in Africa to effectively address
global maritime security.
Therefore, in order to enhance regional and subregional maritime cooperation,
it is a necessity to develop the capacity and also show the capability of navies of Afri-
can states to be up to the maritime challenge. For the Nigerian Navy, the current
government has demonstrated a critical need and commitment to resuscitating the
fleet through the acquisition of new assets to meet the projected maritime security
challenges in Nigeria. Furthermore, the government has made and encourages ini-
tiatives to address the security threats in the Niger Delta through the amnesty
program, which is yielding positive and encouraging results.
Therefore, the way forward would encompass
• Networking of intelligence gathering and sharing of information.
• Effective management of command and control functions through proper in-
terfaces based upon capability for enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness by
African states under the auspices of the AU and other regional bodies (e.g.,
the Economic Community of West Africa, South[ern] Africa Development
[Community], and Gulf of Guinea Commission, just to mention a few of
these).
• Response initiative and enforcement capabilities.
• Combined training exercises among African states, where articulated and
clearly defined and combined training and exercise will form the security
among African states.
Once again, I thank you most sincerely for this singular opportunity to address
this body. The motto of the Nigerian Navy is “Onward Together,” to make the sea a
better place for tomorrow’s prosperity. Thank you very much.
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
I believe it’s time now to play cricket with Vice Admiral Samarasinghe, so please,
Admiral Samarasinghe.
Vice Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe, Sri Lanka:
I bring greetings from His Excellency Mahinda Rajapaksa, the President of Sri
Lanka, and my own navy, to all of you here—to the Chief of Naval Operations for
the U.S. Navy, although he is not here, and the other senior figure, the President of
the Naval War College, and my dear colleagues who are present here today. With
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respect to soccer, soccer is played for one and a half hours. I come from a country
where cricket, the foremost game, is played for five days. So I don’t know this red
card, yellow card. I don’t believe in that, so I will bat around until the five days is
completed or darkness comes since I don’t understand the red card.
Let me, on a small personal note, say that there was a midshipman who sat next
to me in 1976 in Britannia Royal Naval College, International Class 3 Alpha. To-
day, I come here after thirty-three long years to sit next to the same man that I sat
next to thirty-three years ago—that is, Admiral Ibrahim, my good friend from Ni-
geria. And I also have the privilege of interacting with Admiral Molestina from
Ecuador who sat with me in this same auditorium in the Naval Staff College
nineteen years ago in Class 38 of Naval Staff College. And I also have none other
than the dancing Swede, Anders Grenstad, who sat with me in San Remo in Italy
about eight years ago. With that, ladies and gentlemen, let me get to my final task.
A set of fishermen-turned-smugglers operating across the Palk Strait in 10-foot
dinghies with OBMs [outboard motors] in the late ’70s, progressed over a period of
time to transform to a formidable and ruthless terrorist outfit by the late ’90s. This
terrorist organization was eventually capable of operating and launching attacks
from jungles, towns, beaches, coastal waters, underwater, on the high seas, and
even from the air.
How did they achieve this? They developed support, international financial po-
tential, [a] transnational logistic network, global transportation, and trained
paramilitary [forces], mainly through direct and indirect support of some foreign
countries, agencies, and interested individuals.
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None of the military equipment and other commercially off-the-shelf items used
by these terrorists were made or manufactured in Sri Lanka. How did these items
reach an island nation? Your guess is as good as mine. Such terrorist action, with in-
ternational support, very nearly destroyed the serenity and the territorial integrity
of Sri Lanka, an independent, sovereign state. Yet the international community did
not extend effective support or collective counteraction, perhaps not realizing the
gravity. However, a committed, a democratically elected fearless Sri Lankan
leadership with the right attitude, and equally committed brave, provisional, dis-
ciplined, and well-trained armed forces, supported by the general public, defeated
a terrorist group, at one time the most feared and ruthless in the world. Sri Lanka
was compelled to respond to these terrorists aggressively on all fronts for the sur-
vival of the nation and its peace-loving citizens, irrespective of community. This
time was an unprecedented achievement at a very heavy cost in terms of human life
and resources and at the expense of peace, economic progress, and national
growth of my country. Had this victory not taken place, I would not be standing be-
fore this distinguished audience to share almost thirty-five years of experience in
conquering terrorism at sea and on land. Ladies and gentlemen, with this pream-
ble, let me narrow the course to the classic naval role and the lessons learned from
this particular conflict and focus on the aspect leveraging cooperative effort has to
enhance maritime security operations.
Navies today see a newly emerging threat, forcing them to concentrate on
littorals. This has brought about a transformation in contemporary naval forces to
constitute a new form of naval warfare—that is [an] asymmetrical, or, as I prefer to
call it, an irregular kind of warfare.
The Sri Lanka Navy is a small force, but is an experienced, battle-hardened, ro-
bust [force], and one that has met this challenge with discipline and defeated a
terrorist group that was at the cutting edge of maritime terror, a group that used
suicide as its main weapon and became a model for other terrorist groups around
the world, a group well-funded, running an international logistics network and its
own shipping organization.
Ladies and gentlemen, the Sri Lanka Navy used limited resources to go after the
terrorist gun-running shipping network, who took advantage of the freedom of the
seas, using the global commons for its criminal purpose. Results were achieved after
many long, painstaking searches, good intelligence, and mutual cooperation with
friendly states. These enemy floating warehouses that were systematically interdicted
and destroyed carried a cache of weaponry, explosives, and underwater weapons.
An arsenal capable of sustaining full-scale combat operation for years in Sri
Lanka had been buried.
On the other hand, the question still remains as to whether the complete con-
signment of all that materiél carried on board was to create terror in Sri Lanka
alone or [whether] the surplus [was] destined to further terrorist activity elsewhere.
Some of the ships that spearheaded this task group were gifts received from
friendly nations, without which this task would have been impossible. What better
example can I offer for leveraging cooperative efforts to enhance maritime security
operations? The Sri Lanka Navy is possibly the only navy today that has experi-
enced a maritime terrorist threat from every dimension, in every form, and learned
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its lessons the hard way, at the expense of good men who paid with the ultimate sac-
rifice that others may one day live in peace.
I can proudly declare that my navy has experienced what it takes to fight this ir-
regular threat, be it swarm attacks; semisubmersible vessels; or low-profile, high-
speed explosive-laden craft, including Jet Skis. We have also experienced the de-
ceptive, suicide fishing craft, and the suicide underwater saboteur.
The Sri Lanka Navy also formulated the concept of OBST, On Board Security
Teams, which were deployed on board merchant ships for security while transiting
through dangerous waters. These well-trained teams were successful in being an ef-
fective deterrent against terrorist attack. This is the answer to today’s problem
piracy that we are experiencing. A properly trained OBST team could mitigate this
issue in a short period if deployed now. The word is for navies worldwide to focus
their resources in enhancing maritime security operations and adopt cooperative
efforts to deny unlawful elements and nonstate actors from exploiting the freedom
of the sea. To achieve this, we need to share intelligence, resources, and, above all,
have the right attitude and commitment to get the job done.
Our adversary who loiters in open seas is a master of deception and will make use
of loopholes in international maritime law to appear legitimate. How prepared and,
more importantly, how committed are we in dealing with this developing threat? I
believe this is the real challenge. Are we strong enough to provide our commanding
officers with realistic ROE [rules of engagement] required to meet this irregular
threat or otherwise?
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The strategy Sri Lanka adopted to meet and counter this threat was to hit the
core of the terrorists, which was their well-established logistics chain. To achieve
this, the Sri Lanka Navy followed a seven-step strategy, the first being to deter the
desire and potential. The desire for undemocratic action comes from the creation
of an opportunity structure that emanates from the standing economic, social, and
political conditions of a state. This desire has to be countered by deep understand-
ing of the problem, where the root causes of the problem had to be positively
addressed by targeting the grievances of the affected group. This aspect received
the highest priority of my government’s agenda. Another area where the political
potential could be addressed is to break the desire for a political objective—in this
case, a separate state. To achieve this, insurgency and terrorism must be fought on
two fronts, both physical and psychological.
The second step is to deter the organization and the network. A terrorist organi-
zation with maritime capability needs to operate from foreign soil or a safe base.
The prevention of the use of foreign soil for all illegal activity, particularly on the
remote islands and isolated coastal stretches, needs to be addressed. Secondly, pro-
paganda and fund-raising for the group should be effectively curbed. This includes
proscribing the organization, arresting the leaders, probing large bank transac-
tions, neutralizing active cells, disturbing cover-up organizations, and preventing
the use of state and private mechanisms for terrorist propaganda. Making use of
liberal opportunities for such activities must be stopped if detrimental to another
country’s national security. The atrocities committed by these terrorists and their
supporters, both local and abroad, are now coming to light through surrendered
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and captured terrorist leaders and it’s unfortunate that some countries had har-
bored well-known Sri Lankan Tamil terrorists, including leaders, and permitted
them to function within their borders, promoting the escalation of violence and the
terror in Sri Lanka and other countries.
The third step is to deny terrorists’ acquisition of a point of origin. Any terrorist
group will require connections to purchase military hardware and denying such ac-
quisition is a key factor. This is a difficult task, but the best way to achieve it is by
close regional and international intelligence collaboration.
Achieving the third point involves denying the enemy his point of origin. It is a
well-known fact that the Asian region, especially that of Southeast Asia, has become a
safe haven for illegal arms shipment and smuggling. Therefore, thwarting [use of]
such foreign ports and the coastline for such activities at the point of origin is
paramount.
The fourth step involves enhanced surveillance and intelligence monitoring. Su-
perior Maritime Domain Awareness in monitoring activities at sea and integrated
information-sharing mechanisms are viable options in deterring this phase. This is
one point where regional or, for that matter, international collaboration is found
lacking.
The fifth step, the detection [through] effective local surveillances is a must for
formal defense. It is at this stage that an effective navy using surveillance with mari-
time air surveillance could play the decisive role.
The sixth step is the arrest and prosecution. This vessel had 152-millimeter
mortars on board. When detected and confirmed as a rogue ship, the ROE must be
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robust enough to give commanding officers the leeway to act [accordingly]. It needs
clear political will and military resolve to neutralize the potential threat.
The seventh and last step would be securing the landing point. [At] the landing
point, enemy logistics must be denied by the effective coastal land/ground
dominating operations. The threat posed to maritime security through the trans-
portation of large consignment of sophisticated equipment and lethal cargo to
provide logistical support to terrorist groups requires urgent attention.
In the recent years, Sri Lanka’s Navy has experienced and exposed to the world
the most unprecedented and dangerous form of maritime terrorism. This trend
calls for revision in the existing laws on the search of vessels on the high seas. We
need to revise the legal framework in addressing all aspects of safety and security of
maritime navigation, paying particular attention to ships flying flags of conve-
nience, registration of rogue ships, and rights of rogue ships. This would make a
distinct contribution to securing global peace and security.
The United Nations organization has an immediate role to play in this regard.
IMO needs to break the shackles and act now. The survival of the global population
is dependent on maritime trade. The sea lanes being traveled today are highly vul-
nerable to terrorist and pirate attacks, which threaten this critical lifeline of ours.
Transportation of weapons of mass destruction and container terrorism are also
possibilities that further complicate the issue.
Preparation to counter maritime terrorism cannot be undertaken alone and it
needs transnational support. And, like combating terrorist activity on land, use of
one’s land, infrastructure, and institutions to perpetrate and propagate terrorism
in another state must never be condoned.
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The origins of terrorists, the financial and logistic support, are the center of
gravity of maritime terrorism and this must be countered by disruption in keeping
with the obligation of a recognized and a responsible sovereign state. This action
should transcend boundaries [and] override the common human tendency to react
only when one’s own interest are at stake. We all need to go that extra mile. This is
the only way to isolate terrorists and criminal groups at sea, halting them from
shifting their support block from one place to another.
In achieving counteraction, competent naval forces in numbers and capability
for superior surveillance and offensive action are mandated. Effective protection of
choke points and harbors from suspect, high-risk vessels needs special attention.
Managing a database of regional merchant traffic by a multilateral regional sector
authority is what is needed today. The importance of dominating and controlling
one’s coastline needs to be emphasized particularly in the case of an island nation.
Last, but not least, the human-related aspect of men behind the valuable mari-
time assets, deployed for counteraction, matters more, and [they] must be highly
motivated, adequately equipped, professionally trained, and provided with clear
ROE and unwavering leadership.
Maritime terrorism is global and asymmetric. Our response must be global, ap-
propriate, and preemptive. We can deter and defeat terrorism at sea if the right
steps are taken at the right time in a cooperative effort. Hence, a global regional
agreement on cooperative maritime security supported by stringent laws and ag-
gressive diplomacy must be immediately pursued.
The need of the hour is to formulate required action and implement the same
without delay, led by regional maritime powers and the collective support of
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regional navies and relevant nonmilitary agencies. I take the liberty to propose that
such a regional forum must meet within three months from today to formulate ac-
tion plans and the way ahead. To begin with, heads of operations meeting—
focusing on newly evolving threats, efficiency of ongoing naval operations, im-
provement to collaborative effort, unmanned port protection measures, and
interoperative ability and intelligence sharing—will set the course and speed. Sri
Lanka is willing to host this first meeting and coordinate operations-level aspects,
which would be just available in Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, for you to enjoy.
The delegates, heads of navies, senior military officers, the President of the War
College, chiefs of the navies, you and I, being the closest to the political leadership of
our respective countries, could and should make such convincing authoritative and
professional recommendations to executive political leaderships so that their focus
would be to defeat terrorism. This is the legacy I propose to you for using your au-
thority and power of influence, either through maritime assets and mechanisms at
sea or to convince political circles of the importance of dealing with an evolving
threat now. The proposed regional cooperation can be achieved only by changing
the attitude of the decision makers that matter most and [with] unconditional sup-
port by all members of the United Nations towards all those whose sovereign states
are being challenged and attacked by terrorists through this global terror network.
Rationalizing terrorism, double standards, inaction, discrimination, or indiffer-
ence against those fighting terrorism in any form is wrong and needs to be
reconsidered for betterment of the future generation. Such action invariably con-
veys the wrong message and encourages terrorists and their supporters that they
have sympathy and support, no matter what violence they perpetrate.
Let me take the liberty to quote from the U.S. National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism:
For the enemy [the terrorist] there is no peaceful coexistence with those who
do not subscribe to their distorted and violent view of the world. They accept
no dissent and tolerate no alternative points of view. Ultimately, the terrorist
enemy we face threatens global peace, international security and prosperity,
the rising tide of democracy, and the right of all people to live without fear of
indiscriminate violence.
I believe, and I am satisfied, that Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan Navy have construc-
tively contributed to the war on terror and will continue to fight all elements that
advocate violence as a means to an end. Let me also quote former President
[George W.] Bush,
We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have
been stopped, and have been defeated. We must take the battle to the enemy,
disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action, and this
nation will act.
It will be noted that the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony
Blair, was also on board and voiced the same view of combating of all forms of
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terror. “Together,” “trust,” “collaborative action,” “dialogue,” “talk,” “care,” “co-
ordination,” “breaking barriers,” “common understanding,” “common effort” are
words that have reverberated within this auditorium over the last three days and
the Secretary of the Navy used the word “together” many times in his opening ad-
dress. So, my dear friends, our collective obligation is crystal clear. We need to put
these words into practice. We in Sri Lanka have done exactly that and given the
strong message to insurgents and terrorists worldwide that they can be decisively
defeated. The Sri Lanka Navy, in this regard, has done [its] duty in eradicating a
maritime terrorist group supporting terrorists on land. Now the ball is in our court,
in supporting Sri Lanka and other countries, in denying the terrorists from raising
their ugly heads again.
In conclusion, let me wind up leaving you with this message which I formulated
in 1998:
Nothing weakens the enemy’s strength more than detaching, or exploiting
the detachment of the enemy’s allies, communication and support network.
Then he sees that power and ability now arrayed against him and his morale is
endangered by the obvious thought that the support bloc is falling apart and
he is isolated and that defeat is probable or inevitable.
In closing, let me take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude and
thanks to all those who contributed in helping Sri Lanka defeat terrorism and we
Sri Lankans will never forget the part some of you played in supporting us in
achieving peace in our Motherland. We could not have done it without leverage,
the theme of this historical nineteenth Seapower Symposium.
I thank the government of the United States, the Chief of Naval Operations of
the United States, President of the Naval War College, for inviting me, my wife, and
my delegation for this glorious three days and these very informative sessions.
Thank you very much.
DISCUSSION
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
We have passed the time by six minutes; so please, if you allow, I’m asking for just
five minutes so that we can have two or three questions from the audience. Any
questions, please?
Vice Admiral Homero Luis Lajara Solá, Dominican Republic:
[Translation from Spanish follows] I am going to talk about something that is hap-
pening right now in the Caribbean, especially the Dominican Republic.
Last night, after this fantastic reception that we all attended, after I got to the ho-
tel, I received a call regarding an altercation that was taking place at that time in
the southeast area of the Dominican Republic that was a sort of a bombardment of
drugs. They used go-fast [boats] over 50 nautical miles out and our navy cannot
come out over 25 nm; and, therefore, we were not able to intercept these go-fasts.
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I was thinking last night about our limitations because we need to have ships and
boats which would counteract this kind of task. When Admiral Barrera was talking,
I also received another call that was this time regarding an intercept of a boat with
fifteen illegal Cuban citizens that were going to Mona Island because there is an
agreement between Cuba and the U.S. that when a Cuban arrives at Mona Island,
political asylum is immediately granted. And this has really put in danger the safety
of our area because, as you will agree, there are a lot of Cubans that leave Cuba, go
through Haiti, then go to the Dominican Republic, and then try to reach Mona Is-
land. Fortunately, with the conditions existing, the navy is trying to avoid this type
of incident.
I mention this because Admiral Barrera along with the Colombian Navy are our
allies with a bilateral agreement. We have already trained together, and right now we
are evaluating other courses that might take place. Now this equation in the Carib-
bean is rather dangerous, I should say, because [the experience of] these operations
with the Colombian Navy [show that] the drug trafficking is system-wide and they are
going more toward Hispaniola, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
Now this isn’t a question, but this meeting we are attending right now would be a
very good way of making amends and it is fundamental that we have to work to-
gether, we have to collaborate. And the experiences, like those with Colombia, I
know it can be difficult [but it can be] a little bit better. Those countries that have
[inaudible] and [Inaudible] could be able to help out our countries [inaudible] and
technological assistance because when I go to technological centers like the one
that is being set up in Colombia, and we are going to deal with these issues in Santi-
ago next year. [Inaudible] and other Spanish-speaking countries will be invited. We
will invite France and Holland because they do have interests in the Caribbean re-
gion and it is very important for us to work together. And I think it is very
important for African countries, Asian countries, and European countries to have
some sort of relationship with Colombia and the Dominican Republic, because we
have to work together.
And those are the details [inaudible], for example, that has [inaudible] for the
Dominican Republic will have to be able to increase that from drug trafficking. We
were able to seize over 800 tons of cocaine in six months.
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
We have time for two questions, please.
Major General Ahmad Y. Al-Mulla, Kuwait:
My question is to Vice Admiral Ibrahim and maybe Mr. Kamé-Domguia, as well.
Admiral Barrera [of Colombia] gave a very good example of cooperation and coor-
dination between states to counter [terrorism] and to enhance maritime security.
How can West Africa come up with a model to counter and enhance maritime secu-
rity with Nigeria playing the lead nation in that? Thank you very much.
Vice Admiral Ishaya Ibrahim, Nigeria:
Thank you very much for that contribution and question. We are presently here to
learn from each other and I believe the good contribution from various groups has
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enhanced and given us several approaches to this sensitive issue. But some perti-
nent things I would like us to observe:
1. Security is a collective endeavor for all of us. Like it or not, the maritime envi-
ronment contributes over 90 percent of mankind’s survival. Within the
African regions, we know that their capacity to have activities like this is very
low.
2. The political will is not there.
3. Many factors that bind us together are weakened by other factors that divide us.
What we’re asking is that this sensitive problem, which is global in nature, should
not be overlooked and be given just to the Africans to face it. It should be given the
collective responsibility of all. Those who have [resources] should contribute to the
Africans to face these problems. We’re here in your midst as brothers. The problem
does not affect only us, it affects you, too, because the fact of it is poverty and it is
difficult to tie an individual solution to it.
So, what am I saying? Create the environment to enable the citizens of Africa
seeking to be gainfully employed, educated, and, not only that, to be part of this
global effort. There cannot be that without this; it is not possible.
I think I would suggest that this forum should look into those parameters that
would make us thus. We are willing. It is not in our characters to be like this. But
there is a presence from outside us that has pushed the young ones to this extent.
We believe it could go beyond this. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Ahmed al-Tenaiji, United Arab Emirates:
Thank you, Admiral; by this question I would like to close this panel, please.
Unfortunately, our time is up, and I hope to summarize what all the panelists
mentioned, described or commented on. Most of the maritime security challenges
that we addressed today are similar to those that we are actually facing on the
ground, regardless of the different methods of addressing them, or the place where
they occur. This is a good reason for sharing knowledge and information and for
talking with one another. This is very important. Likewise, trans-regional efforts will
help [us] find effective and appropriate solutions to build or strengthen partner-
ships. With regard to maritime security, panelists have been chosen to represent the
entire global maritime sector, as well as international institutions associated with
maritime security. This is for the benefit of all states, because the threats of piracy,
drug smuggling, etc., are shared ones, regardless of nationality and faith.
Like other threats, the threat that we face in the Gulf region and that we are striv-
ing to combat requires the comprehensive maritime cooperation of all countries.
The partnership of all states that have maritime interests is necessary for maritime
security. Accordingly, I wish to shed light on my earlier remarks regarding expand-
ing international partnership in the Arabian Gulf. With the assistance of our
neighboring littoral states, particularly Iran, a wider partnership will help ward off
[possible] threats, and combating these threats will help us resolve many problems.
I wish to thank all the members of this panel whose presentations were fitting for
the goal. I thank them for the ideas, techniques, and measures they proposed for
regional and nonregional cooperation efforts to enhance maritime security. I also
wish to thank the listeners who provided us with useful comments or asked ques-
tions about the topic.
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Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, United States:
Admiral Tenaiji, thank you very much for moderating on this panel. This has been
a very interesting discussion.
Now, you will recall that in my opening remarks, I took a time-out. Well, we actu-
ally have more time if you’d like to continue the discussion, but I just wanted to see
if there was a desire to continue the discussion. We could have a few more questions
if you’d like and, if not, we can break for lunch. Are there questions or more desire
for comment? Okay, we can go to 11:10 or I can wrap up at eleven o’clock. We’ll see
what the questions bring. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Rob Zuiderwijk, The Netherlands:
I have a question to direct to the representatives from the African continent. Admi-
ral Wang suggested that helping the African continent should be done or could be
done through the United Nations. Now, we see the Africa Partnership Station and
other activities to help the African continent. Do you see the possibility to do this
through [the] UN or would you rather see bilateral or multilateral connections to
help Africa?
Vice Admiral Ishaya Ibrahim, Nigeria:
Thank you very much. I believe it is a significant question, whether [it should be] a
forum like this college’s or the UN. What is sensitive to me and to you carries more
weight in comparison to the UN. So what am I saying? How many ships are at sea
now hunting for one thing, keeping the seas safe? It is not the civilians in the street
that undertake this, because we do. What is wrong to formulate a suggestion of a
warning to the United Nations Security Council? [That] would be a good decision.
The process which you suggest certainly is just one of them, but I believe a security
forum like this carries more weight. Let it be started from here, [with those] who
will appreciate it. Africa wants development and progress. Africa [wants] capability,
Africa wants industrialization, wants education and employment, a job for every Af-
rican. [Africans want] progress in making the sea to safe for all of us. We are two
people who are here, all the way from Nigeria to here; I did not come here for
[pleasure]. I believe it is serious business and that business is security. Thank you.
Admiral Guillermo Barrera, Colombia:
General, I think the question is quite important because with different people’s na-
vies we show our people that is one of the objectives. What we have seen in the
Americas and the Southern Conference on Terrorism has made us seek bilateral
agreements—sometimes at the level of presidents, sometimes minister to minister,
sometimes defense ministers, sometimes interior ministers, and, therefore we
could carry out operations at sea.
Somebody said the first day that even though the responsibility of defending our
own nations is the responsibility of the armed forces, once they go into interna-
tional waters the responsibility of protecting those international waters goes to
everybody. For example, one example of this is Chile. Chile has a very forward-
looking policy, feels very responsible for the sea, well beyond the 600 nm limit of
her EEZ. When we, the chiefs of staff of the navies, sit down to talk about common
interests, we find common solutions that will allow us to grow, and will allow us to
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protect our people, and we will give more opportunities to our people. If we think
along those lines, maybe this forum is perfect so that we can find solutions to com-
mon problems.
That, obviously, will allow us to obtain better results in the future and I think
about when Admiral Arleigh Burke created the Naval Command course here in
Newport and this is the reason for this symposium to be held every two years.
I would like to say to all my brothers in Africa, why don’t you come to the course
on maritime interdiction to be held in Colombia that was created using all our ex-
periences that come from our navy and our coast guard? It is the result of hard
work. We brought a lot of people down, we had a lot of people staffing on that topic
and, if we can help in any way, I am convinced that all the countries in America will
be more than happy to invite you. Looking into their faces, I know that they think
like I do, because, if there’s anything that we have learned in this, it is that if we
work together, we work like brothers and sisters with the plan to go back to that. We
have to give to those people that help us. We have to give to others what we have re-
ceived. We have to keep working and this is a way for us to work together with the
countries of the African Union.
Thank you very much.
Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:
Thank you, colleagues. I think there must be a misunderstanding on what is it that
Africa requires. Africa is on a winning path. Africa understands itself—I think from
what Mr. Kamé-Domguia just said—that, at the African Union level, they are busy
formulating strategies to deal with this particular question. We are very happy and
excited with that initiative, which requires the participation of the African navies to
assist him at the African Union level. I think from Admiral Ibrahim’s presentation,
he also clearly indicated the initiatives that are in place in the continent and the slo-
gan of this conference is “Working together, we can achieve more.” Definitely we
can do that.
What we are saying is that the participation of any navy of the world in the Afri-
can continent must be on the African terms. You need to work in conjunction with
us because we are the masters of our territory. So, if you do that, we will be able to
assist you while you are assisting us. This is a partnership, that’s all the language in
partnership. It is not for a bigger brother coming forward to assist a smaller
brother. I think even yesterday speakers alluded to this question. Countries that are
participating [on] the Somali coast, they must provide them with necessary infor-
mation so that is in a position to assist others.
The African navies are here in Newport. We have studied this partnership [for a]
long time, since time immemorial. Many other countries are participating in a vari-
ety of training initiatives with [African navies] so their experiences, what we share
here, are what from our point of reference can add value to all your own countries
while, at the same time, the value that you share with us in this conference assists us
in strengthening the initiatives in our own continent.
We spoke about the Africa Sea Power Symposium. That four years—six years—
ago the chiefs of the navies of South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria decided
that we must have an initiative on the continent. What was the purpose of that ini-
tiative? The purpose of that initiative was particularly to address the weaknesses
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inherent in the African continent. It was also to fight the issues of what we call sea
blindness and Admiral Ibrahim alluded to the fact that we come from a continent
whose main focal point is to ensure that hunger is fought, illiteracy is fought, dis-
ease is fought, and at the same time, we’re fighting the wars that are taking place
amongst ourselves in the continent, but nothing takes away the capabilities and the
intention of all principals to ensure that the long coast of Africa is protected, but
that coast will be protected in terms of Africa, not in terms of anybody whatsoever.
It is Africa that will chart its agenda and then through that agenda, through the or-
ganization of African Union, the AU now and the United Nations, we will find the
partnerships that we require to deal with many myriad problems that affect the
continent.
Training takes place now and will continue to do so. We engage with all the
countries in the world—in Latin America, we’re there; in Europe, we’re there; we’re
in so many countries to position. I said yesterday to you that what is required in Af-
rica is also that the chiefs of the navies of the African continent themselves, when
they emerge from a conference like this, must have the ability to report to their
principals what we discussed, what is it that we see towards building humanity,
building pieces of that ability. If I fail to report back to my country the deliberations
of this conference that is the beginning of failure that is the beginning of sea blind-
ness. When there’s an African Sea Power Symposium, we need to talk to our
principals about those initiatives. The success of the world depends on us being
able to communicate with our own principals in our own individual countries for
the collective good of all. Thank you.
Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe, Sri Lanka:
May I respond to what he’s said? Although we are in a global setup, two things:
What my friend said about the message from this forum to the United Nations, I
think I strongly endorse. I managed to include a paragraph on changing the Law of
the Sea in the address by my honorable prime minister to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly last week. I had a paragraph emphasizing this, so it will be good if
this forum under the leadership of United States of America could convince the Se-
curity Council of the importance of revisiting through the IMO this aspect.
What you just said—deliberations—I have discussed this with the President of
the War College, deliberations of this forum. I have another alternative—rather
than going bottom-up, I request the top-down approach. The United States has
taken the leadership on this issue; they should formulate the deliberations of this
forum, this symposium, what the countries are required to follow up on. At least if
you get the short guidelines in a one-paper document through the channels of the
State Department to the authorities of our countries embassies [it would] come top-
down to our ministries rather than us going and trying to convince our decision
makers in this process. So, more top-down and bottom-up could mean it will be re-
alistic and when we come next time, we could see what progress we have made. I
leave that thought with you, top-down and bottom-up, both. Thank you.
Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:
I’d just like to make an amendment, Admiral, on what you have said. I think you
have said correctly, but you mustn’t say under the auspices of the United States of
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America’s Navy. What we need to say is that we, the chiefs of the navies of the world,
are gathered here on the Nineteenth International Seapower Symposium, and we
recommend that the United States take the collective view on this particular issue.
The lead must not be the U.S. The lead must be the conference.
Rear Admiral Aland Molestina, Ecuador:
[Translation from Spanish follows] Undoubtedly, on these particular issues, it has
been said before that we have to start at the national level, but the national level is
falling behind. There must be regional initiatives, like there are in Africa, America,
and Asia, because there are specific issues to resolve in each region, and we must
start at the regional level and then move on to the global level.
The naval commander of Sri Lanka mentioned that while you have the Law of
the Sea—that great effort undertaken by the United Nations—because the sea be-
longs to everyone, we all realize that if you don’t look out for the sea, we can have
too many problems arise. The Law of the Sea already reflects a number of actions
that we must undertake against drug trafficking and actions to further extend the
possibilities that we have in the sea. We still have the Law of the Sea, [and] so forth,
and environmental protection and drug trafficking. [But] because some other
things are not considered, I insist that we must find a legal form at the global level
and I think that is what happened at the United Nations through the Law of the
Sea, and I believe we should insist upon this. That doesn’t mean we should wait un-
til that happens because this is a place for us to take further steps. Thank you.
Admiral José Luis Cabas, Bolivia:
[Translation from Spanish] Admiral, my country, as is known to many, is in South
America, the heart of South America. I couldn’t have attended earlier because I had
a cold, and thanks to my colleagues from Nicaragua and Paraguay, I feel better now.
Just to reiterate the perspective on Admiral Barrera’s presentation about the
part against drug trafficking, my country has a border with five other countries:
Chile, Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. We can be reached through access to
the Amazon Basin—in that sense, drug trafficking is a plague to our country as well.
Unfortunately, our territorial expanses devoted to coca production and the quan-
tity of cocaine [are] quite vast.
Bolivia is divided into highlands, valley, and tropical jungles. We are part of the
Amazon Basin where drug trafficking is making great headway. So what are we do-
ing? The armed forces, with the limited budget we have at our disposal, are
working toward the eradication of coca leaf through manual extraction. Given our
geography, we don’t have other means to undertake this procedure.
In interdiction, we have river operations and work with our national police on
the rivers of the Amazon Basin to eliminate cocaine.
With our work, I’m trying to say, I understand Admiral Barrera perfectly and I
believe drug trafficking isn’t a problem just for the countries that produce it, but is
a shared problem for everyone.
We have heard from Sri Lanka, who indicated that the seas belong to all and I
fully agree, just as the land belongs to all. We are asked to contribute in kind to fight
against this plague—this scourge of drugs and cocaine, drug addiction—and to
think of future generations who consider that the world is one, and not an
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immutable resource. It is but one. We must consider that our land is quite tired now
and we need to think of it, too. Thank you very much.
Admiral Jorge Omar Godoy, Argentina:
[Translation from Spanish] Just a brief comment. I would like to remember that we
are but a [small] number of agencies that deal with the problems we are discussing
here today. We are but another tool of our countries’ policy arsenal. [In a] plan
where so many issues and interests have been discussed, we must hope we can con-
tribute to what is under our responsibility to countries and our governments, so
they can, in turn, make the best decisions and so that these issues can be discussed
at the relevant level in our countries. That is the comment I would like to make.
Associate Dean Vincent Mocini:
So, thank you, Admiral al-Tenaiji and members of the panel; please, a round of ap-
plause for Panel Three. It was a lively discussion and a very useful discussion, I
think. But now, I will invite you all to proceed to the lunch. Remember the 1330
photo opportunity in Colbert Plaza, if it’s not raining.
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7
Seminar Working Group Reports
Moderated by Dean Robert Rubel
Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College
Dean Robert Rubel:
Good afternoon. It is certainly an honor and privilege for me to be moderatingthe panel of seminar out briefs. Before we get into the out briefs, I’d like to
play War College professor for just a second and say that as far as I can tell, the
global effort to secure the seas against terrorists, criminals, polluters, and other
threats is the largest military project in the history of the world; and, I think,
thereby, it’s no accident that this is the largest gathering of naval leadership in the
history of the world. So, if you think about it, this is a glorious project, unprece-
dented in its scope and unlike other military projects in history. It does not require
for its success the deaths of hundreds and thousands of young men to complete.
When we do achieve it, and I believe we will, it will be a very pure triumph that we
can all take quite a bit of pride in.
I’d also like to point out that it’s common for large projects like this to have spin-
off benefits, much like the space programs of various nations. I don’t know what
those spin-off benefits are going to be right now, but I’m certain that if the Blue Ma-
fia in this room succeeds in the project, there are going to be substantial technical,
economic, and political spin-off benefits for each of our countries. And it’s a real
honor and privilege to be even a small part of this.
Now to the out briefs; we’ve got seven groups to brief out and a little over two
hours to do so—that means each brief should be no more than 15 minutes long and
maybe a bit shorter, if possible, to allow for discussion. I’ve got my yellow and red
flags here, I’ll be sitting down front, so kind of keep an eye—if you see a flash of yel-
low or red, then you know I’m sending you a signal. We should have time for
everybody to complete their briefs, but, if for some reason, we do have to stop you
in the interest of time, don’t worry, because, like [Dean] Vince [Mocini] says, we’re
going to have the CDs prepared that will have all the slides and information on it.
So there will be no information lost. So with that, let me invite the representative
from the African seminar group to the stage.
AFRICA
Captain Lahoussaine El Horri, Morocco:
Good afternoon, Admiral Roughead, senior officers, ladies and gentlemen. I am
here to report on the break-out discussion of the regional group of Africa. The dis-
cussion panel that we held the day before yesterday under the wise moderation of
the Naval War College staff has come up with these results. Participating countries
[and organization] were African Union, Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and the United
States. After this introduction, let me report.
The questions prepared by the Naval War College were:
1. Based on discussion on collaboration among navies, how well do current
[Maritime] Domain Awareness [MDA] engagement and cooperative efforts
meet your country’s needs? How could they be tailored to your needs and im-
prove regional maritime safety and security?
The discussions were frank and the group came up with many thoughts. Among
them:
• MDA engagement has increased since the Africa Partnership Station and
continues to grow and there was a consensus on this. And also,
• MDA will continue to improve by tailoring the MSD [Maritime Security
Detachment] engagement to an individual country’s relevant agencies
and priorities: such as ministries of Transportation, Interior, Justice, Fi-
nance, Fisheries, et cetera, et cetera.
2. The second question: (a) Has information sharing within your region im-
proved? (b) How well have local cooperative efforts been integrated? (c) If you
have seen little or no improvements, what are the reasons?
• The consensus was yes, information sharing has improved within African
regions. Local efforts have been coordinated amongst several Gulf of
Guinea countries and also in the Mediterranean region between the Five
Plus Five [5+5] communities.
• However, more interagency sharing within countries is needed and better
ability to validate information from external sources is needed.
3. The third issue is regarding presentations on improving information sharing
across regions: (a) Would any such approaches work for linking your region to
others? (b) What practical obstacles would need to be overcome, if any?
• Our group was okay to say continued personal interactions to further
build trust across regions, like ISS [International Seapower Symposium]
and regional symposia and workshops.
• The practical obstacles include difference of languages, the ability to ac-
quire and collect information, a matter of hardware and software
capabilities, and incompatibility of computer and data systems.
4. The fourth issue: Information sharing has been addressed previously, but
with respect to the development of a standard of operations, more or better
exercises, and the establishment of a constant presence at sea or ashore, (a)
have you seen an improvement in these areas? (b) How close are forces to es-
tablishing constant security presence in your region?
• Yes. The consensus was yes, exercises and operations have furthered the
development of SOPs [standard operating procedures] for maritime secu-
rity operations. In Eastern Africa, to counter piracy, operations on the
Horn of Africa, and West Africa, African Maritime Law Enforcement
Program.
• However, most countries require additional assets and capabilities to in-
crease and sustain security presence.
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5. The fifth issue: (a) Is there a Maritime Operations Center (MOC) in your re-
gion? (b) How can various regional security groups—for example, NATO, the
European Union, CTF [Combined Task Force] 150/151—combine efforts to
achieve a common picture and improved MDA? (c) Are NATO or other re-
gional groups doing enough in your region?
• The consensus was about Africa regions looking to move from temporary
MOCs stood up for specific exercises to permanent MOCs for full-time
operations.
• External security groups (NATO, the European Union, etc.) are engaging
in areas such as counterterrorism, pollution response, migrant issues and
repatriation, and countersmuggling.
• The establishment of memoranda of agreements and formal processes for
information and intelligence sharing are needed.
In conclusion, local priorities, actionable through regionally generated and
shared information, leading to global synergy. Thank you.
Dean Robert Rubel:
What we’ll do is hold questions until the end of all the groups to make sure every-
body gets to present, and then we can have questions and answers. So, thank you,
sir. Asia-Pacific group?
ASIA-PACIFIC
Rear Admiral Manson K. Brown, United States:
Admiral Wisecup, distinguished chiefs of navies and coast guards, fellow delegates
and sea service professionals: my name is Rear Admiral Manson [K.] Brown, with
the United States Coast Guard, Commander, 14th District, homeported in Hono-
lulu, Hawaii. Good afternoon.
Our seminar group focused on the Asia-Pacific region to discuss current and an-
ticipated practices with Maritime Domain Awareness, or MDA. We had a most
engaging discussion, which was facilitated by Naval War College professor Ron
Ratcliff. Now, our PowerPoint slides capture some summary thoughts, but do not
adequately reflect the richness of our discussions.
But one thing is clear: we are all interested in achieving a more effective under-
standing of the full range of activities occurring throughout the maritime domain
in order to protect our interest with security, safety, economy, and the environ-
ment. Collectively, our group endorsed the notion that MDA enables decision
superiority, which we heard from our first distinguished panel.
Our assessment of the current state of cooperative and engagement efforts in
the Asia-Pacific region is that the trend lines towards enhancement of regional
MDA are going in a positive direction, but there are still significant gaps and daunt-
ing barriers.
We discussed ways to enhance MDA for our individual nations and on a regional
basis. We recognized the challenge of information overload and discussed various
ways to distill information and to analyze products that are actionable.
We agreed that we need to connect with others to enhance MDA. We require a
collaborative interagency, intergovernmental, international, and industry
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approach in order to develop a full understanding of what’s occurring in our mari-
time environment.
We discussed the challenges of attracting everyone to our regional MDA team
given different national interests, capabilities, cultural perspectives, and concerns
about the sensitivity or proprietary nature of MDA data.
We recognize the need for greater use of technology, but concluded that given
the vastness of the Asia-Pacific maritime environment and economic consider-
ations, complete Maritime Domain Awareness is impractical. We discussed risk
management strategies necessary to manage this challenge.
We see bilateral relationships as a key building block in integrating regional co-
operative efforts to enhance MDA. They can be used to develop a framework for
regional MDA cooperation and information sharing. We talked about the types of
incentives that may be necessary to achieve cooperation from our international and
industry partners. Given our different motivations and interests, one size does not
fit all in terms of these incentives.
We agreed that the complexities of the maritime environment counter any argu-
ment that we can achieve MDA similar to that of the air traffic control system. We
felt that such comparisons were neither appropriate nor helpful. One of the group
members said it best: “Aviation has the benefit of gravity.”
Now, it’s been said before, trust is the most important factor in building regional
MDA initiatives. It starts with open communications and mutual understanding.
Then, of course, forums like these help to foster that trust.
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In discussing the goal of establishing constant security presence in the Asia-
Pacific region, we generally agreed that the notion of persistent presence is more of
an ideal than a practical goal. We are all constrained by the amount of surveillance
and enforcement resources needed to provide complete, persistent presence, espe-
cially given the expansive nature of the Pacific Ocean. Technology will help, but
this challenge compels us to work together to create a regional framework to
achieve that ideal of persistent presence.
Now, one of our group members noted that we tend to address such challenges
only when incidents trigger a national, regional, or international response. He
noted that we rarely anticipate and appropriately respond to potential threats,
thereby making changes in our security practices before a triggering event. His
quote was, “We are great at autopsy, but lousy at prediction.”
So let me close by building on this thought on behalf of my group. We must work
together to enhance regional and global MDA. You are all keenly aware of the real
and potential threats that we face in the maritime environment. We must create
and sustain a sense of urgency to avoid the need for a future maritime incident au-
topsy. Thank you.
Dean Robert Rubel:
Next up will be Europe A, Commodore Grimstvedt from Norway.
EUROPE A
Commodore Bernt Grimstvedt, Norway:
Admiral Roughead, distinguished leaders of navies, ladies and gentlemen, before I
start the presentation, I would like to give some initial remarks. First of all, it’s a
great honor for me to address you this afternoon, at this podium in this auditorium
named after such a great admiral as Spruance. It reminds me about our professor
in naval history when I was a midshipman, when he took us through the Pacific War
during the Second World War. As you all probably remember, there were three
great admirals out there: Halsey, Spruance, and Nimitz. And he told us that Halsey
could win a battle, Spruance could win the campaign, but only Nimitz could win the
war. So I’m proud to be here.
Question one was related to current MDA efforts and how to improve regional
maritime safety and security within the region. Europe A countries belong to a re-
gion that has very sophisticated infrastructure. It’s well organized in terms of MDA,
but the group concluded that, of course, there is always room for improvement.
The group also discussed what we called the “too much, too little info” syn-
drome. How do we identify what we really are looking for? The information systems
are also diverse within the separate countries and providing a common MDA pic-
ture is often difficult. Agencies and countries have different responsibilities and
jurisdictions over the same type of information, thus causing possible delays in
both dissemination of information and in the decision-making process.
The group also concluded that “trust” is a key word—trust among partners, trust
among countries, trust among agencies. And, finally, on question one, we have to
establish common norms, and one of the group members suggested that the NATO
norms regarding words as “trust,” “cooperation,” “precaution,” “accountability,”
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and “reciprocity” could be used as a model for interregional and international
MDA information sharing.
Question two was related to sharing information within the region and we have
concluded that improvements have been made. During these days, we have gotten
presentations on a few of them, like the SUCBAS [Sea Surveillance Cooperation
Baltic Sea] in the Baltic Sea, the V-RMTC [Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic
Center] in the Mediterranean, and the NATO Shipping Centre located in London.
We have a few new countries represented here at this nineteenth symposium and
I think everybody in the group was really happy to hear that Russia stated very
clearly that it has had a substantial improvement related to information sharing
over the last years. We took also into consideration that the recent improvements in
communication technology, such as INMARSAT [international maritime satellite]
and SATCOM [satellite communications], have made MDA awareness systems
more available not only in our region, but also worldwide.
The information that is available today is so great that the group also discussed
the problem of discerning what applies to the different stakeholders. Regarding
AIS [Automatic Identification System], we concluded that AIS will probably be the
primary transponder system for ships, but it is possible to increase the preciseness
of the information and thus give AIS a better platform to be included in the MDA.
And finally, yes, we are ready for the next step in the European A region, but we
don’t have any discussions about what [it] might be.
Question three is about sharing information across regions. First of all, I’d like to
present an example of such information sharing across regions and that’s the EU
operation outside the Horn of Africa that has established a Web site that is accessi-
ble to everybody where you can enter and share information. But the basic and
even more important question is do we really need interregional information sys-
tems and, if we do so, how will they be managed and by whom? There is a need to
establish appropriate protocols. The possibility exists for information exchange re-
gions to happen automatically, but once again, their protocols must be appropriate
in order to have this as effective as we would like to.
Technology is not that difficult. I hope you remember that during Admiral
Grenstad’s presentation for the SUCBAS, he talked about making agreements
rather than building technology. I think that’s a key element to success [with] so
many nations, like those in the Europe A group, that it’s very important to put the
agreement first and then build technology.
I would like to give you another example. Everybody here has at least ten credit
cards and I’m amazed that my credit card issued in Norway is valid, more or less, all
over the world. I can put it into a wall and I get money out of it. That tells me two
things: information systems are available and trust has been established.
Then what are regions? Regions are not a single entity. Regions consist of coun-
tries, consist of interests, and solutions must be based on the comprehensive,
multilateral approach rather than a narrow, regional approach.
The major obstacle in this context might be the conceptual one. We need to think
not merely about the physical domain, like regions and technology. Focus must also
include mind-sets and collaboration among countries and interest groups.
Question four, concerning establishment of SOPs, exercises, and naval
presence—yes, in our region, we have had information-sharing SOPs since NATO
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was established 60 years ago, and we think we can rely on that system and use it in
our region. There are also a lot of military exercises which include MDA in our re-
gion, but that’s more part of an exercise which has a more advanced objective. What
we see, unfortunately, is that the civilian agencies are taking more and more of an
increasing role in participating in the exercises.
The Arctic was mentioned in the group. This is a new challenge to everybody. If
we foresee, as some do, a comprehensive increase in the maritime activity in the
high north, we must then take into consideration that lack of infrastructure, lack of
search and rescue resources, the communications are difficult, and the environ-
ment is extremely vulnerable in the Arctic. This could cause another challenge to
the information systems related to MDA, as many countries do not have the capa-
bility of screening the Web or all the information systems that are available out
there. We need to provide [others], especially small nations, with the necessary re-
sources to carry out inventory of all available tools.
Finally, question five related to the existence of MOCs and common efforts. In
our region, there are a number of maritime operations centers, both nationally run
and run as part of, for example, NATO; and there [is], as the group sees it, no need
to take any initiative to increase the number of MOCs.
We have some success stories out there. The group agreed that we must take ad-
vantage of these success stories, like, for example, Somalia. Here is a challenge to
all war colleges around the world—use the experience and use them as tools for im-
proving the MDA awareness.
Safety and security are basic needs for MDA, but we also noted that other agen-
cies would like to have information coming out of such a system that might be
classified or need to be protected by other means. We must establish routines and
systems that leverage the capability and make it possible for other agencies to also
gather information from a security-based system.
Different national legal codes require protocols and laws for MDA for law en-
forcement purposes. This is very important, and several group members
mentioned this especially. Now, we must consider researching and exploiting best
practices of information sharing used in other organizations. There are commer-
cial organizations that have comprehensive and secure information systems, the
law enforcement environment has it, and, also, the scientific environment [makes]
extensive use of information systems. We are sure that there are some best practices
to learn from them.
And, finally, an honest broker is very important. Much of the information that is
accessible through our systems contains commercially sensitive information and we
must try to preserve the confidentiality of such information to all possible users.
To question C, “Are NATO or regional groups doing enough in your region?”
—yes. We don’t think there is any possibility that nations in this region would prior-
itize to carry out MDA operations alone in Europe A region. There are needs for
our resources in other places in the world.
Finally, if you want to take something away and back home from this short pre-
sentation, it must be two things: (1) MDA information sharing is about having a
multinational approach and (2) build trust, trust, and more trust. Thank you, ladies
and gentlemen.
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Dean Robert Rubel:
Now we’ll hear from Europe B, which is Captain Aurelio de Carolis from Italy.
EUROPE B
Captain Aurelio de Carolis, Italy:
Admiral Roughead, Admiral Wisecup, distinguished chiefs of navies and coast
guards, ladies and gentlemen, I will present the results of Europe B working group.
This is my task on behalf of my working group and this is my privilege today.
The results of our working group on MDA refer to the Mediterranean and Black
Sea regions and they will be summarized in the following slides. However, prior to
starting it, I really wish to thank my distinguished colleagues from the navies of Bul-
garia, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States for their excellent
support and for the teamwork that we set up in such a short time. I would also like to
thank the support provided by our moderator, Professor Thomas Fedyszyn, and by
our facilitator, Lieutenant Commander Scott Brendan from the Naval War College.
Several initiatives are ongoing in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea re-
gions with a significant cooperative effort to improve regional MDA. Just to give
some examples, we have the Black Sea Force, the V-RMTC, the 5+5, the Eurasian
Partnership, the Black Sea Border Police Coordination. There is a big effort and
this effort supports and is at the same time supported by ongoing operations that
we have in our region.
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To give you some examples, we have OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY,
OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR by NATO, OPERATION MEDITERRANEAN SHIELD,
and we also have an important operation in front of the coast of Lebanon by the
Maritime Task Force that is run and is under the operational control of the United
Nations. Therefore, many navies are operating in our regions, even countries that
are not in the region. Just to give an example, Indonesia is involved in United Na-
tions operations off the coast of Lebanon. All these operations and other regional
exercise are generating a large cooperative effort that goes even beyond the
boundaries and the main regional organizations and alliances that we have in our
region, such as NATO and the European Union. This cooperation, however—this
is one of our findings—would improve if all regional countries would be participat-
ing, especially those countries that have never been involved so far.
There are also subregional groups in our region and they cooperate at a differ-
ent level—to mention just some of them, the ADRION, the initiative for
cooperation between the six countries in the Adriatic and Ionian Sea; the 5+5, just
mentioned, between five Northern African countries and five Southern European
countries in the western portion of the Mediterranean. All this generates additional
synergies that contribute to the development of regional MDA in our region.
Maritime security requires information sharing and, therefore, it [benefits] sig-
nificantly from interagency relationships; therefore, agencies are important.
However, there is a panoply of agencies that are active in our region with respect to
maritime security and maritime data sharing and these, we found out in our work-
ing group, lead to a proliferation of systems that often do not talk to each other. As
a consequence, we have a growing technical complexity, and, of course, the opera-
tional effectiveness is in some way suboptimized. However, no matter how
paradoxical this may seem, the situation is politically acceptable, because the way it
is in this particular moment, it avoids conflicts among the different actors that
might hamper the particularly delicate stage of the MDA development in which we
are in this particular moment. Therefore, there are inefficiencies but we have to be
ready to accept some of them, at least in the short term. Of course, simplification is
clearly required, at least in the long run, and that would be a fruitful ground for the
interagency process in our region.
We all agreed in the working group that regional information sharing improved
in the last few years—it improved significantly. The exchange data volume in all
the systems that operate in the region has grown dramatically, but quality still is an
issue and this [is] because the main maritime data sources are the AIS and the newly
arrived Long Range [Identification] and Tracking system, which is, again, con-
nected with the AIS. This means that we have big masses of information, because
these systems provide us with it, but sometimes since these systems are not manda-
tory for all commercial ships and boats, such as pleasure boats, and [for] some
places the threat is there, there’s a problem; and also, false data can be entered into
these systems. Therefore, big volume, but quality’s still an issue.
Furthermore, there is cargo information. That is a special field, cargo, and nor-
mally, it is not shared, because of economic sensitivities and, for sure, the position
of a tanker is part of the added value that the shipping company can get out of it.
This does not apply to line ships like containerships, because we do not know ex-
actly where they go and what time they would be passing on this particular position
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and sometimes even the pilots don’t know that. Therefore, we have BLACK SEA
HARMONY, we have MSSIS [Maritime Safety and Security Information System], we
have V-RMTC. All provide a significant contribution to the MDA in our region. In
addition to the AIS, some of these systems also provide some higher-quality infor-
mation; we consider it as certified information. That is the information not coming
from an AIS, but it’s coming from port authorities. Many of our navies in our region
have a direct connection with the port authorities and this is information that adds
up on top of the AIS.
We concluded that many navies play a central role in the regional integration of
local MDA in the region of the Mediterranean and Black Sea, with a contribution
that comes also from navies, as I said before, from nonregional countries, such as
Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, that operate in the Mediterranean
and provide a huge contribution to the MDA.
We also found out that the special form of interagency approach is required for
our navies to continue playing a central role when MDA opens to the international
dimension. We, therefore, are reminded of Admiral Roughead’s words during his
opening speech when he introduced the new “combined interagency approach”
that may lead to an important step ahead, to actually view maritime security in a
comprehensive perspective, because interagency is a big issue at the national level,
but then we go international and, therefore, this approach has to be combined,
multinationally.
In terms of trans-regional exchange of information, we found results that were
pretty much in line with the other groups, especially what has been said by Europe A.
155
Information sharing can be eased when players from different regions are mem-
bers of common organizations and alliances—this is a plus—or if they enjoy
partnerships that are based on historical legacies or current political and economi-
cal relations.
We also found that almost all the countries represented in our working group
are currently involved in a trans-regional cooperation project fostered by exercises,
training, and, of course, symposia. This process is facilitated in the trans-regional
development of MDA and starts by focusing on the lowest common denominator.
The lowest common denominator is decided by what everybody is willing to share
and is also easy to share. This means to pursue, for instance, unclassified data with
limited numbers of parameters. If cargo is an issue then we don’t require them to
fill that particular field, to avoid the barriers that may be raised when individual
sensitivities are affected. We should start with these minimum denominators that
are common possibly to all the players.
As a possible solution, therefore, we foresaw a “federated” approach and this is
pretty much in line with the discussion by the group Europe A. Who runs the sys-
tem? Well, if it is a federation, that’s not going to be an issue. Many countries are
doing such with the Trans-Regional Maritime Network in our region.
A federation of networks would broaden the regional databases relying on re-
gional legal frameworks with ad hoc additions to those legal frameworks that allow
the global connectivity. This approach would minimize overall costs of transitional
development and this has been said by Group Europe A as well, because the infra-
structure, whether it is software or hardware, would remain almost unchanged in
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the single regions and then it’s not that difficult to have databases be exchanged by
different systems. As a matter of fact, we are talking neither about the single system
that manages the global MDA, nor about a “system of systems.” That still is a quite
complicated thing. In a federative approach, efficiency would be based on the exist-
ing maritime surveillance systems.
We also realized that a step-by-step process would permit [us] to credibly and ef-
fectively implement trans-regional MDA, because going step-by-step, we can best
address national needs, taking into account different regional environments.
All this may lead us to a spot, a sort of equation. We might call it the Newport
MDA equation, whereby a “federative approach” relates to information sharing in
the same way as a combined interagency approach relates to maritime security.
This slide exemplifies the federation of regional networks. It is just an example.
We have a Region A: they have their own infrastructure, hardware, software. They
have the important thing, that’s the legal framework represented by a regional op-
erational arrangement. If we look at another region, Region B, what we actually
need to have these two regions talking to each other, rather than the specific tech-
nical software and other technical arrangements, [is] an operational arrangement.
This operational arrangement has to be very easy because it sits on already existing
operational arrangements and that would allow the exchange of information.
Of course, there are problems that need to be overcome and we reported them
on the slide. Lack of trust has been already highlighted as an important issue, but,
also, we would like to point out the national legal caveats that sometimes prevent
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sharing. For this reason, it is important to look at the minimum common denomi-
nator that we introduced before.
In terms of results, we acknowledged within the working group the great im-
provements that we had in our region in terms of telecommunications, especially
thanks to the efforts by regional and subregional organizations or initiatives that
are active in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. We have NATO, European
Union, Mediterranean Partners, Barcelona Process, 5+5; and, therefore, we train
among ourselves, significantly, and navies have a central role in this.
Particularly positive [is] the increased number of exercises aimed at MDA and
their growing level of participation. A global MDA exercise, of course, might boost
the data sharing in the trans-regional dimension, and it might move on from an al-
ready effectively working platform such as, for instance, the T-RMN.
Overall, we also found that constant security presence has improved only mar-
ginally, because many navies in our region have recently increased their
commitment to extraregional areas, such as the Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy op-
erations. All this boils down to fewer assets at sea. That requires sharing
information in order to have a better knowledge with fewer assets, better knowl-
edge of what is happening at sea, and, therefore, a request for more MDA.
In a few words, we should exploit the combined interagency approach that can
let us leverage all the civil platforms that are at sea, other military platforms em-
ployed by other agencies, and also the other agencies as well.
In terms of maritime operations centers in our region, there are several mari-
time operations centers, as reported on this slide. They include operation centers
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also run by other agencies, agencies that are not directly related to navies. As you
can see, we have [Maritime Component Command] Naples, NATO; we have the
operation center of Sixth Fleet, still in Naples; and we have Eregli in Turkey that
runs OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY; then we have the Black Sea Border Patrol
Coordination Center; and we have also national MOCs in each country; and we
have the V-RMTC national hubs; therefore, lots of MOCs in the area.
As a final remark, we observed that an overlapping membership to different ini-
tiatives, organizations, and alliances, which typically happens in the regions that we
are talking about, besides requiring participation in several different MDA systems,
is probably, at the moment, the best way to improve MDA. This allows [us] to better
face MDA needs generated by the growing commitments of some navies, with fewer
assets to patrol our regional sea where “sea-centricity,” as has been highlighted
during this symposium, is a paramount objective.
This concludes my presentation.
Dean Robert Rubel:
Next we’ll hear from Colonel Abdullah Dashti from the Kuwaiti Navy.
GREATER MIDDLE EAST, ARABIAN GULF, AND GULF OF OMAN
Colonel Abdullah Dashti, Kuwait:
Admiral Roughead, President of the Naval War College, professors, distinguished
guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I have, first, the honor to represent
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the Middle East and Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The slides you will see will
represent some glimpse of the rich discussion we had two days ago.
First question [had] two parts, concerning the MDA engagement and coopera-
tive efforts to meet a country’s needs, as well as how could they too meet the need to
improve regional maritime safety and security.
The discussion had agreement, disagreement, consensus, knowledge. However,
we came to some points as displayed in front of you. MDA is still in its infancy
stages; however, there is still room for improvement. As two MDA arrangements
are currently being used, we put forth these two examples in Europe: the Web site
system, which is unclassified, open, inexpensive; as well as we put forth the other
example of the CENTRIXS [Combined Enterprise Regional Information Ex-
change System] as Admiral Hogel mentioned in action in Bahrain. Truthfully, it’s
good; it’s secure; however, it’s limited to the coalition and expensive and compli-
cated. I still have a problem, personally, operat[ing] it.
What we need is the best of both systems. What we need also, we need an MDA
system scalable, affordable, reliable, and easy to operate. The question came up of
NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and the private sector. This is an open
question—we can take it with us and we can think on it. Shall they have a role or
not? We do have some kind of concern about the bureaucracy, about the security
and confidentiality of the system; however, they do exist, it’s very important, and
they have to take a role. Some said no, some said yes. This is an open question for
the audience—the NGOs also.
The representatives also discussed what kind of capability or information each
state needs to provide to make MDA available resources for all of us.
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Second question: This question has three parts—it’s information sharing within
the region, local collaborative efforts being integrated, and what are the reasons for
not doing so?
Most of us felt the need for collective agreement is very important. We need more
than the region involved. We came to that [conclusion], and, also, the importance of
cooperative efforts between some countries. We, Kuwait and Iraq, had an agreement
a year ago on interoperability so we could manage to build confidence. We signed
this agreement with Iraq and it is working. It may be primitive; however, it does have
good [possibilities] for confidence-building measures in the future.
The representatives have also discussed the impediments, limitations remaining
to be overcome. As the previous presentation mentioned, trust, again, trust, trust,
trust. My group had Pakistan, India, Iraq, and Kuwait. This is why we covered three
questions out of five. We need to have trust. I’m sorry to say that. But, as well, we
need political will and approval. Talking off the record, some people say this is not
our job. We are navies. The government has to discuss this kind of stuff. Yes, while
we may be agreed here, however, when we go back, some governments disagree
with us. I think the level of discussion about this should go up more politically and
higher than the military, and also, the [discussion of] capacity and the resources.
Last on this slide are existing regional issues. Some have existing issues with bor-
der disputes. We understand that very well at sea.
The third question, which consists of two parts, is regarding Panel One’s presen-
tation as well on improving information sharing across regions. The rep-
resentatives have had different opinions on the value of cross-regional informa-
tion. We all agreed that sharing depended on the individual needs and concerns.
Some came up with a very good idea and many felt that a single-layered system had
advantages over multiple systems. An example is very simple. We take Interstate
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Highway 95 to Boston, [and] there are a lot of exits. Whatever you want, you take
the exit you want. The system should be like a highway with many exits.
And also, the representatives discussed utilizing international organizations
such as IMO. We may think of bureaucracy, yes; however, we have to believe in the
international regime. We have to believe in the international umbrella and this is
where we came up [with the thought] that there can be tension between the interna-
tional organization approach to separate issues from local politics and the inherent
local nature of the problem.
For example, a South Korean aircraft can fly over North Korea. [This is] very
simple because this is the [International Civil Aviation Organization] system and
the aviation system of the world. We can use these international organizations to
overcome other problems. Obstacles? Of course: cost scalability, liability, and ease
of use.
That concludes my presentation. To summarize, we all need MDA, but what
kind of MDA system do we need? That’s the ultimate question. And, second, shall
we have more of a role for nonmilitary people to come in on board or not? The
third is the architecture of the system and what that kind of system does and how is
my country to pay for it?
Thank you very much.
Dean Robert Rubel:
Now we’ll hear from North [America], Central America, and the Caribbean. Admi-
ral Espino Ángeles?
NORTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN
Rear Admiral Horacio Espino Ángeles, Mexico:
Good afternoon, I will ask you all to put on your headsets, because I will speak in
Spanish. [Translation from Spanish follows]
Before I start, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here before you
as the spokesperson for the group from North [America], Central America, and the
Caribbean. This panel was composed of Canada, the United States, Nicaragua, Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, and Mexico.
During the panel, we talked about all the issues that are faced in the Central and
North American region. We have common problems, such as drug trafficking, peo-
ple smuggling, arms trafficking, and ways which we can face these issues through
MDA as well as ways in which we can improve the relations among countries that
are part of this northern region.
Throughout the course of our deliberations, one of the issues that came up was
that countries, like Mexico, have serious legal barriers to overcome in order to be-
come a part [of] multilateral and bilateral agreements. So what must we do to
overcome these obstacles? Throughout the panel, we agreed that such obstacles
could be overcome through initiatives at the level of the armed forces since there
are the necessary constitutional elements that allow for further cooperation.
We also saw that other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, were in need
of further cooperation in order to undertake their operations. They required more
fuel and more resources. There is individual progress, albeit no collective progress.
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Cooperation is still an obstacle; although there is technological cooperation, there
are countries that don’t have the same opportunities at their disposal to make the
most of its use.
We also came to the conclusion that we need to develop the necessary means to
forge mutual trust and information exchange needs to be reliable and expeditious.
We saw that there were a number of agencies that were producing intelligence, al-
though, unfortunately, they weren’t working in concert and, oftentimes, did not
produce the information in a timely fashion, which renders it useless at times.
What can we do then so those intelligence agencies can act in concert so informa-
tion flows in a natural and expeditious way? Well, this must be achieved through
agreements, agreements that are bilateral or multilateral in nature. We have some
such agreements in the area of trade, such as NAFTA [North American Free Trade
Agreement], and through these trade agreements, we could consider extensions so
that we can also forge information exchange agreements among the countries.
How can we achieve more cooperation? We agreed that one of the paths towards
greater cooperation and collaboration was the ramping up of joint exercises
among nations. We need to increase the number of exercises in order to develop
mutual trust in the first place and then in order to develop interoperability.
In Mexico, we have fourteen CUMARs [Mexican Unified Operation Centers] in
operation and that has been quite an accomplishment for our navy’s
interoperability. In sum, we can say that the first steps on the path towards better
understanding in North and Central America are being taken, and successfully so.
We can also conclude the joint exercises are the best way of achieving integration
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and mutual understanding. We also concluded that each country, through its
armed forces, must exercise pressure on its legislative bodies so that we are able to
eliminate the legislative obstacles that hinder regional integration. In other words,
faith, trust, exercises, and integration should be the common denominator for our
armed forces. Thank you.
Dean Robert Rubel:
Okay, we’ll finish up with the South American group and that would be Rear Admi-
ral Lopes de Moraes Zamith from Brazil.
SOUTH AMERICA
Rear Admiral Wagner Lopes de Moraes Zamith, Brazil:
Admiral Roughead, Admiral Wisecup, distinguished delegates, admirals, ladies
and gentlemen, first of all, I would like to say that I’m much honored to be here be-
fore such a distinguished audience. I feel also privileged to give you our group’s re-
port on behalf of my colleagues of the South American countries and, therefore, I
would also [like to] take the most of this opportunity to thank them for allowing me
to carry on with present[ing] the summary.
The issues we have discussed are related to Maritime Domain Awareness and in-
formation sharing from our regional perspective. The outcome of our productive
work will be summarized along the forthcoming slides. Before we go through the
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answers to the questions we had to deal with, I’m going to provide you with some in-
troductory points.
Generally speaking, there’s no doubt about the utmost importance of the Mari-
time Domain Awareness as one essential segment underlining the whole concept of
the maritime security. There is also a common sense that the information sharing,
with its intrinsic characteristic of enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness, is a very
useful and important tool for the decision makers. [Among] all the key points that
were brought up during our work session, the question of reciprocity was high-
lighted. Any country willing to provide information to any system probably will
expect to also receive data.
It was also emphasized that the building of trust was one of the main factors to al-
low information sharing between countries, mostly when we are talking about
classified data. In this case, the sharing of information will usually be preceded by a
specific bilateral agreement in order to guarantee correct management of the re-
lated data.
When we are talking about the South America region, we are actually talking
about distinctive realities, unequal budget constraints, inequality of technological
development, and different countries’ concerns. This region from a geographical
perspective could be divided in three subregions: Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean.
Even though Maritime Domain Awareness and information-sharing topics have
been considered of high relevance by the South American countries, due to our dis-
tinctive realities, each one is moving forward in the same direction, but at its own
pace. On this effort, the regional forums, like Inter-American Naval Conference,
specialized Inter-American Naval Conferences, bilateral naval talks, and joint op-
erations have contributed to foster cooperation and cooperability among South
American navies, in addition to strengthening relationships and creating mecha-
nisms of integration and trust building.
The question posed is what challenges exist to achieving MDA. Regarding this
question, we realized that small boats, fishing boats, go-fast boats, and semisub-
mersibles are very difficult to track with typical systems of detection and
surveillance, and they could represent a threat if not detected in a timely fashion.
It’s important to point out that these types of boats certainly will not be using any
cooperative system of position information, like AIS, Long Range Identification
and Tracking, and so on. In fact, they can approach your lines, oil platforms, or
other sensitive points undetected.
On the other hand, it’s relatively difficult to maintain sufficient assets, readily
available to patrol the area of interest in an effective manner. Furthermore, it’s very
important to make efforts to engage and integrate all agencies involved with mari-
time activities that could provide any useful data to fulfill the MDA purpose.
We found that despite having some bilateral and multilateral information-
sharing arrangements in place, they could be improved.
Regarding the first question, the answer is yes. At this point, it would be very in-
teresting to talk about the South Atlantic Maritime Coordination Area, CAMAS.
Since it is a unique and emblematic regional example of information sharing, this
acronym was mentioned yesterday morning during the Brazilian Navy Com-
mander’s [Admiral Julio Soares de Mouro Neto’s] speech. This agency was created
in 1966 with the purpose of tracking merchant ships and protect[ing] sea lanes in
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the region. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are members of this mutual,
multilateral agency and from its beginning information sharing has been carried
out between them. We are certain that CAMAS is one of the oldest multilateral
agencies involved with maritime information sharing. This is an agency that has
been working with a permanently established structure in which the coordinator
changed from country to country in a rotational basis, every two years. The coordi-
nator and admiral work with liaison officers who are the representatives from the
members’ countries. Being aware that the information-sharing system could be im-
proved using new technological architecture, the Brazilian Navy, as the current
CAMAS coordinator announced during the MDA conference held in Chile in De-
cember 2008, had already started to develop an information-sharing regional
center in which participation would be offered to the countries belonging to
CAMAS. At this time, the offering has been tendered and accepted by all CAMAS-
participating countries. It’s important to say that the specifications of this new
information-sharing system were suggested by all countries of CAMAS. The proto-
type of the center is due to be ready for testing by July 2010. Depending on the
results and evaluation of the forthcoming system, it could be offered to other coun-
tries of the region, because it’s being developed to accommodate additional
nations.
Another relevant issue stressed during our discussions was the importance of
working on the political level to achieve a political will and the proper support
needed to improve the MDA.
Regarding these questions [on the slide below], we can say again yes, concerning
the information sharing across regions. We have got some recent valuable experi-
ence worthy of mention. The Brazilian Navy’s Maritime Traffic Information
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System, called SISTRAM, has ended its integration tests with the Italian Navy’s Vir-
tual Regional Maritime Traffic Center, V-RMTC, and it’s ready to join the trans-
regional maritime network.
Additionally, in a couple of months, we are completing the interface we have
been developing to integrate SISTRAM into the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Safety and
Security Information System (MSSIS). I would also like to reinforce the successful
experience of Chile with the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center Americas,
VRMTC-A, as it was indicated by the Chilean Navy Commander [Admiral
Edmundo Gonzáles Robles] during Panel Two.
As you can see, our region is striving forward on information sharing based on
trans-regional experiences. We are confident that depending on integrational re-
sults, more countries will be motivated and willing to participate. We have listed in
this slide some obstacles that would need to be overcome.
Finally, the group members agreed that the United States Joint Interagency
Task Force South and the Maritime Analysis and Operational Center on Narcotics
(MAOC-N) located in Portugal are effective maritime operations centers for drug-
trafficking operations and good templates for interagency and international coop-
eration in other fields.
I would also like to mention the Colombian Navy’s initiative with the Interna-
tional Maritime Analysis Center for Narco-Trafficking at Sea. The center is due to
be ready by the second semester of 2010. Many countries have already demon-
strated an interest to be part of this center. With respect to the new U.S. Fourth
Fleet Maritime Operations Center, some South American countries have already
accepted U.S. Fourth Fleet’s invitation for sending liaison officers.
Now I have finished our report, I would like to thank you for your attention here.
Thank you.
Dean Robert Rubel:
Well, as everybody saw, I didn’t have to bring out any yellow or red cards and we
have quite a bit of time left.
Vice Admiral J. Mudimu, South Africa:
I have an issue to take with the group from Africa. I don’t know how they arrived at
some of the answers they provided here. They referred to the issue that the MDA
has improved since the arrival of the partnership station. I don’t know how they ar-
rived at that. There is a lot of reference, for an example, to Task Forces 150 and
151. How have you arrived at that? In the reality of the African situation, we’re a
member of the UN, the African Union, and so forth. These are the structures from
which we derive our mandates. If the United States participates in any mission in
South Africa, it will be the relationship between South Africa and the United States,
or the relationship between Angola and the United States, which you do not neces-
sarily head with an admiral, because you are not the members of that [force]. So the
reflection in terms of the terminology used in that presentation, it does not capture
or contextualize the reality of the situation as obtained in the African countries. I
think that presentation needs correcting to reflect the context. You know we need
to generalize. I think that certain countries, perhaps, feel the impact of this part-
nership station. It’s not necessarily a global view of the African countries in terms of
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that particular thing. I saw a lot of incongruences there. I’m not sure really how
they arrived to some of them.
Dean Robert Rubel:
Sir, I would throw it open. If I understood, it was more of a comment than a ques-
tion on that. Are there any other comments or questions? Well, let me say for my
part that, as I looked at the pattern of out briefs here this afternoon and compared
what I saw to 2007 and before that in 2005, what we see here is a step forward in
terms of more practical matters, more detailed descriptions of specific things that
we need to do to move forward; so, just in the pattern of the out briefs I’ve seen in
the past three [symposia], there’s substantial progress being made, I believe. So I
congratulate all of you for moving forward on this, not to mention the substantial
progress on actual information sharing and coordination of efforts that has been
very clear from the presentation of our panelists. Do I have any more questions or
comments? I guess not. With that, we’re done a bit early. I believe it’s my privilege
to turn the floor over to Admiral Roughead for some closing remarks.




Chief of Naval Operations
Well, you can tell it’s a Friday afternoon and a lot of people have to travel. But Ithink that the fact that so many of us are here for these final moments is indic-
ative of the effort and the strength of what we have been doing for the past couple of
days. Before I provide any closing remarks, I would like to thank Phil Wisecup, the
President of the War College, and the many, many volunteers that have made—well,
in our business, they’re not so much volunteers—but the many people who have
come in to help make this conference a reality: the largest ever, as we have said on
several occasions, but I would say that the most important part that they enabled was
the atmosphere, the way that we have been able to come together in many different
settings, whether it was in the panel discussions, the regional breakouts, [or] the won-
derful discussion that the chiefs had in our private session, but also in the sidebars
and in the social events that took place. So, Phil, on behalf of all of us, to you and the
great team that you have assembled, I thank you for all that hard work and the suc-
cess of that. Thank you. As I said, I think for me, and to echo what [Dean Robert]
“Barney” [Rubel] said, the content, the tone, the substance, the engagement that
we’ve had at personal levels I think have been extraordinary for ISS XIX. That, in
turn, has been a function of, I believe, the wonderful regional activity, and the sym-
posia, and most importantly, the interaction among the leaders in the regions in the
various settings, various venues that have kept this momentum going, have kept the
discussion going, have kept the dialogue going. But the tone here, the content, has
been absolutely extraordinary. I think the regional breakouts are much clearer in the
definition and the ambition and, indeed, in some of the challenges that we all face as
we try to bring increased cooperation in the Maritime Domain Awareness together.
I was sitting here listening to the conversations and it struck me that communi-
cations have enabled Maritime Domain Awareness and Maritime Domain
Awareness has enabled communications among all of us and I think it has been an
organizing principle.
I’d once again like to thank some of the new countries that have joined us. I hope
that you have found this to be a valuable and worthwhile experience. I would en-
courage you, as you go back home, to engage other countries who perhaps have not
participated to share with them and encourage their attendance and share the ben-
efits of being able to come to this.
I think as we leave from here and go back, as I’ve said, to keep the momentum
going at the regional levels, it is so important that we continue that, because I really
do believe that it’s the regional activity, the energy that gets put into this, the per-
sonal relationships that take place, the systems that are developed, the
involvement—as has been said on a couple of occasions—where we, as leaders of
our navies, coast guards, or maritime services, have an obligation, I believe, to give
the best advice that we can to our political leadership as to how we can help the
safety, security, and prosperity in the individual regions. So as we go back and take
the lessons, the experiences, the observations from here, I do believe that we can
continue to advance this effort. In an age of great connectivity that we enjoy, some-
times it’s good, sometimes it’s bad, but the connectivity that we enjoy, I believe,
enables all of us as leaders to maintain the dialogue among ourselves as we go for-
ward, to exchange notes, to take advantage of some of the mediums that are out
there, so that our conversation can continue even though the formality of these ses-
sions may not be present. I think that we now have the means to stay connected in
ways that we never have been able to do before and to keep our conversations alive
and keep our conversations going.
To circle back on the importance of regional activity, I think that that’s where we
go, but as Admiral Molestina [of Ecuador] has said, “It’s about how do we harmo-
nize all this,” and I think that term “harmonize” is one that allows us to begin to
bring things together in a very powerful way.
And I would also add my endorsement to the great work that Admiral La Rosa
[of Italy] is doing with the trans-regional maritime networks. I look forward as we
move on to bring all of that to fruition. I speak for my country when I say I look for-
ward to concluding the agreements that we have in that regard. But I think those
are some terrific opportunities that we have ahead of us.
I also believe that as we move forward in this new era, if you will, or in an era
where we can take advantage of certain technologies and where countries at a na-
tional level will pursue the needs that they may have, I believe it’s also very, very
important for all of us to keep in mind how important it is for us to stay in step with,
and in league with, our partners who, as a result of their needs, their national
needs, may not be moving in the same direction. But I think we all have the obliga-
tion to stay connected to one another and even though there may be other national
priorities that we may pursue and systems that we may procure, it is important that
we, as leaders of our navies, always make sure that we are able to stay connected, to
stay aligned, because as that old nautical saying goes, “The strength of the cable de-
pends on each link in that chain.” I believe it’s our obligation to keep that cable
strong by making sure we’re always mindful of the needs of other countries and
[that] we do not get out of step in that regard.
We talked about, in the chiefs’ session, the opportunity to use the operational
gaming structure and facility to try some things and to bring some of our rising
leaders, leaders that will someday sit in our chairs, here into the games to try some
of the things that we talked about at regional levels, trans-regional levels. We can
do this in an environment where mistakes can be made, things can be tried, and use
that opportunity, from that gaming experience, to form discussions for ISS XX.
We’ll continue to work on that and remain in contact with all who are here to ensure
that we all have the same, as we say, sight picture on that.
It has been my great privilege to be able to be part of this endeavor as we’ve gone
forward on two oceans, as we have operated in many places in times of peace and,
unfortunately, also in times of war. But it has also been a great privilege and plea-
sure to see how we have changed over just these last few years, how much more we
are connected, how much more we share, and how much more we cooperate.
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It is amazing and I believe it’s a testament to the great work and the leadership of
you and all who support you and your endeavors. And so as we go into the future, it
will be upon us to work through the challenges, but most importantly, to be able to
see where the opportunities are, to be able to look at how best to take advantage of
those opportunities and to use our leadership to move things forward, step-by-step,
and, in that process, move down the path of the journey that we all began just a few,
short years ago that, quite frankly, has put us in a very, very good position, I believe,
for the future.
As I told Phil and his support staff, we here will take a day off and then on Mon-
day, we will begin planning for ISS XX, to look at where we should go with that. So
as I said, we now have the benefit of being able to communicate throughout the
year in many, many ways. So, as you go back, as you’re on those long flights home,
think about things that would be helpful, would be important. Please share them
and please send them back because our objective is to take and build upon ISS XIX
and make ISS XX the best ever. I thank you for that.
I thank you for being here on behalf of Ellen. I would also like to thank you for
having, in many cases, your spouses with you. For those whose spouses did not
come, I understand the great demands on your time, but, from every indication I
have, I think that our spouses had a great time. I can speak probably for more than
just myself and say that I leave Newport a much poorer man than when I came. So I
think that is a mark of success as well.
Again, thank you so much for a wonderful, wonderful experience here; but most
importantly, thank you for your leadership, for your friendship, and for your com-
mitment to something that is bigger than each and every one of us and that is the
safety, the security, and the prosperity of the world’s oceans and the citizens of the
world everywhere, because it doesn’t matter if you are from one of our countries or
if you are from a landlocked country where the citizens will never see the ocean. Ev-
eryone, wherever they live on this planet, depends on the ocean for their
livelihood, for their safety, and their security. That is our privilege and that is what
we get to do, that is our calling, and it is a true pleasure and an honor for me to
stand with each and every one of you on this noble venture. So I thank you for that.
I wish you safe journeys home and fair winds and following seas, my friends.
Thank you very much.
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